Actors and Processes of Ethno-National Mobilization in Kosovo

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This report was compiled in the frame of the FP6 project “Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts”.
The authors were affiliated to the University of Pristina/Prishtina (Kosovo), one of the partners in this project.

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MIRICO: Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts
I. ACTORS AND PROCESSES OF ETHNO-MOBILISATION

1. Definition of “ethno-mobilisation:

2. Actors

   a. Actors of ethno-mobilisation

      i) Domestic/internal actors

      ii) The role external/foreign actors in the process of ethno-mobilisation

   b. The stratum’s of society that actors belonged

      i) Politicians

      ii) Military, paramilitary and state intelligence agencies

      iii) Civilians

      iv) Intellectuals

      v) National majorities (“peoples of the republic”), their interrelations and clashes, and victimisation of minorities for the ‘national cause’

     vi) The position of other minorities in Kosova

     vii) The proportion of the Kosova’s ethnic groups in relation to the whole population

   viii) the role of age-groups in the process of ethno-mobilisation

3. Ethnic groups that are considered as a “minorities” in Kosova

   a. A definition and understanding of the concept of “minority” and applicability of this concept in Kosova

   b. The changes that the dissolution of former Yugoslavia brought for the status of each ethnic and minority group

   c) Roma community as most vulnerable minority


   a. Objective requirements for the process of ethno-mobilisation

      i) The role of global changes of economics and political systems (in the first place cold war disappearance) for creation of bases for ethno mobilization

      ii) The role of economic crisis in federation: poverty and inequality in distribution of goods and power as basis for ethno-mobilization

   b. Instruments that were used for ethno-mobilisation

      i) Media (TV/radio/ printed media) used for this purpose

      ii) The influence of the social environments

      iii) The role of schools and language to promote ethno-mobilisation

      iv) The role of the judiciary system in the process of ethno-mobilisation
v) The influence of intellectuals to promote ethnic based stereotypes ............................................................... 62
vi) The role of religious communities in the ethno-mobilisation process ......................................................................... 63
c. The role of the traumatic experiences in the past as factor to foster ethno-mobilisation and conflicts ........................................ 68

II. ETHNO-MOBILIZATION AND VIOLENCE: ........................................... 73

1. Violence used in Kosova 1981-1997 ................................................. 73
2. Albanians as main target group of state violence .............................. 81
3. Ethnic distance and the lack of understanding of the others’ sufferings from state violence .................................................. 81

III. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION .................................................... 84

1. The role of individual state interests (states outside former Yugoslavia) and the role of regional concerns (Europe) in the process of the ethno-mobilisation ................................................................. 84
   a. The interests of Albania in Kosova and instruments that it used to intervene and influence the process of ethno-mobilisation in period after 1991 ................................................................. 84
2. The role of the EU .............................................................................. 85
   a. EU dialogue partners prior and during the escalation of crisis ...... 86
   b. EU institutions that were involved in crisis management .......... 86
   c. Instruments applied by EU ............................................................. 87
   d. Approaches that EU did have for financing the different countries . 87
   e. Expectations of different actors from EU involvement .......... 88
   f. The effects of EU policies .............................................................. 88
3. The role of other international organisations and institutions .......... 92
   a. Council of Europe ........................................................................ 92
   b. NATO ..................................................................................... 92
   c. OSCE ..................................................................................... 93
4. Reasons why there was no conflict escalation in certain Ex-Yugoslav Republics ................................................................. 94

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 95

LITERATURE ..................................................................................... 98
LIST OF ACRONYMS

AI - Amnesty International
BCA - Badinter Commission for Arbitration
CDHRF - Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms
CLK - Communist League of Kosova
CLS - Communist League of Serbia
CLY - Communists League of Yugoslavia
CoE - Council of Europe
CPN - Conflict Prevention Network
DLK - Democratic League of Kosova
ECCY - European Community Conference on Yugoslavia
EP - European Parliament
EPC - European Political Cooperation
EU - European Union/ European Community
FADURK - Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosova
FARK - Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova
FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYRM - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HRW - Human Rights Watch
ICFY - International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
ICG - International Crisis Group
IMF - International Monetary Fund
KLA - Kosova Liberation Army
MLOK - Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosova
NAM - Non-aligned Movement
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMLK - National Movement for Liberation of Kosova
NMLKALY - National Movement for Liberation of Kosova and other Albanian Lands in Yugoslavia
OSCE/CSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCIJ - Permanent Court of International Justice
PMK - People’s Movement for Kosova
PMRK - People’s Movement for the Republic of Kosova
RMAU - Revolutionary Movement for Albanian Unification
SAP - Socialist Autonomous Province
SASA - Serbian Academy of Science and Arts
SAWPK - Socialist Alliance of Working People of Kosova
SAWPS - Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia
SFRY - Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
SOC - Serbian Orthodox Church
SR - Socialist Republic
SWU - Serbian Writers Union
UBD - State Security Administration
UN - United Nations
UP - University of Prishtina
US - United States of America
YNA - Yugoslav National Army
Keywords: Ethno-mobilization, Kosova, Yugoslavia, Serbia, Albania, Kosova Albanians, Kosova Serbs

Abstract

Speaking of the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia would almost naturally imply stressing the importance of political developments taking place in Kosova during the Yugoslav era, especially post-Tito's Yugoslavia. Indeed, for most scholars, ethno-mobilization taking place in Kosova from 1981 onward is crucial to understand properly the beginning of the ‘Yugoslav crisis,’ which lasted until the Federation's dissolution was internationally and officially recognized in December 1991. Although we can not submit that the principle source of this rise was Kosova, it is a widely recognized and shared argument among various scholars that ethno-mobilization processes within this country — formerly an autonomous province within Serbia, now under an interim United Nations administration until a settlement is found — played a strategic role in the bloody break-up process of Yugoslavia.

This report will attempt to analyze the political, juridical, economic, and cultural conditions and causes of this ethno-mobilization within Kosova dating from Yugoslavia's (re)creation in 1945 until its last breath as a political creature at the beginning of ‘90s. For the sake of more accurately the genuine causes of the Kosova problem, we will also, from time to time, analyze and describe events that took part in Kosova prior to the establishment of communist Yugoslavia. In addition, we will try to explain the rise of national sentiments and the disintegration process within both Yugoslavia and Kosova itself as a consequence of the structural problems of SFRY’s constitutional regulation in the course of its existence. We will also deal with economical resentments as one of the causes of the process of ethno-mobilization not only in Kosova, but also in Serbia and in SFRY. Finally, our main line of argumentation is that ethno-mobilization among Kosova Albanians emerged mainly as a reaction to perceived injustices and political, economic, judicial, and cultural discrimination they faced with Kosovo as part of Serbia. We argue that conflict in Kosova historically took part between the subjugated Albanian population and the Serbian regime that occupied Kosova since 1912-13, and not between the Albanian and Serbs as a whole.

Our work will circumstantially examine the relations of the Albanian population within Yugoslavia with other nations as well as the relations of the Albanian majority in Kosova with other national groups, primarily with Serbs. With regard to Kosova’s relationships with other Yugoslav Republics, we will focus our survey mainly on interrelation of Kosova and Serbia, since the former has been a province within the latter since 1946, through 1999 officially and nominally from then on.
I. ACTORS AND PROCESSES OF ETHNO-MOBILISATION

1. Definition of “ethno-mobilisation:

The dissolution of Yugoslavia\(^1\) was preceded by the robust process of ethno-mobilization. In this process, Kosova has its own peculiarities in addition to similarities with other cases in ex-Yugoslavia. One of the most vivid peculiarities of Kosovo is that Albanians as a majority never accepted its political status in Yugoslavia, instead endeavoring all the time to improve it. This enduring political struggle undoubtedly homogenized the Albanian population on an ethnic basis. On the other side, the permanent struggle of the Serbian elites to keep control over Kosova fed mobilization of Serbs within Kosova and in Serbia proper along ethnic lines as well. Kosova’s similarities with the rest of ex-Yugoslavia can seen in the fact the Serbian political elites, by prompting mobilization along ethnic lines all over the country, caused bloody war, thousands of civilian casualties, ethnic cleansing and attempted genocide that ended in Yugoslavia’s dissolution. In this regard, ethno-mobilization is at best conceived as a “process by which an ethnic community becomes politicized on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations. This process requires awareness, usually promoted by ethnic entrepreneurs, that political action is necessary to promote or defend the community’s vital collective interests. This awareness results in the recruitment of individuals into the movement or into specific organizations that purport to speak for the movement. Likewise, financial and other material resources required for political action are drawn to the movement”\(^2\). We consider that the process of ethno-mobilization in Kosova has all these elements. Therefore they will be discussed further in our report below.

2. Actors

a. Actors of ethno-mobilisation

We have identified several actors and different sources of ethno-mobilization in the case of Kosova. Depending on time and political context, particularly among Albanians, there emerged different actors. From the early ’60s up to the ’70s, the most important role was played by young

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1 The term Yugoslavia, whenever used, refers to the Yugoslav Federation, also known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), created in 1945 and lasting until its downfall in 1992. After four of the constituent Republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia) plus Kosova declared independence at the beginning of ‘90s, what remains Serbia (with Vojvodina and reoccupied Kosova included) and Montenegro became the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). On February 4, 2003, FRY’s name changed to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (USM). This Union ceased to exist after Montenegro declared its independence on July 3, 2006, followed by Serbia’s independence proclaimed two days later. For the period prior to 1945, we use different terms, including the official “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,” and “Kingdom of Yugoslavia,” as well as the unofficial “Old Yugoslavia” or “First Yugoslavia”.

intellectuals and activists, influenced mainly by Albania; students had become the predominant actor by the beginning of the ’80s. When local Albanian communist leaders were removed by Milošević, an event which was followed by Serbia’s abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy, the main sources of ethno-mobilization added miners to the students, who were organized around illegal resistance organizations, Marxist in form but national in content, such as the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo. Also during the end of the ‘80s, an important role in the process of ethno-mobilization was played by state institutions including the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Kosovo (hereinafter SAWPK) and the official trade union organization. At the end of ‘80s and the beginning of ‘90s, when all autonomous institutions of Kosovo were suppressed and abolished, when more than 200,000 Albanians were expelled from their jobs and when all secondary schools and the University of Prishtina were shut down, main actors in the process of ethno-mobilization were illegal organizations, intellectuals gathered mainly around the Writers Association of Kosovo, emerging civil societies, emerging political parties such as the Democratic League of Kosovo (hereinafter DLK) or the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK), ex-political prisoners etc. Students and young intellectuals reemerged on the scene again during the student protests of 1997 and during the outbreak of war in 1998-99, when they played a crucial role in the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (hereinafter KLA).

On the Serbian side, the traditional actors of ethno-mobilization since Kosovo’s occupation in 1912-13 were political elites, intellectuals, media and the Serbian Orthodox Church (hereinafter SOC). From the beginning, the political elite established in the Communist League of Yugoslavia (CLY) tried to halt the improvement of the political and legal position of Kosovo and Albanians within the Yugoslav Federation. This political elite was backed by many intellectuals, such as Dobrica Ćosić (who was also part of this elite until ‘60s), arguing that granting more autonomy to Kosovo meant diminishing Serbian interests in Yugoslav Federation. Serbian media played an important role in ethno-mobilization, in particular during the ‘80s and ‘90s. In relation to Kosovo, the SOC played an important role, keeping alive the myth of Kosovo as the epicenter of Serbian nationhood during the long Albanian-Serbian conflict, always giving a spiritual, religious and ethnic

4 See Interview with Rexhep Selimi, one of the leaders of the KLA, conducted by Glauk Konjufca on the 30 May, 2007. Interview is in the HRCUP’s files.
5 About the role of Serbian political and intellectual elite in the aftermath of the Kosovo occupation see Dubravka Stojanović, “Kosovo—the ultimate myth” Helsinška Povelja, (January-February 2007), 103-4. An English version article can be found in http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2266.
6 See Vesna Pešić, Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis, Peaceworks No. 8 (United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 14-17.
7 Whenever we discuss, in historical terms, the Albanian-Serbian conflict up to 1999, we see it as conflict between occupied Albanian people and Serbian chauvinist regimes as their conqueror and not as ethnic conflict between Albanian and Serbian ethnic groups.
frame to the Kosova problem and thus shifting attention of this problem from its real political and economic content.\(^8\)

\textit{i) Domestic internal actors}

\textbf{(Federal-orientated and regional/republic-orientated actors)}

In the first Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter SFRY), adopted in 1946, Kosova was legally recognized as an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia. At this time, Kosova enjoyed even lower legal status than Serbia’s other autonomous province, Vojvodina. In the second Council of the National Assembly (also known as the Council of Nationalities), which was the highest political institution of that time, but which nonetheless ‘had no real decision-making capacity’\(^9\), Kosova was represented only 15 members in contrast to Vojvodina, which was represented by 20. Republics had 30 representing members\(^10\). But unlike republics, which were represented on the Federal Council, the two autonomous provinces of Serbia were not federally represented. This Constitution provided for the republic’s right to secession from the Federation, but it denied this right to autonomous provinces. In the Constitution of 1946, the issue of the provincial borders of Kosova was treated as an internal problem of Serbia\(^11\). During these years, Serbia could change these borders without asking the authorities of the two provinces. This discriminatory policy toward Kosova Albanians continued with the Constitution of 1963. During these years, Kosova was the most discriminated against region within Yugoslavia. In 1968, Albanians were still officially called ‘shiptari’, a pejoratively-based term used chiefly by Serbs. This term was employed also by the Orthodox Church of Serbia\(^12\). After 1968, this term was officially banned, together with the word ‘Metohija’, which in Greek means ‘Church land’. Until this time, Kosova had been called ‘Kosovo and Metohija’. Even though these changes brought some positive developments, Kosova still remained discriminated against in different areas. According to Sabrina P. Ramet, Kosova in 1972 was the most deprived of the federal units with almost 7 percent of the population but only 4.9 percent of vocational-technical schools, 2.7 percent of the cinemas, one Albanian-language daily, and two radio stations (1.1% of the 174 in Yugoslavia)\(^13\).


\(^11\) See Ramet, \textit{op.cit.} note 9, 76.

\(^12\) Howard Clark, \textit{Civil Resistance in Kosovo} (Pluto Press, London, 2000), 12.

\(^13\) See Ramet, \textit{op.cit.} note 9, 140.
Domestic actors of Albanian ethno-mobilization in Kosova came on the scene furiously especially after 1966. Two years after the fall of Ranković as head of the secret police (known in the Serbian language as UDB-a) at the Fourth Plenum of the Communists League of Yugoslavia (CLY) in 1966, demonstrations started in Kosova on 28th November (national day of Albania) 1968 in Prishtina. One student was killed by police forces. Kosova Albanians were demanding unconditional equality with other existing republics. During this time, Kosova experienced an appreciable increase of national sentiments. In the same year, Kosova Albanians celebrated with dignity the 500th anniversary of the death of the Albanian national hero Gjergj Kastrioti-Skënderbeu. One year later, the first departments were opened (which in the beginning operated as branches of the University of Belgrade) following the establishment of the University of Prishtina in 1970.

Generally speaking, during most of their history under either communist Yugoslavia or previous Yugoslav and Serbian states, Albanians never viewed these political and state creatures as their own. They most often perceived them as occupying states, and their own position as ‘outsiders’ in the Slav-dominated Federation, thereby always considering Albania as their genuine homeland. On the other side, Serbian and Yugoslav regimes always failed to consider Albanians as equal citizens as well. Thus, until 1968, all Albanian illegal organizations and to a certain degree the Albanian communist political elite and emerging intellectual elite were in favor of unification with Albania. Ever since the demonstrations that took place in 1968, where Albanians for the first time proclaimed a ‘Kosova Republic’, this objective was shifted toward upgrading the autonomous status of Kosova under the Socialist Republic of Serbia into equal republic status within the Yugoslav Federation. However, this objective was always perceived as first step toward Albanian unification in the future, particularly among the intellectual elite, students and illegal resistance organizations. These actors were more oriented toward Tirana than to an independent Kosovo.

The first illegal organization was founded in 1946 in the immediate aftermath of World War II, after it was realized that Kosova would not join Albania as was hoped for at that time among Albanian communists and patriots. This organization was called the Albanian National Democratic Movement and was led by Albanian intellectuals such as Gjon Sereqi, Ymer

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15 Ibid. 351.
16 Ibid. 261-265.
17 Fahrudin Radončić, Deset tisuća dana robije: Adem Demaci Ispovijest (One Thousand Days Imprisoned: The Story of Adem Demaci) (Danus, Zagreb, 1990), 66; see also interview with Hydajet Hyseni, one of the leaders of illegal movement on ‘70s and ‘80s, conducted by Glauk Konjufca on 15th of May 2007. This interview is in the HRCUP’s files.
18 See Stojanović, op.cit. note 5; and Pula, op.cit. note 3, 39.
20 See interview with Hyseni, op.cit. note 17.
Berisha, Marie Shllaku, Halim Spahia, etc, who were executed in 1948. It is interesting to note that this was the first and maybe last political organization of Albanians until 1989 that had no Marxist orientation either in form or in content, even though many of its activists have been active in the National Liberation War against German and Italian occupation. Afterwards, the most active formation, called the Revolutionary Movement for Albanian Unification (RMAU), was a group of young people gathered around the well-known young Albanian writer, political activist and, later on, political prisoner, Adem Demaçi who was arrested and sentenced first in 1958. He stayed in prison for three years, until 1961. Then he was imprisoned again from 1964 to 1974. Just one year after he was released, Adem Demaçi was arrested again. This time he spent 15 years in jail, until 1990. Overall, he spent 28 years of his life in prison. During the last war against Serbian military and police forces, Demaçi headed the Political Office of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) in Prishtina. From the end of ‘70s up to the end of the ‘80s, the most important clandestine organizations were the Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosova (hereinafter MLOK), the National Movement for Liberation of Kosova and other Albanian Lands in Yugoslavia (hereinafter NMLKALY), and the People’s Movement for Republic of Kosova (PMRK). In 1993, PMRK split up. After 1991, the dissolution of Yugoslavia had became clear fact and thus the fundamental goal of the Kosova Albanians and their political elite shifted from demanding republic status toward seeking to be an independent state, and the remainder of PMRK changed its name into the People’s Movement for Kosova (PMK). As a result of disappointment with the PMK strategy and disagreement with pacifist resistance followed by the DLK, the National Movement for Liberation of Kosova (NMLK) was established in 1993 and worked illegally for the organization of armed uprising against Serbian regime. However, during the period of 1991-97, the most important domestic factors of ethno-mobilization among Kosova Albanians were political parties created after the so-called ‘liberal era of pluralism’ in Yugoslavia, which came after ‘90s.

21 See Çeku, note 25, 29-40.
22 See Rexhep Abdullahu, Dijathtizmi dhe Demokracia në Proces (The Rightism and Democracy in Process) (Prishtinë, 2002), 40-51; see also Lalaj, op.cit. note 14, 338.
23 About Demaçi’s activities, his life and activities of his organization see Radončić, op.cit. note 17.
24 Controversies arose during the Rambouillet Conference in 1999 and afterwards whether Demaçi was the political representative of KLA (as Demaçi claimed and as it was perceived as such by broad public opinion) or he was just appointed to co-ordinate efforts of KLA to cooperate with other political forces in Kosova (as it was asserted by KLA) in order to establish a joint assembly.
26 See Bahri Fazliu, Kundër mistifimit për të vërtetën (Against Mystification for the Truth) (Çlirimi, Prishtinë, 2000), 5-8 and 64-7.
Parliamentary Party of Kosova (PPK), the Social Democratic Party of Kosova (SDPK), and the Liberal Party of Kosova (LPK).\textsuperscript{27}

As far as the Albanian communist political elite is concerned, the majority of them were at the same time federal-oriented and province-oriented (Kosova was an autonomous province within Serbia and Yugoslavia), but never republic-oriented (meaning the Socialist Republic of Serbia). Consequently, the Albanian communist political elite, even though vaguely believing that the best option was unification with Albania as was promised by the Yugoslav Communist Party during the Second World War\textsuperscript{28}, took into consideration their own weak position, political momentum in Yugoslavia and generally in the world, and thus looked more toward the Federation as a savior in their relation with Belgrade republican authorities than toward Albania. These elites tried to take advantage of the conflict between the Serbian clan on one side and the Croatian clan on the other in order to improve the position of Kosova within the Federation, mostly through efforts to avoid links with republican authorities. Also, they tried to use the opportunity to benefit from the conflicts that Tito had with both clans. The Constitution of 1974 was also a product of these efforts and this political context.\textsuperscript{29}

As regards Serbian actors of ethno-mobilization, we can divide them into two phases. During the first phase, up until the beginning of the 1980s, they were more federal oriented. The second phase, which began in the early '80s, was marked with the shift of Serbian actors toward the idea of unifying Serbia (meaning reducing Kosova's and Vojvodiana's autonomy) and thereby they became more republic-oriented.

Since the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Serbian political and intellectual elite, but also to a certain extent the SOC, considered that the Serbian national question was solved through the creation of this state of South Slavic nations.\textsuperscript{30} As Vesna Pešić rightly put it: “Toward the end of World War I, the Serbs realized their unification plan with the establishment of Yugoslavia under the slogan ‘national and state unity’. From that time on, they considered Yugoslavia the permanent solution to their national question”.\textsuperscript{31} After World War II, Serbian political elites and intellectual elites continued to consider Yugoslavia as the best solution for the Serbian question, upholding a centralized federation as much as possible. This kind of federation functioned up till the end of '60s. At this time, the second phase of Yugoslavian Federation started, the phase in which republics and autonomous provinces started to take more responsibilities and powers in weakening the prerogatives of the central federal government in Belgrade. These movements were constantly either defied outright or reluctantly accepted by Serbia, being backed by

\textsuperscript{27} See Kosova Information Center, Albanian Democratic Movement in Former Yugoslavia: Documents 1990-1993 (Prishtinë, 1993).

\textsuperscript{28} See Horvat, op.cit. note 14, 56-58 and 171-76; see also Pula, op.cit. note 3, 12-6.

\textsuperscript{29} About these efforts and conflicts see the whole interview of Mahmut Bakalli given to Shkelzen Gashi in daily \textit{Koha Ditore}, 16-24 April 2007, 5.

\textsuperscript{30} See Viktor Meier, \textit{Fundi i Jugosllavisë: Goditja në Kosovë} (The end of Yugoslavia: The Strike in Kosova) (Liria, Lubjanë, 2006), 75-80. (The original title is \textit{Wie Jugoslawien Verspielt Wurde} and is translated from German language by Elton Lelo).

\textsuperscript{31} See Pešić, op.cit. note 6, 7.
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Vojvodina. The idea of a decentralized federation frightened Serbian political and intellectual elites, particularly in relation to Kosova, which they considered as gradually slipping away from Serbian control. Therefore, Serbia was pushing forward ideas of a more centralized Yugoslavia, resisting ideas coming particularly from Croatia and Slovenia, and backed mainly by Kosova, which were supportive of a greater economic and politically decentralized state.\(^\text{32}\)

This attitude started to change gradually during the ‘80s when the Federation was seen as an obstacle to the realization of Serbian national interests. Particularly, Slovenia and Croatia were perceived as a barrier to reducing Kosova’s autonomy, a process that started after the Albanian student demonstration of 1981.\(^\text{33}\) The changes in the Communist League of Serbia in 1987, when the conservative and nationalist wing of Serbian ‘communists’, led by Slobodan Milosevic, eventually won power, exacerbated the already very tense situation in the Federation and in Kosova particularly.\(^\text{34}\)

About this time, the role of the media and Serbian intellectual elite in ethno-mobilization increased significantly. In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (hereinafter SASA) drafted a Memorandum, which started to serve as the basis for activities of Serbian political elites. The position of Kosova and Albanians was treated extensively in this document, advancing ideas for the reduction Kosova’s autonomy and blaming Albanians and their political elite for the Serbs’ suffering and their expulsion from Kosova.\(^\text{35}\) In this document, the authors have gone so far as to label what happened with Serbs in Kosova after 1981 as genocide,\(^\text{36}\) “dehumanizing the Albanians of Kosova”\(^\text{37}\). Also, the media played a very active role in stigmatizing Albanians and created a very false idea about what was happening in Kosova in reality.\(^\text{38}\)

These attitudes not only induced ethnic animosities between Albanians and Serbs in Kosova but also mobilized Serbs all over ex-Yugoslavia in the battle that was lead by the political elite to abolish Kosova’s autonomy. This abolishment took place in March of 1989. Albanians never accepted it as suppression of their autonomy but rather as complete abolishment of Kosova’s autonomy.

\(^{32}\) Ibid. 12-13; also see Thomas D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997), 114; and Lalaj, op. cit. note 14, 150-51. The extensive explanation of these processes in relation to Kosova can be found in the aforementioned interview of Mahmut Bakalli.

\(^{33}\) About the Serbian perspective of the support given to Albanians by other republics, see Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Memorandum, note 35, 20.

\(^{34}\) Ibid. 14-23.


\(^{36}\) Ibid. 15.

\(^{37}\) See Zimmermann, op.cit. note 8, 17.

\(^{38}\) About the role of media in this situation Izvještaj Nezavisne Komisije (Report of Independent Commission), Kosovski Čvor: Dresiti ili Sedi? (Kosova Knot: Untie or Cut) (Chronos, Beograd, 1990), 77-102. Editors of this report are Srđa Popović, Dejan Janča and Tanja Petovar while texts were written by Srđa Popović, Ivan Janković, Vesna Pešić, Nataša Kandić and Svetlana Slapšak.
When analyzing factors and actors of ethno-mobilization, it is interesting to note an opinion of Adem Demaći, who served about 28 years in Yugoslav prisons for his political activities and ideas that were seen as hostile to Yugoslav regime during Tito’s Yugoslavia. In an interview for Večernji List in 1990, from his cell, he argued that the Serbian political elite, through its nationalistic and hostile approach toward Albanians, was ironically having a positive effect in homogenizing them. In his words, these politics were doing what he himself would not have been able to do in his entire life. Therefore, we can also conclude that Serbian political elite, apart from mobilizing Serbian people around the idea of Greater Serbia, played a crucial role in the ethno-mobilization of Albanians around the idea of self-determination and secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia.

**ii) The role of external/foreign actors in the process of ethno-mobilisation**

One indisputable actor in the process of Albanian ethno-mobilization in Kosova since 1913 was the state of Albania itself. This does not mean that its involvement was always direct, but its very existence was a sufficient factor in influencing the increase of national conscience among Albanians in Serbian and Yugoslav states, who were traditionally and historically suppressed. It is important to note that from the Kosova-Albanian side, particularly among common people, this influence and involvement was not seen as foreign interference, but always as the patriotic duty of the Albanian state toward Albanians that were left outside Albania proper. The Serbian and Yugoslav political elite, however, perceived this influence as involvement in the internal affairs of the Serbian and Yugoslav state. From time to time, but particularly before the fall of Ranković (prior to 1966) and after 1981, the Albanian political elite in Kosova was in accordance with the official stance of the communist regime in Yugoslavia.

In the words of Adem Demaći, who was active in illegal activities during the ‘50s and ‘60s his organization did not have any contact with representatives of Albania either legally or illegally (through Albanian secret service Sigurimi). However, stronger external influences on the process of ethno-mobilization of Albanians began in the ‘70s, during the epoch of flourishing educational and cultural relations between Tirana and Prishtina. Just after Kosova gained more autonomy from Serbian control, contacts and exchanges of different levels started between Kosova and Albania. After an official cooperation agreement was signed between the University of Tirana and the University of Prishtina in 1970, dozens of teachers and professors came from Albania to teach in Kosova. The influence of Tirana over Albanians in

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39 Interview with Adem Demaći conducted by G.Litvan, Večernji List, 24. 2. 1990.
42 See Radončić, *op.cit.* note 17, 26.
Kosova started to increase significantly. Literature from Albania started to circulate more extensively among Kosova Albanians. This resulted in the increase of national sentiments amongst Albanians in Kosova. During this time, the Albanian state started to have more contact with illegal Albanian organizations in Kosova. This is confirmed by the many actors of that time. Hydajet Hyseni, who was one of the leaders of illegal movements of that time, explains the way contacts were conducted and the real influence of the Albanian state in these movements. He confirms that, together with Kadri Zeka, who represented the MLOK, he had contact with the Albanian ambassador in Vienna in late ‘70s. In these meetings and others like it, Albanian officials were interested knowing more about the situation in Kosova but they never interfered in organizational matters of the illegal movement in Kosova. Their official stance was that they could not recommend anything but they could just some suggestions if Kosovars would accept them. As Hyseni pointed out, they suggested that the illegal resistance should not use terrorism as method of war, should not establish anarchist methods in their organizations, should not propagate hatred and chauvinism between people, and should be open to all types of ideologies (apart from fascism) instead of only communism, since Albanians in Kosova aspired to national and not class liberation. The only concrete help in that time was that the Albanian state furnished illegal organizations with propaganda material. It is interesting to note that, according to Hyseni, Albanian officials stated that Albanians in Kosova should also utilize the legal institutions of the province in order to improve their position within the Yugoslav Federation. On the other side, the last Albanian communist leader in Tirana, Ramiz Alia, confirmed contact but also denied that Tirana had given recommendations on how to operate these groups. This attitude is shared by Albanian historian Ana Lalaj, who argues that even though the influence of Albania in that time was huge due to improved relations with Prishtina, the Albanian state didn’t directly feed illegal organizations in Kosova with the idea of unification with Albania. Ramiz Alia argued that “it was not our duty to recommend what to do in Kosova since people there knew the political circumstances better than us”. Mahmut Bakalli, one of the most prominent Albanian communist leaders in Kosova during the period 1971-81, also confirms that the Albanian state had

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45 See Glenny, op.cit. note 40.
46 Interview with Hyseni, op.cit. note 17; see also Hydajet Hyseni et al., *Ngjarjet në Kosovë nuk janë kundërrevolucion: Letër e të burgosurve politikë dërguar Kryesisë së Jugosllavisë* (Events in Kosova are not Contrarevolution: The Letter of the Albanian political prisoners sent to the Presidency of SFRY), (Central Prison, Belgrade, 8 March 1985). This edition of the letter was published illegally in Kosova by the Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosova, 1986, 15.
49 See Shala et al., *op.cit.* note 47, 92,
started to have real impact on the process of homogenization in Kosova among Albanians but was not sure about the role that Sigurimi had during the 1981 demonstrations.\(^{50}\) Hydajet Hyseni, as one of the direct actors of the demonstrations of 1981, denies any involvement of Albania in the events of 1981 in Kosova.\(^{51}\) A different perception about these relationships prevailed among Serbian political and intellectual elite. Particularly after 1981, Albania was openly condemned for the organization of the 1981 demonstrations and thereby it was considered that it had been directly involved in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.\(^{52}\) After the 1981 demonstrations, all contacts between Tirana and Prishtina were banned together with all literature coming from Tirana as support for the University of Prishtina and for the Kosova educational system in the Albanian language in general.\(^{53}\)

During the ‘80s, but more particularly after the ‘90s, a strong Albanian Diaspora in the West became a crucial external actor, providing significant financial support for the Albanian political movement and resistance in Kosova.\(^{54}\) European countries such as Switzerland and Germany served as safe-havens for some Kosova Albanians political organizations, such as PMRK, which developed their activity abroad starting from 1982.\(^{55}\) Political organizations acting in the Diaspora organized many demonstrations in which Albanians expressed their dissatisfaction with the repression of the Serbian state upon the people of Kosova. Those Kosovo Albanians who were the leading political figures of these organizations were targets of the Serbian secret services. On 17 February 1982, Kadri Zeka (leader of MLOK) and Jusuf Gërvalla (head of NMLKALY) were killed in Untergruppenbach, a municipality in the northern part of Germany, just after they agreed to unite the two aforementioned organizations.\(^{56}\) In 1989, Enver Hadri, another Albanian activist, was killed. Mr. Hadri was active in lobbying in Brussels during the ‘80s. From 1989 until 1999, this diaspora played a strong role in both passive resistance against the Milošević regime and in active resistance during the 1998-1999 war. The huge inflow of money in the ‘90s, through the 3 percent that people gave from their salaries and up to 10 percent from their business profits to the fund of Kosova’s government in exile, maintained life in Kosova, the work of political parties and the parallel system of education that was established during those years.\(^{57}\) This Diaspora, through the Homeland Calling fund, also provided a lot of support for the Kosova Liberation Army after the war started.\(^{58}\) This Diaspora also played a very important role in lobbying for the Kosova question during this period in both political centers and public opinion in Europe and the United States.

\(^{50}\) See Interview with Bakalli, op.cit. note 29.
\(^{51}\) See interview with Hyseni, op.cit. note 17; see also Hyseni et al., op cit. note 46.
\(^{52}\) See Lalaj, op.cit. note 14, 392; and Viktor Meier, op.cit. note 30, 43.
\(^{53}\) See Glenny, op.cit. note 40.
\(^{54}\) See Judah, op.cit. note 44, 69.
\(^{55}\) Ibid. 104-105.
\(^{56}\) Ibid.; see also Çeku, op.cit. note 25, 11.
\(^{57}\) Ibid. 69; see also IICK, op.cit. note 44, 47-8.
\(^{58}\) Ibid. 104, 116, 118, 127, an 206.
On the other side, the Serbian political elite, supported by some circles of the Serbian intellectual elite in Belgrade, always played an important and crucial role in the process of ethno-mobilization of Serbs in Kosova.59 The position of Serbs in Kosova, even though a privileged one most of the time, always as a justification for their nationalistic policies. This privileged status was to some extent lost after 1974 and thus served as a basis for claims that Serbs are discriminated against.60 Accusations of expulsion of Serbs from Kosova, of genocide against them, of campaigns of intentional rape against Serb females, and of the “Albanization” of Kosova were main features of this political discourse.61 About the reality of this accusation against Albanians, Misha Glenny points out that “there were [sic] indeed an exodus of Serbs in the early eighties, but they were economic migrants, not refugees. The stories of rape, murder and intimidation were without foundation.”62 This opinion is shared by Victor Meier, who was a political analyst for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and who was very closely attached to the region during the 70’s and ‘80’s.63 It is worth noting that, according to the Report of the Independent Commission published in 1990 in Belgrade, official statistics of that time showed that the average number of rapes as reported crime in Kosova was quite below the average for Yugoslavia and for Serbia proper.64 Vesna Pešić, who was part of that Commission, indicates that “as of 1987, there was not a single interethnic rape (i.e., a Serbian woman raped by an Albanian), although such cases were constantly mentioned in the press”.65

However, this discourse, through stigmatization of the Albanian population, laid down conditions for Milošević’s rise in power in 1987 with the promise to reduce Kosova’s autonomy and increase support for the Serbs in Kosova. Considering as the first and main obstacle that Serbia is divided in three parts, the first goal was unifying Serbia through reducing Kosova’s and Vojvodina’s autonomy.66 In turn, this policy started to induce what is known as happening of people - misusing the general bad economic conditions that prevailed during those years in Yugoslavia and the bad interethnic relations in the country to create mobilization of Serbs from Kosova, and also from other parts of Federation, around Milošević’s politics of Great Serbia as the ultimate goal.67 During the happening of people, the first victim was the political elite of Vojvodina followed later on by that of Montenegro and Kosova.68 The main and strongest resistance to these attempts encountered in Kosova, where Albanians organized numerous strikes during 1988 and 1989, protests and demonstrations in defense of their political elite and

59 We will consider the influence of the state institutions of the Serbia over Kosova Serbs as external influence, even though Kosova legally was situated within Serbia.
60 See Judah, op.cit. note 44, 44.
61 See Dobrica Ćosić, Kosovo. (Novosti, Beograd, 2004), 5-68 (this book of Dobrica Ćosić is his political diary about Kosova since 1968); see also Memorandum, op.cit. note 35.
62 See Glenny, op.cit. note 40, 625.
63 See Meier, op.cit. note 30, 54-7.
64 Izvještaj Nezavisne Komisije, op.cit. note 38, 41.
65 Pešić, op.cit. note 6 and 54, 35.
66 See Memorandum, op.cit. note 35, 19.
68 Ibid. 46.
Serbs in Kosova had already started to be organized in different associations and organizations. The main Serb organizations from Kosova mobilizing Serbs to demonstrate throughout the Federation were the Organizing Committee for Participation of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins in Protest Rallies Outside of the Region, led by Miroslav Šolević and Kosta Bulatović and founded in 1988, and the Association for the Return of Serbs and Montenegrins Exiled from Kosovo - Božur (Peony) headed by Bogdan Kecman, whose organization operated within the frame of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia (hereinafter SAWPS). The fact that this latter organization was established by official political institutions of Serbia shows the direct role that this elite played in the ethno-mobilization process in Kosova among Serbs.

b. The stratum’s of society that actors belonged

1) Politicians

Until 1988, the Albanian political elite in Kosova had not played any direct, significant and vivid role in the process of the ethno-mobilization of Albanians. Even in 1988, only a few politicians such as Azem Vlasi and Kaqusha Jashari would play, to a certain degree, such a role in resisting Milošević’s attempts to remove them and to abrogate Kosova’s autonomy. Still, a majority of them didn’t have the courage to defy Milošević’s policies publicly. According to sociologist Besnik Pula, secondary institutions such as SAWPK and official trade unions played an important role in the process of ethno-mobilization of Albanians starting from 1988. SAWPK bore the responsibility for holding open discussions on constitutional changes proposed by the SR of Serbia. In these discussions and debates, for the first time after 1981, the official political line represented by republican and federal institutions in regard to Kosova was openly opposed, and as a result, these proposed changes were refused by the greater part of the participants and populations in general. Nevertheless, generally speaking, it is clear that this elite had had indirect influence through pressing for the opening of an Albanian university in Prishtina in 1970, through improving relationships with Tirana and through vague attempts to improve the political and legal position of Kosova within the Federation. However, their attempts were always dependent on the balance of force prevailing in the Federation. Furthermore, after the demonstration of 1981, they were scared to an extent, as a majority of this elite then played an important role in suppressing demonstrations, condemning their demands, conducting process of differentiation in the CLK, and arresting and convicting thousands of students, intellectuals, etc.

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69 Ibid.
70 Ibid. 45-6.
71 See Pula, op.cit. note 3.
72 Differentiation process basically meant purging the communist party of its officials who didn’t agree with the official stance of the communist party and of those who sympathized with the demands of demonstrators. This process was very brutal and harming for the authority of Yugoslav and Kosova Communist League among Albanians. By 1982, nearly 700
Another important factor for why they were not so active in their efforts to mobilize Albanians around the popular demand for a *Kosova Republic* was that the Communist Albanian leadership of Kosova was predominantly characterized by the conviction that Kosova after 1974 was an ‘almost-republic’ or ‘*de facto* republic except by name’. But, as human rights scholar and activist Julie Mertus pointed out: “for Kosova Albanians, almost was not good enough”.\(^74\) According to the Constitution of 1974, Kosova was at the same time a constitutive part of the Federation and a part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.\(^75\) This legal and political status, however, left Kosova dependent on the will of Serbia. Yet some of the political leaders of that time still think that Kosova was a *de facto* republic. According to Mahmut Bakalli,\(^76\) one of the most prominent Albanian communist leaders in Kosova in the period 1971-81: “We have been a state with the full meaning of that concept and this was not contested by no one even it was not contested by Serbia. Our word and vote was as equal as that of Croatia and that of Slovenia. In Kosova have been applied Kosova’s and federal laws but not laws of Serbia”\(^77\). Another communist leader, Kaqusha Jashari,\(^78\) argued in the same line:

> According to the Constitution of 1974, Kosova had all the rights in the level of the Yugoslav Federation, so it had the right to veto and it functioned as an independent state unit. Thus Kosova had a high degree of autonomy, but was short of being named as a republic. It had its assembly, its government, its president, and thereby it had legislative, executive and judicial power. We had the Constitutional Court as well. What is more important - no one is mentioning that - we had the People’s Bank of Kosova, and a People’s Bank is given only to a state.\(^79\)

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\(^74\) See Mertus, note 138, 19.

\(^75\) See Article 1 of the Constitution of Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosova of 1974, note 228.

\(^76\) Mahmut Bakalli was, during the period of 1971-1981, the most influential Albanian politician in Kosova and Yugoslavia. He was considered as one of the most promising cadres of the YCL. He was also known for a close relationship with the Yugoslav leader Tito. He resigned after the demonstrations of 1981 after huge pressure on him by the leadership of SR Serbia.

\(^77\) See interview with Bakalli, op.cit. note 29.

\(^78\) Kaqusha Jashari from 1987 to 1989 served as the Chairperson of the Executive Council of the League of Communists in Kosova. During 1988, she was also appointed as the Secretary of the Central Committee of the League of the Communists in Kosova.

In the same interview she got perplexed when the interviewer insisted on the importance of dubious representation of Kosova:

I: Earlier you said that Kosova was treated equally compared with other republics! Now I have a question about this: does Croatia for instance, have representatives in the Assembly of Serbia?
KJ: No, it hadn’t.
I: Does Kosova have representatives in the Assembly of Serbia?
KJ: Yes.  

Sabrina P. Ramet rightly noted how the formal equality of nations and nationalities demonstrated nothing at all since the provinces lacked the essential element, which was statehood. Once you were born in Kosova, you gained a dubious citizenship – that of Yugoslavian and Serbian citizenship. Even Mahmut Bakalli asserted that “the only disputable point was that in the case of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the position of Kosova and Vojvodina should be discussed again.” However, this ambiguous position of Kosova never satisfied either side. On the one side, Albanians constantly demanded that, for the sake of realization of their rights, Kosova’s status should be elevated to that of an equal republic within the Federation and totally separate from Serbia. In contrast, Serbian political elites were not satisfied with this position of Kosova. Accordingly, they insisted, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, that this constitutional regulation of autonomous provinces within Serbia and the Federation should be changed in Serbian favor through reducing Kosova’s autonomy and subordinating it completely to Serbian authority.

In contrast to the Albanian political elite, the Serbian political elite had a much stronger position as one of the main factors in the Yugoslav Federation. As a result, their role in the process of the ethno-mobilization of Serbs was always of crucial importance. Other difference between these two elites was that the Serbian political elite always strove to impede the improvement of the legal and political status of Kosova and of Albanians in general within the Federation, whereas the Albanian political elite tried to defend what was achieved as a result of popular pressure from Albanians for more rights and as a result of a balance of forces within the Federation. Even though the Albanian political elite from time to time found opportunities to claim more rights for Kosova, its position was mainly defensive, while the position of the Serbian political elite was mainly offensive and, during the reigns of Ranković and Milošević, even aggressive.

The constitutional changes of 1974 caused more centrifugal rather than cohesive effects. Serbian political and intellectual elites considered these changes as anti-Serbian acts since this reduced Serbian direct control over

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80 Ibid. 61.
81 See Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 77.
82 See interview with Bakalli, op.cit. note 29.
83 See Memorandum, op.cit. note 35.
its two provinces. In 1977, the LCY of Serbia first expressed its dissatisfaction with this direction by publishing the Blue Book, which showed Serbia's disagreements with the constitution of 1974, opposing especially the autonomy of Kosova and Vojvodina. Regarding what Mahmut Bakalli claims, this book was published under the title ‘Position of Serbs in Yugoslavia according to the Constitution of the year 1974’. Its central complaint was the reduction and narrowing of Serbia up to ‘Belgrade’s Pachalic’. Even though this document was criticized by federal organs in closed meetings and it was never publicly admitted that it existed, it had huge influence in the political establishment of Serbia. Serbia remained unsatisfied with the fourth constitution, for it felt weakened and federally underrepresented. After the federal presidency was reformed, each of the constituent elements of the Federation (including the two autonomous provinces) was equally represented. Therefore, Serbia constituted nearly 40% of the overall population of Yugoslavia and had just one vote in the Federal Presidency, which meant 15% of overall representation. All these facts were misused by Milošević to start constitutional changes on the abolition of Kosova autonomy. It is worth noting here that some academic circles and also political levels in the international community tried to link Kosova’s problem with the rise of Milošević to power. This is one of the biggest mistakes of all those that aim to know something more about the genuine causes of the Kosova conflict or to try to deal with and resolve it. It is true that during his era the situation got worse and eventually ended with an armed uprising of Albanians and the military intervention of NATO, but Milošević inherited this problem from previous Serbian regimes and political elite. The roots of the Kosova problem go back to its occupation in 1912-13 and can be solved only within a broad political framework that will take into consideration the will of the majority and that would respect the rights of minorities.

Thus Milošević achieved the mobilization of enough human resources for more political power by inciting national sentiments just after April 1987. On 24 April 1987, he came to Kosova, to a place called Fushë Kosova, to meet local Serbs. Around the building in which this meeting was about to be held, some thousands of Serbs were gathered, many of them trying to get inside the building. Police forces intervened and Milošević seized the moment. All of a sudden he went outside, stood in front of the building, and shouted to the mass of the people - ‘No one should dare to beat you!’ One of the well-known journalists of Yugoslavia, an eyewitness of this event, Slavko Ćuruvija, describes it: “We even didn’t understand how he went there and when he started talking to the masses. From the window of Fushë Kosova Culture Center’s building, Milošević delivered a speech which later would be remembered as famous, and which served as a prelude of Yugoslavia’s death.”

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84 See Clark, op.cit. note 12, 13; and Pula, op.cit. note 3, 59. Mahmut Bakalli, provincial communist leader of Kosova during that time, argues that this book was published one year earlier (1976).
85 See interview with Bakalli, op.cit. note 29.
86 See Thomas, op.cit. note 57.
During that night Milošević spent many hours, until six in the morning, hearing Serbs express their fear and anger against Albanians. Their message was clear: we want to rule over them, recalling Ranković’s time. By the end of 1987, Milošević managed to topple Ivan Stabić from his political position as president of Serbia. He became de facto the most powerful man in Yugoslavia. The bases of the destruction of Yugoslavia were created. The following year, the Serbian Assembly undertook substantial constitutional changes toward the abolishment of the autonomous status of Kosova. Milošević gave his full support. During this time, he started manipulating Kosova Serbs to attain more power by mobilizing and sending them to the provinces and other republics, putting pressure on their institutions. On 6 October 1988, thousands of Kosova Serbs, and those from other areas as well, were gathered in the capital of Vojvodina, Novi Sad, in one of what they used to call ‘meetings of truth’. After great pressure, the political leadership of Vojvodina resigned. Some days later, both Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari, provincial communist leaders of Kosova, were displaced forcibly from their positions. In their place, Milošević put Rrahman Morina as a head. The same happened to Montenegro on 11 January 1989.

These events were crucially important for inciting a strong new wave of ethno-mobilization among Kosova Albanians. Debates and discussions organized by SAWPK about the proposed constitutional changes were held in very hot, tense and even explosive atmospheres. These meetings revealed the existing divisions along ethnic lines. Thus, out of nearly 3,500 meetings, 85 percent were against any constitutional changes. These meetings, according to Besnik Pula, indicated two trends: “First, it revealed the deep division between Albanians and Serbs regarding their vision for the future status of Kosova, thereby solidifying the fissures between members of both nationalities in all public institutions. Second, it indicated the overwhelming consensus among Albanians of all socioeconomic profiles in their opposition to any curtailment of Kosova’s autonomy.”

Meetings organized by SAWPK preceded mass homogenization of Albanians in upcoming years. On 17 November 1988, Trepça miners in Mitrovica started to march the 30 miles to Prishtina in defense of the autonomy of Kosova and the political establishment of Kosova led at that time by Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari. In the following days, the rallies of the miners were joined by all strata of Albanian populations and the number of protestors was even estimated at 100,000 by Radio Television Belgrade.
demonstrations were seen as contra weight to ‘demonstrations of truth’ organized by Serbian political elite. However, despite strong opposition from the Albanian population, the Serbian regime achieved two of its main goals in the meantime. They eliminated every resistance among the Albanian communist elite, which had opened the door to subrogate Kosova’s autonomy.

Deeply concerned with the dangerous aims of Milošević, in February 1989, 1,350 Albanian miners barricaded themselves in the depth of their mine in Stan Trg of Trepča and started a hunger-strike. Among other demands, their most important ones were ‘no retreat from the fundamental principles of the 1974 constitution’, the dismissal of Rahman Morina, Ali Shukriu and Husamendin Azemi (who were seen as Milošević’s servants) and reversal of Milošević’s discriminatory policies. Slovenia’s leadership, as a sign of disagreement with Serbia, supported the miners. On 27 February, one massive supportive meeting for Kosova’s miners was organized in Ljubljana. Milan Kučan, the communist leader in Slovenia, said to the people that Yugoslavia must be defended in Trepča. Serbia intensified its cruel campaign. Azem Vllasi was arrested on 2 March 1989. Some days later, the authority of the Supreme Court of Kosova was abrogated. After these changes, on 23 March, the Assembly of Kosova held a special session to discuss the constitutional changes made in Serbia. While work proceeded, dozens of tanks were deployed around the building. Most of the deputies were blackmailed and frightened, others as collaborators voted for these constitutional changes of Serbia. Other deputies present in the hall during that day reported that there were also some men voting who were not deputies. The autonomy of Kosova was wiped away. This was considered by many observers as the moment that fueled the whole process of the disintegration of the Federation.

Immediately after the abrogation of autonomy, demonstrations erupted throughout Kosova. During these demonstrations, twenty-one Albanians and two policemen were killed. During 1990, based on the new constitution that essentially reduced Kosova’s autonomy, the new Assembly of Kosova was elected. This assembly, meant to be more loyal to Milošević regime, adopted the Declaration of Independence on 2 July 1990 under huge pressure from public opinion in an extraordinary meeting and conditions (the meeting was held outside the facilities of the Assembly since the order was not to allow deputies to enter the building and to proceed with the work). The declaration didn’t at that moment call for secession from Yugoslavia, but it declared Kosova’s secession from Serbia and declared

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98 Ibid. See also Judah, op.cit. note 44, 55.
99 Ibid.
101 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 344.
102 CDHRF, note 445, 16-8.
103 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 344; and Thomas, op.cit. note 57, 46.
104 See IICK, op.cit. note 44, 41.
105 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 344. More extensively and in detail for the gross human rights violation will be discussed in the second chapter of this report. In that part data were taken mainly by AI, HRW and CDHRF while in other part we use occasionally other sources.
equal status for Kosova in the Yugoslav Federation or future confederation. After this declaration, on 5 July 1990, the Serbian Assembly dissolved Kosova’s Assembly, an act that was endorsed by Yugoslav Presidency. The same assembly, in an illegal meeting in Kaçanik on 7 August 1990, declared the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova. Afterwards, members of this assembly and the government that was elected by the assembly went into exile. The residence of the government in exile was first in Slovenia and afterwards, until the end of war, in Germany. The DLK, which was founded at the end of 1989 but didn’t have much contact and influence over these institutions in the beginning, gradually started to take control over them after 1990. According to Pula Rugova realized “the importance of maintaining institutions and legal basis for claiming republican status within a new Yugoslavia and, after 1991, independence”. As a result of these changes in attitude, close cooperation began between the assembly, the government in exile and DLK and other political actors in Kosova. Consequently, the Assembly of Kosova elected Ibrahim Rugova as president of Kosova on 24 May 1991. The plebiscite on independence was organized during 26-30 September 1991. Of 87 percent of eligible voters, 99.87 percent voted in favor of the sovereignty and independence for Kosova. The changes of government in exile appeared in October 1991, when one of the DLK leaders, Bujar Bukoshi, was elected as the head of this government. This government started to play an important role in maintaining the passive resistance in Kosova, through supporting it financially, taken from sources in the huge diaspora in Western Europe, as was already explained above. In the elections of 1992, held in Kosova but not recognized by Belgrade, the DLK won and Rugova was elected as President of Kosova. It is important to note that compared to the 1981 process of ethno-mobilization, which was more particular in its nature, the mobilization that took place after 1988 was more general, including all strata of population. If in 1981 the political elite and most intellectuals either hesitantly supported or even openly condemned the demonstrations, from 1988 on, and particularly after 1989, most of the political elite and intellectuals were supporting popular demands. Between the years 1981-89, 584,373 Kosova Albanians – or half the adult population – were arrested, interrogated, interned or reprimanded. Seven thousand of these were jailed, hundreds more dismissed from school, university and work’. This record, which will be elaborated in a lengthier manner in the second chapter of this report, shows the high degree of human rights violations against Albanians in Kosova during this period. These events can definitely be qualified as a starting point of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The last US ambassador to Yugoslavia,  

108 See Pula, op.cit. note 3, 95.  
109 Ibid. 96; and Radan, op.cit. note 106, 199.  
110 See Pula, op.cit. note 3, 77.  
Warren Zimmermann, wrote that in 1989 ‘Kosovo had become the most serious European human rights problem west of the Soviet Union’\textsuperscript{112}.

\textit{ii) Military, paramilitary and state intelligence agencies}

Since the creation of the state of south Slavic nations in 1918, named in the beginning the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians and Yugoslavia (known as First Yugoslavia afterwards), the army played a crucial cohesive force in maintaining the unity of the state.\textsuperscript{113} From the very beginning, Serbs played a decisive role in this army. This was normal, bearing in mind that it was only Serbia (jointly with Montenegro) that had its own army prior to creation of a joint state. This army had experience, expertise and tradition in warfare gained in the First and Second Balkan Wars as well as through its participation in World War I.\textsuperscript{114} Furthermore, this army to a certain extant was even seen as saviour to other Slavic nations (Croats and Slovenes) from the Italian and Austrian territorial claims.\textsuperscript{115} This situation more or less continued even after World War II.

In both First and Second Yugoslavia, the army led an important role in suppressing Albanian claims for more rights and their armed risings. Just in January and February 1919, an estimated 6,040 people were killed and 3,873 houses were destroyed.\textsuperscript{116} According to the information from the Albanian Government, delivered to the League of Nations in April 1921, around 2,000 people had been killed since the beginning of that year.\textsuperscript{117} After World War II, even though the participation of other nations and nationalities increased, and the role of Tito was crucial in shaping the policies of the Yugoslav National Army (hereinafter YNA)\textsuperscript{118}, Serbian domination in the army still remained. Almost 60-80\% of the upper leadership of the YNA was of Serbian ethnicity.\textsuperscript{119} Since 1974, the YNA started to play an important political role in the Federation and, by 1974, army officers made up 12 percent of the central committee of the CLY membership, up from 2 percent in 1969.\textsuperscript{120} Bearing in mind their privileged position, higher salaries than average in the country and privileges in housing, until 1990-91 the YNA tried to play a cohesive role in keeping the

\textsuperscript{112} Zimmermann, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 14.
\textsuperscript{113} About political and military circumstances of the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, see Glenny, \textit{op.cit.} note 40, 402-412 and 428-436.
\textsuperscript{114} See Pešić, \textit{op.cit.} note 6, 5.
\textsuperscript{115} See also Glenny, \textit{op.cit.} note 40, 366.
\textsuperscript{116} See Malcolm, \textit{op.cit.} note 73, 273.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. 278.
\textsuperscript{118} See Pešić, \textit{op.cit.} note 6, 12.
\textsuperscript{119} See Lampe, \textit{op.cit.} note 10, 345. According to Lampe, 60 percent were Serbs, 8 percent Montenegrins, 14 percent Croats and 6 percent or less the others. About this issue see also James Gow, \textit{The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes} (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston and Ithaca, Montreal, 2003), 57-8; and V.P. Gagnon, Jr., “Historical Roots of the Yugoslav Conflict...” in Milton J. Esman and Shibley Telhami (eds.), \textit{International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict} (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995), 179-197 (this article can be found also in http://www.ithaca.edu/gagnon/articles/io/io-fin07.htm).
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
Federation alive. Furthermore, they tried to give the impression to other actors in the Federation that they had a neutral position. However, other actors in the Federation perceived this position of the army in conformity with the interests of the Serbian political elite, particularly with that of Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia. This perception turned out to be true after interventions of the YNA in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. During most of its existence, the YNA among Albanians in ex-Yugoslavia was perceived with antipathy, thereby very few of them decided to continue military career in this army. Since 1945, federal authorities in Kosova had imposed a state of emergency or martial law four times - in 1945, 1981, 1989 and 1990. During the uprising of 1945 in Drenica that started as a revolt against the conscription of Albanian youth to fight in other parts of Yugoslavia, out of fear that they would be victimized by the Yugoslav army and ending as a popular uprising against the establishment of Yugoslav authorities in Kosova (there was genuine belief that Yugoslav communists would keep their commitments that would allow Kosova to exercise the right of self-determination that would result in unification with Albania), thousands of Albanians were killed by the army. In the demonstrations of 1981, 9 demonstrators were killed, 57 injured, and many others were arrested and put to trial as was mentioned above. The demonstrations of March 1989 cost the lives of 22 protestors and 2 policemen. As Viktor Meier noted, the behaviours of the Yugoslav and federal police in Kosova during this period were unseen in the post war history of Europe. In the demonstrations of January and February 1990, in which around 40.000 students in Kosova participated, the YNA and special federal police forces killed twenty-seven Kosova Albanians and wounded many more. These laws were maintained by the intervention of the army in Kosova and special police forces that entered Kosova from other parts of the Federation. This intervention played its role in the process of ethno-mobilization on two sides. The natural reaction of Albanians was their further homogenization around their national goal for more rights within the Federation and equal position with others. On the other side, the Serbs were also mobilized around the idea of the suppression of the autonomy of Kosova and of the creation of unified Serbia.

Every trace of neutrality, even in form, was removed after 1991 when the Yugoslav wars started and when the army started to serve as a main base for the realization of the concept of Greater Serbia. This army was transformed into the Yugoslav Army (YA or known also as VJ - Vojska

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121 Ibid.
122 See Pešić, op.cit. note 6, 17, and 23-4.
123 Ibid. 27.
124 Ibid. 40.
125 Ibid. 46.
126 Ibid. 30.
127 Ibid. 46.
128 See Meier, op.cit. note 30, 137.
129 See Pešić, op.cit. note 6, 26-7.
130 Ibid. 27; see also Ivan Vejvoda, “Democratic Despotism: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia” in Pridham and Gallagher (eds.), note 158, at 225.
Jugoslavije) and, in relation to Albanians in Kosova, was responsible for gross human rights violations during the period of 1991-1999, with its culmination during the 1998-1999 war with the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA). During this period up to 11,000 citizens of Kosova were killed, around 2,500 disappeared and up to one million were forcefully displaced to Albania, FYROM, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, other European states and even to the USA, many of whom had been arrested, raped etc. During the process of ethno-mobilization for wars that took place in ex-Yugoslavia, the Serbian political elite used for its objectives paramilitary forces and their leaders. Main paramilitary groups supported by state apparatus, particularly by the secret service, were the Serbian Volunteer Guard, founded on 11 October 1990 by Željko Ražnatović Arkan, the White Eagles and Dušan Silni (Dušan the Mighty), founded by Serbian National Renewal at the end of 1990, and the Serbian Chetnik Movement that was composed of the volunteers of Serbian Radical Party led by Vojislav Šešelj. More independent and even hostile in relation to the Belgrade regime in the beginning were paramilitary forces created by the Serbian Renewal Movement led by Vuk Drašković in 1991, called Serbian Guards. These forces and figures had played three roles. Firstly, they were used to instil fear among Croats, Bosnians and Albanians. Secondly, they were used as icons of Serbian bravery and nationalism (figures like Arkan, Šešelj, and Kapetan Dragan played that role) in order to enhance the process of ethno-mobilization of Serbs for wars. And thirdly, they were used by Belgrade to justify YA operations in order to avoid responsibility and to blame, when needed, these paramilitary forces for obvious human rights violations against innocent civilians. As well known journalist Christine Amanpour puts it rightly, “in the former Yugoslavia, paramilitary forces were the primary agent of criminal violence, murdering unarmed men, women, and children, raping and pillaging, and instituting a campaign of terror with the goal of forcing all non-Serbs out of territories that historically were ethnically mixed”. However, we consider that their role is less important than it was illustrated in public opinion since behind their activities were hidden operations of the institutions of the Serbian state.

The role of the provincial police forces and intelligence service in the process of ethno-mobilization of Albanians was traditionally very weak. Until 1990-91, Albanians serving in provincial police forces were mostly just mere servants of state apparatus, very often regarded by the Albanian population with antipathy because of their role in human rights violations. However, during the period of 1990-91, they opposed measures undertaken by the

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131 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 351-2.
133 Ibid.
Serbian regime, particularly after the dismissal of 200 Albanian high officers of the Kosova police in 1990. This opposition of Kosova police forces was mainly manifested in the form of disobedience of the orders coming from Belgrade. Belgrade’s reaction to this opposition resulted on the dismissal of Albanian police officers and they were replaced by local Serbs or by Serb police officers brought from Serbia proper.

**iii) Civilians**

Even though civilians were major victims during conflicts and wars in ex-Yugoslavia, they were also used in the process of ethno-mobilization by political elites. For a long period of time, the Serbian political elite manipulated Serbian civilians, inciting their discontent with the position they had in Kosova. This discontent was stronger after 1981 when they claimed that they were harassed and assaulted in different forms by Albanians. Albeit these allegations mostly were never officially proven, at least not to the degree that they were reported, they played a crucial role in the process of the ethno-mobilization of Serbs in and outside Kosova.

Some of these allegations as ethnic rape assaults were denied even by independent Serbian inquiries. In reality their demands were aiming toward constitutional changes that would establish a united Serbia. They held the Constitution of 1974 responsible for their position in Kosova since they lost a lot of their privileges. In their eyes, what happened after 1974 was the establishment of Albanian domination which should be removed, together with changing the ethnic composition of Kosova in favour of the Serbian population. They were backed by the SOC and by Serbian intelligentsia in their efforts.

In the beginning, Serbs in Kosova started their activities by filing petitions to the authorities in Belgrade and circumventing those in Prishtina. The first petition circulated in early 1982, carrying the names of 79 Serbs. The second petition was drafted in 1985 and signed by 2.011 Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosova. After a while, in March 1986, a group of 95 Kosova Serbs travelled to Belgrade in order to contact authorities and explain to them their complaints about their position in Kosova. As a result, Serbs in Kosova started to be organized around different associations and organizations whereby they tried to address some of their resentments.

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141 See Malcolm, *op.cit.* note 73, 339; and Pešić, *op.cit.* note 6, 16.
142 See Izvještaj Nezavisne Komisije, *op.cit.* note 38, 41.
143 See Pešić, *op.cit.* note 6, 16.
144 Ibid.
145 See Thomas, *op.cit.* note 57, 35.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
As it was stated above in this report, the two most prominent organization were the Organizing Committee for Participation of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins in Protest Rallies Outside of the Region, led by Miroslav Šolević and Kosta Bulatović and founded in 1988, and the Association for the Return of Serbs and Montenegrins Exiled from Kosovo - Božur (Peony) headed by Bogdan Kecman. The latter operated within the frame of the SAWPS. These two organizations that were in reality influenced directly by the Serbian political elite, particularly by the Milošević clan, and played an important role in the process of the ethno-mobilization of Serbs which influenced the fall of the political elite in Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosova in 1988.

iv) Intellectuals

The role of Albanian intellectuals in the social and political life of Albanians in Kosova and generally in ex-Yugoslavia was of crucial importance. As a result, they had huge influence on the political processes throughout the half century of communist Yugoslavia’s existence. This influence has a rational explanation in the historical roots of suppressing education in Albanian language in Yugoslavia since its creation. This suppression left the Albanian population in deep backwardness, with 74 percent of all Kosova Albanians over age 10 illiterate after the World War II. The struggle for more rights in education, huge sacrifices of the first Albanian intellectuals, and results achieved during the years gave intellectuals special social status in Kosova.

Albanians in old or first Yugoslavia didn’t have the status of minority because they were not recognized as such. Therefore, the Yugoslav state didn’t feel any responsibility to fulfil any obligation to respect minority rights under the League of Nation’s system of minority rights protection. Therefore, Albanians were not entitled to conduct education in their own language. A kind of parallel system existed even at that time where Albanians illegally organized schools in their own language, either at private homes or at Albanian Catholic churches. This system was less sophisticated but can be seen as predecessor of the modern Albanian parallel system in education, established during ‘90’s of last century.

148 Thomas, op.cit. note 57, 45-6. It is worth mentioning that neither Miroslav Šolević nor Kosta Bulatović were from Kosova. The former was from the Serbian town Niš and the latter was from Montenegro.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 318.
154 In general about the parallel system organized in Kosova during ’90s see Pula, op.cit. note 3, 89-125; and in particular for the educational system see Denisa Kosotovičová, “Albanian Schooling in Kosovo 1992-1998: ‘Liberty Imprisoned’”, in Michael Waller, Kyrir
Albanian schools were opened for the first time in Kosova since the First World War when Austrians opened them during the Second World War, in what was known as Greater Albania\(^{155}\) which had been created by Axis Forces during the war.\(^{156}\) After the Second World War, with the establishment of the second Yugoslavia when communists took the power, the Albanian education system encountered a great number of problems. Even though Albanian schools remained opened and in the period from 1945-48 the state tried to induce education in the Albanian language, from 1948 until 1966 circumstances were not conducive to the education of Albanians in their own language.\(^{157}\) The situation got worse, particularly after the split of relations between Yugoslavia and Albania over ideological and political issues.\(^{158}\) The lack of Albanian teachers, the lack of primary and secondary schools spread all over Kosova, and the lack of the will of the state to solve these problems, joined with constant policies of discrimination against Albanians, marked the period between 1948-66.\(^{159}\) Just after the fall of Ranković in 1966, the Albanian education system got its momentum. In 1970, for the first time in Kosova’s history, the University of Prishtina was opened. The education system was held in two languages, in Albanian and Serbian. During 1970-80, relationships between Yugoslavia and Albania were improved with support given by the University of Tirana to the newly founded University of Prishtina with academic cadres, textbooks and exchange programs. Since 1945, Albanians, through all means and through all methods, legal and illegal, within and outside the system, gave constant pressure to make education in Albanian equal with other languages in the Federation, furthermore to make it equal in Kosova with the Serbian language, and pressed for the opening of new schools, both primary and secondary, to train teachers, to publish books and magazines in the Albanian language, to foster the development of Albanian science, etc.\(^{160}\) As it was mentioned above, as a result of this struggle for national emancipation of Albanians in ex-Yugoslavia, intellectuals started to have huge influence in political and social life. Thus their role in direct political processes was huge. Since 1945, the main bearers of resistance against state suppression were such intellectuals as Ymer Berisha, Xheladim Hana, Gjon Sereçi, Adem Demaçi, Ali Aliu, Rexhep Abdullahu, Ukshin Hoti, Hydajet Hyseni, Mehmet Hajrizi, etc., who were active in different times but who

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\(^{155}\) The term Greater Albania was established by the Fascists during the Second World War. This term has no usage in Albanian political thought. Albanian political thought uses the term ‘ethnic’ or ‘unified Albania’, meaning the creation of a unified Albanian state that would include territories where Albanians are a majority and have uninterrupted territory, in contrast to the concept of ‘Great Serbia’ that aimed to include in Serbia territories where Serbs are minority or without any territorial link with Serbia. See Fehmi Agani, *Demokracia, kombi dhe vetëvendosja* (Democracy, Nation and Self-Determination) (Dukagjini, Pejë, 1994), 213-9.

\(^{156}\) See Malcolm, *op.cit.* note 73, 289-313.

\(^{157}\) *Ibid.* 318; see also Lalaj, *op.cit.* note 14, 114-134.

\(^{158}\) *Ibid.* 118.

\(^{159}\) See Lalaj, *op.cit.* note 14, 114-134.

\(^{160}\) About the period and the position of Albanian education system during 1966-1981 see *Ibid.* 45-316.
were either murdered by the state for their activities or jailed. Some of them were even part of the communist political establishment, but in the course of time they disagreed with the official policies of the Yugoslav state. In addition, the University of Prishtina was the main base for political activities, feeding illegal organizations with activists that were mainly students at UP.\footnote{See interview with Hyseni, \textit{op.cit.} note 17.} As a result of these constant political activities, the political atmosphere that required changes in the political and legal status of Kosova was created. Thus the demonstrations of 1981, which commenced at UP, started with social and economic demands and ended with the demand for Kosova to be a republic equal with other republics in the Federation.\footnote{See Malcolm, \textit{op.cit.} note 73, 334-5.} In the beginning, a number of professors supported these demands but after the brutal crush of these demonstrations, which resulted in 9 dead demonstrators, with the increase of political intimidation at UP, with to the arrest of a number of students and professors, and with the undergoing process of differentiation, the defying voice of the professors was suppressed.\footnote{See Rexhep Qosja, \textit{Populli i ndaluar (Forbidden People)} (Mega Medium, Prishtinë, 1990), 17-8, and 24.}

However, the role of intellectuals in the process of ethno-mobilization of Albanians increased hugely at the end of the 1980s. This process can be seen as opposition to the Serbian ethno-mobilization around the idea of suppressing Kosova’s autonomy, which was preceded by a huge campaign of dehumanizing Albanians.\footnote{About campaign of dehumanizing Albanians see also Tom Gallagher, “Nationalism and Democracy in South-East Europe”, in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher (eds.), \textit{Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans} (Routledge, London and New York, 2000), 84-111, at 91.} In the very tense atmosphere of the ‘80s, when Albanians were considered in ex-Yugoslavia as a main potential destructive force for the Federation, the first signs of resistance from the side of Albanian intellectuals came in the Congress of Yugoslav writers in 1985 in Novi Sad, when intellectuals such as Rexhep Qosja and Ibrahim Rugova started, for the first time after 1981, loudly to oppose this generally very hostile atmosphere towards Albanians.\footnote{See Qosja, \textit{op.cit.} note 163, 45-56; see also the speech of Ibrahim Rugova in this congress, Ibrahim Rugova, “Liria konkrete” (“Concrete Freedom”), in Ibrahim Rugova, \textit{Pavarësia dhe Demokracia: Intervista dhe Artikuj (Independece and Democracy: Interviews and Articles)} (Fjala, Prishtinë, 1991), 29-30.} This meeting was the first big public disagreement between Serbian and Albanian intelligentsia. The culmination of the resistance of Albanian intellectuals against the process of the suppression of Kosova’s autonomy was the well-known \textit{Appeal 215} of 215 Albanian intellectuals sent on 21 February 1989 to all the relevant Yugoslav, Serbian and Kosovo institutions. This \textit{Appeal}, which was signed at the time by the most prominent Albanian intellectuals, asked from Serbian leadership not to reduce the autonomy of Kosova since it would pave the way for the deterioration of ethnic relationships in Kosova in particular and in Yugoslavia in general. Many of these intellectuals were imprisoned without any court order and were held in custody for about three months, being
physically and psychologically ill-treated. Consequently, Albanian intelligentsia since then started to support the idea of the total separation of Kosova from Serbia, whereas a considerable number of Serbian intellectuals sided with Milošević policies toward Kosova and Albanians. Serbian intellectuals also played a huge role in the process of the ethnomobilization of the Serbian population. Particularly, a number of Serbian intellectuals gathered around the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, led by Dobrica Ćosić who openly challenged new policies toward Kosova in the Central Committee of the Communist League of Serbia (hereinafter CLS) in 1968, and therefore was dismissed from that body. This stratum of intellectuals during the ‘70s and ‘80s continued to articulate public resentments concerning the position of Serbs and Serbia in the federation, of Serbia in relation to autonomous provinces and of Serbs in Kosova. The seven key themes of Serbian resentments, according to Vesna Pešić, can be identified in the attitudes of these intelligentsia: 1) Yugoslavia was a Serbian delusion, meaning that Serbs naively believed in the idea of Yugoslavism; 2) The conspiracy against the Serbs; 3) Serbia was exploited economically by Croatia and Slovenia; 4) Serbs were the losers because they were the only ones who did not have a state proper; 5) Serbs were exposed to the hatred that all Yugoslav people had toward them; 6) Serbs were exposed to genocide, first in Croatia during the World War II and now in Kosova; and 7) The Serbian nation needed to establish a national state for all Serbs.

These attitudes started to gain ground particularly after the demonstrations of 1981 in Kosova. In these attitudes, one can find the first public signs of direction that would create the suppression of Kosova’s autonomy and the destruction of the Federation. The culmination of these efforts was the famous Memorandum of SASA. In the beginning, after a draft of this document was leaked to the public, Serbian officials harshly criticized it. This document addressed the position of Serbs in the Federation and demanded the transformation of relationships between federal units in political and economic fields. The main demand was that the status of autonomous provinces should be changed in favour of Serbian unitarism. It was argued that with two autonomous provinces being already on equal footing with other federal units but also operating within SR of Serbia, having even veto power in decisions made in Belgrade, put SR Serbia in an unequal position with the other republics. This document also tackled economic problems present in the Fand in republics, arguing that the economic structure of the federation and the economic balance was in favour of Croatia and Slovenia and unfavourable for Serbia. In the Memorandum, it was urged that this structure and balance to be radically changed in order for Serbia to improve its economic performances.

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166 See Zekeria Cana, Apeli 215 i intelektualëve shqiptarë (Appeal 215 of Albanian Intellectuals) (Rilindja, Prishtinë, 2001), 123-137.
167 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 329.
168 See Pešić, op.cit. note 6, 18-20.
169 Ibid. 14-22; see also Mertus, op.cit. note 138, 137.
170 See Mertus, op.cit. note 138, 140-1.
171 See Memorandum, op.cit. note 35, 18-21.
172 Ibid. 15-18.
it criticized the position of Serbs in other federal units, particularly in Croatia.\(^{173}\) This document laid down conditions for further developments in ex-Yugoslavia. Although these intellectuals in the beginning were seen as opposition to the mainstream of political attitudes, after 1987, when Milošević took power, they became every day more and more powerful and more influential in Serbian political and social life.\(^{174}\) Their authority as the head of the Serbian nation was misused by politics constantly. However, we cannot conclude that all Serbian intellectuals were in the service of Milošević politics. There has been a range of Serbian intellectuals, such as Bogdan Bodanović, Nataša Kandić, Vesna Pešić, etc, who, with intellectual and human dignity, opposed the policies of confrontations with other nations and constantly criticized Milošević’s policies of Great Serbia.\(^{175}\)

**v) National majorities (“peoples of the republic”), their interrelations and clashes, and victimisation of minorities for the ‘national cause’**

The question of who is the majority in Kosova and who is the minority was always a matter of dispute between Albanians and Serbs. Albanians traditionally were the majority in Kosova, but were treated as the minority within Serbia and Yugoslavia. They never accepted this position due to the fact that they represented almost half of the Albanian population in general.\(^{176}\) Albanians sought to acquire the status of a nation in Yugoslavia but they achieved the elevation of its position just to the category of nationality in 1974, even though, according to official statistics of 1981, they numbered more than Macedonians, Montenegrins, and equal with Slovenes.\(^{177}\) The invention of term *nationality* was a product of the 1974 Constitution, placing this category between national minorities and nations. On the other side, Serbs, even though they were the minority in Kosova, never accepted this status because, since Kosova was legally within Serbia, where Serbs are majority, they considered that they were part of that majority within Kosova as well. These two attitudes continuously clashed, particularly after 1974. Thus, as it was mentioned above, demography always played a political role in relations between Serbia and Kosova. Serbs in general during the ‘Yugoslav era’ manifested low population growth rates compared to Albanians. In 1953, 27.9% of Kosova’s population was Serb; in 1961, 23.5-24%\(^{178}\); in 1971, between 18.4-20.9%; in 1981, between 13.3-14.9%; and in 1987, this dropped to 10%\(^{179}\). During 1961-71, Kosova’s population growth was 25.4%, compared to Serbia’s of 8.3%. During the next decade (1971-81),

\(^{174}\) See Mertus, *op.cit.* note 138, 137.
\(^{175}\) See for example the Appeal of Serbian Intellectuals, February 9 1992, on 17 February 1992 in Vreme News Digest Agency No. 21 (the appeal can be found in [http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/21/t21-4.htm](http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/21/t21-4.htm)).
\(^{176}\) See Troebst, *infra* note 416, 6.
\(^{177}\) See Ramet, *op.cit.* note 9, 37.
\(^{178}\) See Woodward, *op.cit.* note 100, 34.
\(^{179}\) See Ramet, *op.cit.* note 9, 201.
this growth in Kosovo was at the figure of 27.5% while in Serbia it was 8.4%.\(^{180}\)

It is important to note that this decrease of the Serbs in absolute numbers in Kosovo between 1961-1981 (which is more evident in the below Table nr.1), even though for a long time it had been politicized by Serbian regime for their needs, had several causes. First, Serbs in Kosovo had a lower birth rate compared to Albanians, even though higher than Serbs in Serbia. Second, since Kosovo was the poorest region in Yugoslavia, qualified Serbs started to seek better jobs in other parts of Yugoslavia. Third, the forced emigration of Albanians for Turkey that caused thousands of Albanians to leave Kosovo, particularly during 50s, which influenced the changes of the ethnic composition of Kosovo in favor of Serbs, was stopped after the mid of 60s. And last but not least, the improvement of the position of Albanians in Kosovo after 1966 which were underrepresented in all sectors of economic, social and public life until then, created a feeling of uncertainty among Serbs, which was related to the loss of some privileges that until then the state preserved for them. The increase in the absolute number of Roma in the same period is mainly result of their high birth rate.

Another important aspect of Kosovo’s demographic structure is Serbia’s endeavor to change this structure by two processes undertaken simultaneously:

* Colonization of Kosovo
* Organized forced expulsion of Albanian population from Kosovo

The colonization of Kosovo started immediately after Serbia occupied Kosovo in 1912\(^{181}\) followed by expulsion of Albanians.\(^{182}\) This process was intensified especially during the interwar period of 1918-41. During this period the so-called Agrarian Reform served as a tool for the colonization of Kosovo. According to G. Richard Jansen from Colorado State University, ‘land was appropriated from Albanians illegally and Albanians were encouraged to leave’.\(^{183}\) According to Obradović, until 1939, 11.383 families

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\(^{180}\) Ibid. 141.

\(^{181}\) See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73 (stating that Kosovo was ‘conquered’). But see Aleksa Dijlas, presenting the Serbian view that Serbs ‘liberated Kosovo after five centuries under the Turkish yoke’. Aleksa Dijlas, “Imagining Kosovo: A Biased New Account Fans Western Confusion”, 77 Foreign Affairs, 1998, 127. For Malcolm’s reply, see Noel Malcolm, “What Ancient Hatreds?”, 78 Foreign Affairs, 130-134 (1999) (speaking of the ‘Kosovan territory’ as being ‘legally part of a Serbian unit for just over 50 of the last 500 years’.). See also G. Richard Jansen, “Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo: An Abbreviated History”, at http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html (last visited: June 5, 2007), describing it as ‘Serbian reoccupation of Kosovo’; compare it with Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999, International Documents and Analysis, Vol. 1. (Documents and Analysis Publishing Ltd, Cambridge, 1999), 34 (noting that in the years that followed the proclamation of a Serb Kingdom in 1878, ‘serbia agitated for territorial expansion, including a demand for the incorporation of Kosovo, still part of the Ottoman Empire, and access to the Adriatic’.).


\(^{183}\) See Jansen, op.cit. note 181.
with 53,884 members colonized Kosova.\textsuperscript{184} As for their ethnic composition, 49,244 were Serbs, 5,148 Croats and 162 were Slovenes.\textsuperscript{185} One should take into account that during that time Montenegrins and Macedonians were not recognized as distinct nationalities.\textsuperscript{186} British historian, Noel Malcolm, states that over 70,000 Serb colonists were settled in Kosova during years 1928-29, which at that time comprised more than 10 percent of Kosova’s overall population\textsuperscript{187}. According to him, during the interwar period between 90,000 and 150,000 Albanians and Muslims were forced to emigrate from Kosova.\textsuperscript{188} During this period, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts considered the colonization of Kosova as a sacred duty. One of its well-known members, Vaso Ćubrilović, in March 1937, wrote the infamous memorandum on the violent expulsion of Albanians from Kosova and other parts of Yugoslavia:

> The Albanians cannot be repulsed by means of gradual colonization alone...The only way and the only means to cope with them is the brute force of an organized state, in which we have always been superior to them... The law must be enforced to the letter so as to make staying intolerable for the Albanians: fines, and imprisonments, the ruthless application of all police dispositions, such as on the prohibition of smuggling, cutting forests, damaging agriculture, leaving dogs unchained, compulsory labor and any other measure that an experienced police force can contrive...There remains one more means, which Serbia employed with great practical effect after 1878, that is, by secretly burning down Albanian villages and city quarters.\textsuperscript{189}

His concept was more than pathological. He even dared to justify this institutionally organized massive crime by referring to crimes the Nazi regime already started against Jews and with the tragedy of Gulag in ex-USSR:

> At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews and Russia can shift millions of people from one part of the continent to another, the shifting of few hundred thousand Albanians will not lead to the outbreak of a World War. However, those who

\textsuperscript{184} Obradović, op.cit. note 182, 221.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid. 220.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid. 220.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid. 298.
\textsuperscript{189} Vaso Ćubrilović, The Expulsion of the Albanians, 5, 8; English version of this memorandum can be found at [http://aacl.com/expulsion2.html], 19. 10. 2006, 14:52.
decide should know what they want and persist in achieving this, regardless of the possible international obstacles.¹⁹⁰

One of the United Nations High Commissioner Representative’s reports states that repression of the Serbian state over Albanians during the interwar period resulted in the forced emigration of over half a million ethnic Albanians¹⁹¹. After the second Yugoslavia was established, the forced organized migration of Albanians continued in Kosovo, particularly in the period 1953-1966. Even Vaso Ćubrilović was rehabilitated in meantime, continuing his work in transforming himself into communist adviser, continuing to urge (in a document presented to Yugoslav Communist Party on 1944) that the only solution of the question of national minorities was their expulsion.¹⁹² His advice was taken into account particularly regarding Germans, who were virtually all expelled, and partially for Italians and Hungarians.¹⁹³ In Kosovo, the situation was more complicated since Yugoslav and Albanian communists were allies during the war. This alliance lived until 1948.

Even Tito himself supported Serbia’s cruel campaign to expel Kosova Albanians from their homeland. In 1953, he signed a gentleman’s agreement with Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (coincidentally Albanian by origin!) to push Albanians to leave Kosovo and declare themselves as Turks.¹⁹⁴ It is important to state that during the period 1948-1953 the number of Turks in Kosovo and Macedonia increased significantly. For example, in 1948 in Kosovo, according to official census, Turks were 1,315 and in 1953 their number jumped in 34,583, while in Macedonia the recorded population of Turks had jumped from 95,940 in 1948 to 203,000 in 1953.¹⁹⁵ This agreement revived the so-called Yugoslav-Turkish Convention of 1938 on creation of conditions for Kosova Albanians to migrate to Turkey, the signs of which can be discerned in Ćubrilović’s disreputable plan on expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo.¹⁹⁶ David Stanley argues that nearly 195.000 Albanians were pushed forcibly to migrate between years 1953-57 during the so-called ‘time of weapons collection’¹⁹⁷. While according to Daskalovski between 1950 and 1966 ‘more than 400.000 Albanians were

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. 5.
¹⁹² See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 322-3.
¹⁹³ See Judah, op.cit. note 44, 31-2.
¹⁹⁵ See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 322-3.
forced to leave their homes and migrated to Turkey. This last figure is supported by some Albanian scholars, but, in our view, is not supported by any strong factual evidence. According to a research done by Ferit and Sevdije Shehu in the period from 5. 1. 1953 until 18. 6. 1957, the newspaper Nova Makedonija (New Macedonia) in Shkup (Skopje) every day published lists with names of citizens giving up Yugoslav citizenship. The number of families registered in those lists were 16.467, with 66.141 members, plus 1,507 citizens individually registered, reaching the total number 67.648. Research showed that 75% of these people were Albanians and the rest were Turks and Muslims. The publication of names stopped in 1957 after pressure from the Albanian state through official diplomatic notes sent to Belgrade. This period lasted during the time when Aleksandar Ranković simultaneously served as Minister of Internal Affairs in Yugoslavia and head of UDB (Uprava Državne Bezbednosti - State Security Administration). The second period of massive colonization of Kosova by Serbia happened during the war between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia after 1990. As one of the Human Rights Watch reports pointed out: “Approximately 13.000 Serbian refugees, many of whom had fled the Krajina region during the Croatian offensive or areas of northwestern Bosnia that fell to Bosnian government forces, were settled in Kosovo by the Belgrade government during the last quarter of 1995. Another 3.000 had been settled in Kosovo earlier during the year.”

After Milošević came to power and Serbia abolished Kosova’s autonomy, hundreds of thousands of Kosova Albanians who found themselves under direct oppression were forced to leave Kosova, mostly by seeking political asylum in Western countries. It is considered that almost half a million Kosova Albanians left Kosova during the years 1989-1998. Young Albanian men started boycotting military service of Serbia since many of them got killed while serving there. This was another reason why thousands of them left the country.

In the end all these policies were not able to change the ethnic composition of Kosova. Therefore, Albanians remained the dominant population in Kosova up until the present. However, these policies played an important role throughout last century in the process of ethno-mobilization in, Serbia and Yugoslavia.

vi) The position of other minorities in Kosova

In the conflict between the Serbian state and Albanians over Kosova other national minorities did not play any significant role. At best they were neutral, trying to benefit from this encounter to improve their status. The

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198 Daskalovski, op.cit. note 194.
199 See Shehu and Shehu, op.cit. note 196, 32.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid. 28-9.
203 See Judah, op.cit. note 44, 69; and Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 353; see also IICK, op.cit. note 44, 47.
Constitution of 1974 was of crucial importance also for improvement of position of Turks, Muslims (Bošniaks), Romas etc. However from time to time these minorities were used by state to advance its interests. As described in the preceding section, after 1950 a huge campaign of converting Albanians into Turks and sometimes into Muslims was launched. The Yugoslav state had two main goals. First, it aimed to transform the ethnic composition of Kosova and secondly to foster the emigration of Albanians to Turkey.

The most problematic time for ethnic relations in Kosova was, however, during the '90s of the last century. The Milošević regime openly started to discriminate against Albanians. Trying to justify its acts, this regime began to use as a political tool other minorities as well. The regime particularly used the weakest ones, such as Romas and to a certain degree Turks. In that period Romas became very privileged, Turks were quite neutral, while the role of Bošniaks was either neutral or they sided silently with Albanians. The logic of these acts by the Serbian regime was to prove that neither of national minorities that respected and recognized the Serbian state had any problem with enjoying equal rights with Serbs. Consequently they argued, the main responsibility for Albanian difficulties lay with the Albanians themselves, who were not interested in improving human and minority rights but rather wanted to destroy the Serbian state and to conquer part of its land.

As result of this situation and also due to a general perception by the Albanian population of active participation of some Romas in atrocities committed against Albanians during the war in Kosova, their position in the aftermath of the war in some regions of Kosova was very delicate. In those regions where atrocities occurred against the Albanian population many of Romas experienced personal revenge by some Albanians and were forced to leave Kosova. According to the report of the Humanitarian Law Centre, Romas were coerced through fear and intimidation into assisting the Serb security forces and paramilitary groups into looting and destroying Albanian property and burying Albanian bodies. However, nowadays the situation of Roma people-- even though is not the best possible (due to hard economic conditions and problems with education)--has been improved considerably. According to Gani Toska, who was active since the end of war in NGO sector in Kosova, relationships between Roma community and Albanians are good and they are improving every day, particularly in the Dukagjini region.

204 See Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 55.
205 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 322-3; and Dasalovski, op.cit. note 194.
206 See interview with Gani Toska, Roma civil society activist conducted on 20th May 2007. Interview is in the HRCUP’s files. Toska stated that particularly Roma in villages were manipulated by Serbian regime.
207 See Donia infra note 348, 2. Donia noted that Albanians that were dismissed from their jobs in the social sector were replaced by Serbs and Roma.
210 See Humanitarian Law Center, “Kosovo Roma: Targets of Abuse and Violence” (1 December 1999).
211 ICG, op.cit. note 208, 1; see also interview with Toska, op.cit. note 206.
212 See interview with Toska, op.cit. note 206.
vii) The proportion of the Kosova’s ethnic groups in relation to the whole population

According to the official census of 1981, 36.3 percent of Yugoslav population was Serbian, 19.7 percent Croats, 8.9 percent Muslims, 7.8 percent Slovenes, 7.7 percent Albanians, 6 percent Macedonians, 2.6 percent Montenegrins, 1 percent Hungarians, and 9.1 percent others. It is clear even from this official statistics that the number of Albanians was higher than Montenegrins and of Macedonians and almost equal with Slovenes and Muslims. In the other side, Albanians were traditionally majority in Kosova. However it is interesting to see below the table that shows trends of participation of Albanians and other nationalities in the ethnic structure of the population in Kosova from 1948 up till 1981.

Table nr.1: Trends of participation of Albanians and other nationalities in the ethnic structure of the population of Kosova according to censuses 1948-1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Albanians</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Montenegrins</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Other and unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>733,820</td>
<td>498,242</td>
<td>171,914</td>
<td>28,050</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>11,230</td>
<td>7,746</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>808,141</td>
<td>524,529</td>
<td>189,869</td>
<td>31,343</td>
<td>6,241</td>
<td>34,583</td>
<td>11,904</td>
<td>8,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>963,988</td>
<td>646,605</td>
<td>227,016</td>
<td>37,588</td>
<td>8,026</td>
<td>25,764</td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>15,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,243,988</td>
<td>916,167</td>
<td>228,261</td>
<td>31,555</td>
<td>26,351</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>14,593</td>
<td>14,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,584,440</td>
<td>1,226,736</td>
<td>209,497</td>
<td>27,028</td>
<td>58,562</td>
<td>12,513</td>
<td>34,126</td>
<td>15,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

viii) the role of age-groups in the process of ethno-mobilisation

For Kosova Albanians age played its role in the process of ethno-mobilization. Young people and students were more attracted toward ethno-mobilization endeavors. Both of the demonstrations, in the years 1968 and 1981, were organized by students. Students started huge demonstrations in the year 1997, which were followed by the public appearance of the KLA. KLA ranks were also filled mainly with young students.

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213 See Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 37.
214 See in Hivzi Islami, Demographic Reality in Kosova (Kosova Information Center, Prishtina, 1994), 31.
people.\textsuperscript{215} On the other hand we didn’t detect any importance of age in the ethno-mobilization of Serbs.

3. Ethnic groups that are considered as a “minorities” in Kosova

a. A definition and understanding of the concept of “minority” and applicability of this concept in Kosova

There is no agreement on the international level about the definition of the term \textit{minority}. This is understandable given that this concept traditionally implied a lot of political and interstate problems and was at the center of ethnic conflicts throughout the world. However this does not mean that the “problem of minorities” was ignored totally by international community. The first signs of efforts to regulate this problem at the international level appeared after the First World War and during the creation of the League of Nations when it the original system for protection of minorities was established under international law.\textsuperscript{216} Ever since then a lot of work was done at the international level to protect minorities as much as it is possible through international and national legal norms.\textsuperscript{217}

Even though there is no single accepted definition of term minority, one of the most cited definition in regard to the concept of minority is that of Francesco Capotorti who was appointed in 1977 the Special Rapporteur by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: “A group numerically inferior to the rest of population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their cultures, traditions, religion or language.”\textsuperscript{218}

Another important definition very much cited in academic literature, which however did not bring any new elements, was that of Jules Deschênes:

A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a

\textsuperscript{215} See interview with Selimi, \textit{op.cit.} note 4.
\textsuperscript{216} See Pentassuglia, \textit{op.cit.} note 152, 32-61.
\textsuperscript{218} Cited by Pentassuglia, \textit{op.cit.} note 152, p.57 (references to original text are Francesco Capotorti, \textit{Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities}. (UN Study E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1) (United Nations, New York, 1979), 96 (or paragraph 568).
collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.\textsuperscript{219}

These definitions seem consistent with an earlier definition provided by Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ), the new element or the difference being their emphasis on the size of the group. The PCIJ in its \textit{Greco-Bulgarian Communities} case provides the following:

The community is a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united by this identity of race, religion, language and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other."\textsuperscript{220}

All these definitions can be applied to a certain degree in Kosova’s context as well. However because of its specifics, Kosova does not perfectly fit these schemes. Kosova is a case that proves the difficulties of defining social categories as a ‘nation’, ‘nationality’, ‘national minority’, ‘linguistic or cultural minority’, ‘ethnic group’ or any other similar designation. Whenever one tries to apply such notions in Kosova or tries to clarify ethnic problems through conventional definitions or legal norms, he or she can only get a blurred picture about the situation and the wider political context.

First, when Albanians were divided from emerging state of Albania in 1913, they comprised almost half of the whole Albanian population in the Balkans and one third of all Albanians in the world.\textsuperscript{221} Also, it is important to note that, from that time on, Albanians as population and their territories had uninterrupted territorial links within Yugoslavia and with Albania as a state, thus living in a homogenous territory.\textsuperscript{222} Secondly, Albanians remained in Yugoslavia were even more than some of the constituent Yugoslav nation after 1945 as Macedonians and Montenegrins and almost equal with Slovenes and Muslims. Thus it was always hard to treat Albanians in ex-Yugoslavia as mere minority.

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid. 58 (original text can be found in Jules Deschenes, “Qu’est-ce qu’une Minorite?” (1986), 27 Cahiers de Droit, 255).


\textsuperscript{222} See Qosja, \textit{op.cit.} note 194, 81-120.
Another characteristic is that Kosova comprises different nationalities, but traditionally a large majority of the population was and is Albanian (the percentage of Albanians varied in different periods from 70 to 90%). The biggest minority was and is Serbian population (jointly with Montenegrins). Other small minorities are Turks, Bošnjaks (ex-Muslims), Romas (now divided into three groups: Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians), Gorani, Croats etc. Some of these minorities even though have keen states they do not have any direct territorial links with them preventing them to claim any territorial revisions. Therefore, the aforementioned definitions of the term minority more or less can be applied to them as well. All other minorities apart from part of the Serbian minority which is concentrated in the north of Kosova and has direct links with Serbia are dispersed throughout Kosova, while Albanians live in very homogenous territory. As it was clear from observations in this report the main conflict was between Albanians and Serbian regime over Kosova. Other minorities didn’t play any significant role in this conflict.

In the period 1918-1941, as now indicated, Albanians were not even recognized as minority. After 1945, as to be seen in the following discussion, Albanians first gained the status of minority and afterwards with the Constitution of 1974 that of nationality. The term nationality was a vague one, trying to reconcile Serbian pressure that Albanians should enjoy only the rights of minorities and Albanians’ claims that they deserved to be treated as equal nation with the other nations in the Yugoslav federation, meaning that they should have the full right to form a republic of their own, thereby being entitled to an undeniable right to self-determination. As it was indicated already, Albanians never really accepted the position of minority or afterwards that of nationality since they were in reality not only the biggest non-Slavic minority but in the same time they were more in number than Macedonians and Montenegrins, and almost equal in number with Slovenes and Muslims. On the other hand, Serbs in Kosova even though they were a minority, never felt as such. Since Kosova was part of Serbia and Serbs were considered as one of the constituent nations of the federation, and furthermore were the biggest population in the federal state, Serbs considered that the same criteria should be applied in Kosova when it comes to the question who was a minority and who was majority in Kosova. In their view, Serbs constituted the majority. Until the beginning of 1971 they were the privileged population in Kosova. This conclusion can be supported by statistics, which shows that as of 1956, Serbs accounted for 23.5 percent of population, but 58.3 percent of the members of the security forces and 60.8 percent of the regular police. Montenegrins accounted for only 3.9 percent of the local population, but fully 28.3 percent of security forces and 7.9 percent of regular police. On the other hand, Albanians, who according to official statistics, were 64.9 percent of the population

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223 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 268.
224 See Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 187-201.
225 See Islami, op.cit. note 214.
226 See Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 187-201.
accounted for only 13.3 percent of the security police and 31.3 percent of the regular police.\textsuperscript{227} Even though the Constitution of the 1963, compared to that of 1946, increased Kosova’s autonomy a bit, giving to the province some more powers and strengthening its connection with federal bodies, Kosova’s status was still inferior compared to that of the six republics and Kosova Albanians continued to be treated as a minority within Serbia.\textsuperscript{228} The core difference was that provinces had statutes,\textsuperscript{229} while republics operated under their own constitutions. It was no longer stated that the right of secession belongs to Republics, but to the ‘peoples’ (‘kombet’ in Albanian, or ‘narodi’ in Serbian) of Yugoslavia, meaning Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and from 1971 Muslims, but for example not to Albanians and Hungarians, which were not considered ‘peoples’ but ‘nationalities’ therefore not entitled to secede.\textsuperscript{230} ‘Nation’ or ‘people’ was defined as the population who constitute the majority of the population in a certain Republic, considering it as their homeland. All other remaining peoples were considered as ‘nationalities’ (‘kombësi’ or ‘narodnosti’). According to Gazmend Zajmi, there were nine group of populations categorized as nationalities in the Yugoslav federation: Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Ruthenes/Ukrainians, Czechs, and Italians, amounting to 10.8 percent of the whole population of Yugoslavia in 1971.\textsuperscript{231} Romas were among those communities that were exempted from this categorization. Apart from Macedonia, which granted to them in its constitution equal status with other nationalities, other federal units didn’t guarantee any collective rights to them.\textsuperscript{232} As it was seen from above, Kosova Albanians were categorized as nationality. Tim Judah explains the meaning of the difference between ‘nations’ and ‘nationalities’:

The peoples of Yugoslavia were classed as either ‘nations’ or ‘nationalities’. The former were entitled to Yugoslav republics. They were the Slovenes, Croat, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. In 1971, they were joined by Bosnian Muslims. By contrast, ‘nationalities’ were peoples who were, in effect, cut off from an existing motherland. The most important from the ‘nationalities’ were the Kosovo Albanians and the Hungarians who

\textsuperscript{227} See Horvat, \textit{op.cit.} note 14, 62.
\textsuperscript{228} See Ramet, \textit{op.cit.} note 9, 76.
\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Ibid.} 73.
\textsuperscript{231} Gazmend Zajmi cited by Ramet, \textit{op.cit.} note 9, 55 (the original reference is Gazmend Zajmi, “Položaj i uloga narodnosti u SFR Jugoslaviji” (“The Position and the Role of Nationalities in SFRY”), in Drušveno-Politički Sistem SFRJ, 379-80.
\textsuperscript{232} See Ramet, \textit{op.cit.} note 9, 55.
Although the next constitution of 1974 advanced the legal status of Kosova within Yugoslavia, Kosova was still treated as an autonomous province within Serbia. Nonetheless some things changed positively. For the first time Kosova was represented federally. In this time the highest governing institution was the Federal Assembly which was constituted of a Federal Chamber and Chamber of Republics and Provinces. In the Federal Chamber, which gathered representatives from socio-political and self-managing socialist organizations, Kosova was represented by 20 members. Republics were represented by 30 members in this Chamber. In the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, there were 8 members representing Kosova directly elected from the Provincial Assembly. In this Chamber 12 places were reserved for each Republic. For the first time it was constitutionally codified that the borders of Kosova were unchangeable without Kosova’s consent. Article 5 states that republican borders cannot be changed without their consent, while for autonomous provinces, it states that the two provinces ‘also’ must agree. More explicitly this issue is regulated within Kosova’s Constitution when it is stated that territory of the province can not be changed without the consent of the province’s assembly.

But the Constitution of 1974 still denied the central right to Kosova - that of self-determination. Kosova Albanians, even though legally treated as a nationality-which was meant to be more advanced that being mere minority-still lacked the right for self-determination. Denied a republic of their own, they felt that in essence they were still treated as a minority. And, of course, this was a purely political decision. Whenever one talks of national minorities it is usually related to numbers. But, in SFRY this was not the case: even though in 1974 and afterwards Kosova Albanians were larger as a national group than Montenegrins and Macedonians, and nearly equal in numbers to Slovenes, which were considered as ‘peoples’, they were treated as equivalent to Bulgarians, Slovaks, Turks etc., that were considered to be ‘nationalities’. According to their high birth rate at the 1991 when they boycotted the census in Kosova it was estimated that the total number of Albanians in the federation probably was greater than the number of Slovenes and equal to the number of Muslims. All assessments showed that in 1991 they were the third or the fourth population in Yugoslavia according to numbers. But unlike these national groups who

233 See Judah, op.cit. note 44, 37.
236 Ibid, Article 292.
237 See the Constitution of SAP of Kosova, op.cit. note 234, article 3.
238 See Clark, op.cit. note 12,41.
239 See Gow, op.cit. note 119, 4;and Hivzi Islami, “Demografski problem Kosova in njihovo tumačenje” (“Demographic Problems of Kosova and its Interpretation”) in Slavko Gaber and
had their own republics, Albanians did not. Moreover Article 1 of the 1974 Constitution clearly states that two autonomous provinces are within the SR of Serbia:

The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state as state community of nations willingly united and of its socialist republics and of the socialist autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosova which are set within the Socialist Republic of Serbia, based on the power and self-management of working class and of all working men, and democratic self-managing socialist commune of working people, citizens and equal nations and nationalities.\(^{240}\)

It is interesting to mention that while Article 3 defines the six republics as ‘states’, it calls autonomous provinces as ‘democratic socio-political self-managing socialist communes’.\(^{241}\) Although the constitution affirms the equality of nations with nationalities\(^ {242}\), the inequality of autonomous provinces compared to republics was obvious at every level even at the most symbolic. Article 9 defines the official blazon [what?] of SFRY. It comprises a wheat garland above six flambeaus which symbolized the six republics.\(^ {243}\) It is interesting to note that Branko Horvat also observed that even the name of the state Yugoslavia alienates Albanian population which never felt to be Slavic. Thus he proposed at the end of 1987 that with the upgrading of the status of Kosova into the level of republic, the name of the state also should be changed, proposing the name “Balkan Federation.”\(^ {244}\)

The table below summarizes Besnik Pula’s views on the evolution of the legal and political status of Kosova.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Provinces and Districts recognized as legal categories of and sanctioned by the</td>
<td>Autonomous Provinces and Districts recognized as legal categories of the federation but formed and regulated</td>
<td>Autonomous provinces formed and regulated by republics.</td>
<td>Autonomous provinces recognized as special legal categories of the federation that perform functions equal to republics. However, provinces lack the right to secession.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The changing status of the SAP Kosova in Yugoslavia\(^ {245}\)

\(^{240}\) Tonči Kuzmanić (eds.), Zbornik: Kosovo-Srbija-Jugoslavija (Collection: Kosovo-Serbia-Yugoslavia) (Krt, Ljubljana, 1989), 45.
\(^{241}\) See the Constitution of Yugoslavia, op.cit. note 235, Article 1.
\(^{242}\) Ibid, Article 3.
\(^{243}\) Ibid, Article 245.
\(^{244}\) Ibid, Article 9.
\(^{244}\) See Horvat, op.cit. note 14, 144-47.
\(^{245}\) Pula, op.cit. note 3, 25.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of legislation</th>
<th>Legislative Body</th>
<th>Basic function</th>
<th>Authority of republic in controlling the province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional administration on the basis of federal and republican laws.</td>
<td>People’s Council (Provincial Chamber and Chamber of Producers)</td>
<td>Administrative unit</td>
<td>Republic can declare null and void any resolution passed by the provincial assemblies and annul any decision by the Executive Council. It can abolish the provincial assembly and the Executive Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional administration on the basis of federal and republican laws, with the right to complement them according to regional needs.</td>
<td>Provincial Assembly (Provincial Chamber, Chamber of Economics, Chamber of Culture-Education, Social-Health Chamber, Organizational-Political Chamber)</td>
<td>Administrative unit</td>
<td>Republic can declare null and void any resolution passed by the provincial assemblies and annul any decision by the Executive Council. It can abolish the provincial assembly and the Executive Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional administration on the basis of federal and republican laws.</td>
<td>People’s Council</td>
<td>Administrative unit</td>
<td>Republic can declare null and void any resolution passed by the provincial assemblies and annul any decision by the Executive Council. It can abolish the provincial assembly and the Executive Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional government on the basis of provincial laws, and relevant federal and republican laws. Provincial assemblies can enact their own laws.</td>
<td>Provincial Assembly</td>
<td>Legislative unit</td>
<td>Republic can adopt laws that are in the “joint interest” of all, such as those related to security and economic policy. All other fields are regulated independently by the Provinces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Executive**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Executive Council</th>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Authority of republic in controlling the province**

- Republic can declare null and void any resolution passed by the provincial assemblies and annul any decision by the Executive Council. It can abolish the provincial assembly and the Executive Council.
- Republic can declare null and void any resolution passed by the provincial assemblies and annul any decision by the Executive Council. It can abolish the provincial assembly and the Executive Council.
- Republic can declare null and void any resolution passed by the provincial assemblies and annul any decision by the Executive Council. It can abolish the provincial assembly and the Executive Council.
b. The changes that the dissolution of former Yugoslavia brought for the status of each ethnic and minority group

In the short term, the dissolution of Yugoslavia worsened to a tragic level the position of all ethnicities, since almost all ‘peoples’ and nationalities of ex-Yugoslavia experienced to a certain degree the atrocities of the wars accompanying the process of dissolution of a joint state. In the long term however this horrible process paved the way toward realization of some of the national goals of certain nations such as Slovenes, Croats, Macedonians and to certain degree Albanians, Serbs and Bośniaks (ex-Muslims), since the joint state never managed to reconcile their national goals and desires.

After the suppression of the Kosova’s autonomy, the most affected was the Albanian population which was subjected to open apartheid. Thousands of people were expelled from their jobs. Teachers, pupils, and students were expelled from their schools and faculties. Doctors were expelled from hospitals. Provincial police were dismissed and 25.000 policemen were brought from Serbia to Kosova. As Noel Malcolm observed rightly ‘arbitrary arrest and police violence have become routine’. In 1990 approximately 6.000 teachers were sacked because they took part in protests and afterward refused to comply with imposed Serbian curricula, which totally changed Albanian history and ignored much of Albanian literature. In 1994, 15.000 people were invited in ‘informative talks’, usually without being told the reason of summons. According to the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter CDHRF) in Kosova in 1994 alone were recorded 2.157 physical assaults by police, 3.553

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246 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 345-356.
247 Ibid. 349.
248 Ibid.
raids on private dwellings, and 2.963 arbitrary arrests.\textsuperscript{249} This entire situation led to the creation of the parallel system, meaning the creation a set of institutions that were totally independent from Belgrade, institutionally and financially. These institutions were illegal from Belgrade’s point of view therefore it intimidated them but legal in the eyes of the majority of population in Kosova, who supported them, showing high level of solidarity.\textsuperscript{250} It was about this time when the whole Kosova society acted as a civil society opposing the Belgrade regime in all fields of life. The position of other minorities in Kosova during this period didn’t change substantially since they were never in the focus of the conflict but were more spectators of the conflict. From time to time they were misused by the regime in this conflict. After the war in Kosova the position of Serbs and Romas deteriorated. The position of Albanians and Bošniaks who continued to live in the northern part of Kosova mainly controlled by Serbs also continued to be very bad.\textsuperscript{251} Even though there have been substantial improvements in creating a secure environment in Kosova for all people, many, particularly in north and south Mitrovica still face uncertainty regarding security.\textsuperscript{252}

One can conclude that among biggest victims (together with Bošnjaks, Croats and Albanians) of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia are Serbs, whose politicians bear the main responsibility for the outbreak of the war during this process. During this process and as result of the war a lot Serbs lost their lives and many others left their homes, villages and towns in Croatia, in the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and finally in Kosova. They became a minority in Croatia, Macedonia, in Montenegro, and in Kosova.\textsuperscript{253}

c) Roma community as most vulnerable minority

After Milošević’s rise to power, relationships of Serbs with Albanians have been aggravated. As it was stated above some non-Albanian minorities were used by the Serbian state apparatus in their confrontation with Albanians. Romas, as a more vulnerable ethnic group in Kosova, ex-Yugoslavia and generally in Europe today, were particularly used for the regime’s

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid. 349-50.
\textsuperscript{250} See Pula, \textit{op.cit.} note 3; see also Valon Murati, “The Role of Civil Society in Good Governance in Kosova”, in Wolfgang Benedict (ed.), \textit{Civil Society and Good Governance in Societies in Transition} (Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Belgrade, 2006), 77-114, at 82-4.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{253} In Kosova terms ‘nationality’, ‘nation’ or ‘national minority’ in political rhetoric of international administration and in their legal norms established in Kosova are not in use. When they refer to different nationalities they term them just as a ‘community’. However bearing in mind that Albanians comprise about 90 percent of population in Kosova, in reality other communities but Albanians are considered as minorities. The term ‘community’ is a compromise with Serbian tendency not to accept to be treated as minority in Kosova since they consider that Kosova is undeniable part of Serbia.
objectives. They even were organized to demonstrate in support of Serbia’s effort to abolish the autonomy of Kosovo: “In 1989, in an action which will likely not to be forgotten soon by the Kosovo Albanians, some Roma in Belgrade demonstrated under a banner stating ‘We are behind you, Slobo’ in support of abrogation of the autonomy of Kosovo province.”

On the other hand, some Gorani minority who perceive themselves Slavic by origin but Muslim by faith, started to change their Muslim surnames to the Slavic form (Sherifi changed into Sherifović). Most of the Goranis live in Dragash municipality which is in the southern part of Kosovo. Nearly 18,000 of them lived there before 1999. There also is another community emerged from the Roma people which have chosen the Albanian language as their mother tongue. They call themselves Ashkali. Some others who speak Albanian consider themselves as Egyptians. Nonetheless it seems that during the Yugoslav era the most privileged non-Albanian minority in Kosovo were Turks. The Turkish language was one of the official languages of Kosovo since 1974 and therefore official documents in Kosovo were published in three languages: Serbian, Albanian, and Turkish. Their position did not worsen either during Milošević or after the establishment of international administration in Kosovo. However, the role of these minorities in political events taking place in Kosovo was less important than relations between Serbs and Albanians.


a. Objective requirements for the process of ethno-mobilisation

i) The role of global changes of economics and political systems (in the first place cold war disappearance) for creation of bases for ethno mobilization

The Cold War, which lasted about 45 years in Europe, gave to Yugoslavia a specific political and economic position. This occurred due to the fact that Yugoslavia was a socialist country that defied Stalin’s policies in 1948. As result of trying to avoid the pressure from the Soviet camp, it established special relationships with the West. For much of the Cold War Yugoslavia served as a buffer zone between two blocs. This position was extensively used by Titoist regime to gain benefits, in the beginning from the West, and afterwards from both camps and the Third World. The Yugoslav economy regularly was financially supported by international financial organizations as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. As well, as it received economic aid from West, particularly from the USA in the aftermath of Yugoslav break up with USSR. During 1951-1959 for example Yugoslavia

254 Claude Cahn and Tatjana Perić, “Roma and the Kosovo Conflict”, in Roma in the Kosovo Conflict, European Roma Rights Center, Budapest, 2000, 6.
256 Interview with Gani Toska, op.cit. note 206.
257 See the Constitution of SAP Kosova, op.cit. note 234, Article 5.
received economic aid alone from USA that amounted to $700 million.\footnote{258 See Steve Terrett, \textit{The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: A Contextual Study of Peace-Making Efforts in the Post-Cold War World} (Ashgate and Aldershot, Burlington, Dartmouth, 2000), 60.} During the Cold War Yugoslavia borrowed capital and imported advanced technology and spare parts from the West, while through bilateral agreements with countries of the Soviet bloc and those of Third World, it secured fuel and other strategic resources in exchange for armaments, construction projects, and manufactured goods.\footnote{259 See Woodward, \textit{op.cit.} note 100, 27.} Politically Yugoslavia kept its neutrality through active engagement in Non-aligned Movements (NAM), comprising countries of the Third World that were not participating in either of two big alliances. In creating and maintaining of this movement Yugoslavia played a crucial political and economic role.\footnote{260 \textit{Ibid.} 26.} Yugoslav engagement with the West continued throughout 80’s, when the IMF particularly was active in supporting Yugoslav efforts to overcome huge economic crises that embraced the federation after the 1970’s.\footnote{261 \textit{Ibid.}} However with the collapse of Soviet bloc and the end of Cold War, the position of Yugoslavia in the international scene dramatically changed, weakening its once very strong international status.\footnote{262 See Lampe, \textit{op.cit.} note 10, 332.} Yugoslavia was not anymore as attractive and as important as it used to be during Cold War. There was no more Soviet Union; therefore there was no longer any threat that adversaries of the West could penetrate to the Mediterranean through Yugoslavia or that these adversaries could threaten Greece and Italy using Yugoslav soil.\footnote{263 See Zimmermann, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 6; see also Woodward, \textit{op.cit.} note 100, 25.} This situation had given to Yugoslavia a special position in maintaining international security, playing its game between Western and Eastern blocs and continuously benefiting from it. The last ambassador in Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann explained very precisely this position: “Yugoslavia’s position between hostile Eastern and Western camps made its unity a major Western concern. As long as the cold war continued, Yugoslavia was a protected and sometimes pampered child of American and Western diplomacy. Tito and his successors, after his death in 1980, grew accustomed to this special treatment.”\footnote{264 \textit{Ibid.} 7.} To preserve this position Yugoslavia strengthened its military capacities, causing its military to represent one of most unified institution in the fragile Yugoslav federation.\footnote{265 \textit{Ibid.} 29} The disappearance of the Cold War left the Yugoslav Army without a job — a situation that induced rather than restrained the dissolution of Yugoslavia. As Steve Terrett put it rightly “the disappearance of ‘external’ threats which existed during the Cold War allowed internal problems to be ‘promoted’”.\footnote{266 See Terrett,, \textit{op.cit.} note 258, 63.} Also the role of Non-Aligned Movement declined, accompanied with growing economic problems, unemployment, social and ethnic tensions. Yugoslavia once a very privileged country in its relationship with European Community, started to be replaced by other
Central European Countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia that started immediately to be drawn into European culture and heritage.\textsuperscript{267} As Zimmermann recalls his discussions with deputy secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger after he was appointed ambassador in 1989, in the eyes of the US, Yugoslavia will no longer enjoy its former geopolitical significance as a balance between Western and Eastern bloc. In addition he stated that US would now carefully observe human rights violations, particularly repression of Albanian civil liberties, which were downplayed in the past because of US security interests.\textsuperscript{268} Furthermore he explains that he reasserted to the Yugoslav regime the US traditional stand, supporting the unity, independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, but warned that this support continue only if Yugoslavia progressed toward democracy and if this unity would not be maintained by force.\textsuperscript{269} It was clear by then that times had changed. The decline of Yugoslavia’s privileged international position was followed by the collapse of all internal social, economic and political structures that had kept the federation together. This situation, induced by growing ethno mobilization campaigns in all federal units and among all of Yugoslavia’s peoples, led to the bloody break up of the federation.

ii) The role of economic crisis in federation: poverty and inequality in distribution of goods and power as basis for ethno-mobilization

During almost 50 years of the existence of SFRY, Kosova always was economically the most underdeveloped and backward region of Federation. Of course this position played an important role in the political processes that took place in Kosova throughout the last of half of the 20 century. However it is impossible to analyze the causes of this backwardness and its political effects without analyzing the general economic circumstances in the federation. The first economic strategy of Tito’s Yugoslavia after the Second World War was the orientation of economic development and investments based on following two fundamental factors:

* Existing state of economic infrastructure after the Second World War and
* Mapping the structure of natural resources through the Federation\textsuperscript{270}

The northern part of Yugoslavia was ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It inherited not only a richer legal and administrative culture, but also was economically more advanced than the rest of the country. Therefore it is not by chance that export-oriented (mostly to Western Europe) light and consumer-goods industries were mainly concentrated in this region (in Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina as the northern part of Serbia, but also in Belgrade’s environs).\textsuperscript{271} The southern part of the Federation for a long time

\textsuperscript{267} See Woodward, \textit{op.cit.} note 100, 104-5.
\textsuperscript{268} See Zimmermann, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 7.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid. 8.
\textsuperscript{270} See Ramet, \textit{op.cit.} note 9, 29-31; and Woodward, \textit{op.cit.} note 100, 28-9.
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid. See also Woodward, \textit{op.cit.} note 100, 29.
was ruled by Ottoman Empire. Serbia and Montenegro, even though they were independent states in contrast to other regions that joined them in 1918, were greatly influenced by the Ottoman Empire, which ruled both states for centuries. The Empire’s permanent decline in the last century of its existence influenced the poor performances of the economy in these regions as well. These regions also inherited a different legal, political and administrative culture that made the process of integrating all these parts into one unified political and administrative unit quite hard. Taking into account the backwardness of these southern regions but also their richness in natural and mineral resources, Yugoslavia’s heavy industry was concentrated in Kosova, Bosnia and Macedonia. These industries in these poorest regions were oriented toward exploiting primary commodities. In contrast to the northern part of the country, these regions cooperated more with countries in from Middle East. Serbia because of its substantial metal industry and heavy manufacturing had relatively more business with Eastern Bloc. Access that had to those markets through Danube river also had an important influence in that direction.

As it was indicated, the relatively sustainable economic functioning of Yugoslavia was especially indebted to its international relations created during the Cold War. Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948 transformed Yugoslavia in a favorable place for Western countries to extend their ideological and political influence in Yugoslavia pushing forward the borders of the battle with the world of Socialism. Also, Yugoslavia regularly used to receive funds from the IMF and the World Bank, which played an important role in financial reforms undertaken time to time by federal government and also supported many infrastructural projects.

Despite this economic openness toward the neo-liberal capitalist West, the main economic problem Yugoslavia always faced, but which it never managed to overcome, remained the deep inner differences of economic development of the different regions. Sabrina P. Ramet in her study offers, maybe, the most insightful analysis of this issue, concluding that the fundamental economic challenge in Yugoslavia, which later served as a destructive element, was the difference between the poorest and richest regions.

The first serious measure undertaken toward the leveling of these different stages of economic development was the foundation of the FADURK starting its activity on 1965. There were 4 regions defined as underdeveloped places: Kosova, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The developed republics paid into this Fund a percentage of republic incomes, initially 1.85%, increased up to 1.94% in subsequent years. 30% of this amount was dedicated for Kosova. Even this couldn’t stimulate wide-scale economic development in Kosovo. Widespread economic development in Kosovo was held back by Kosova’s traditionally unfavorable economic structure, which was based on those industrial sectors that exploited primary commodities to supply

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272 Ibid.
273 Ibid. 27.
274 See Woodward, op.cit. note 100, 26-7.
275 See Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 137-141.
efficient finished-product industrial sectors in the rest of the country. During the 1970-s Kosova supplied other regions mainly with electric energy, colored metals, textiles, etc. Increased investments in growing energy capacities of Kosova were done mainly to fulfill the huge needs of other parts of the country for the energy. In addition 2/3 of the energy produced in Kosova was ‘sold’ to other regions, with low prices set by administrative bodies of the federation. The situation was more or less the same with the lead-metal exports to other republics and with zinc and silver which was virtually all exported to other regions of the country. Capital investments in these sectors were too big in comparison to the low profits that Kosova gained and the low number of new jobs secured by these investments.

The situation was more than ironical, regarding cooperation with neighboring federal units in field of energy. Macedonia and Serbia bought this energy with prices 2-3 times lower than market prices. Furthermore through electro distributors from these federal units sold the same energy in Kosova at higher prices. It is interesting to quote how the only daily in Albanian, Rilindja, analyzed in 1980 failures of investments in Kosova by FADURK:

From 1966 through 1975 every dinar invested in the country’s power-generating economy resulted in an increase in social production of 0.24 dinars, whereas in Kosova the figure was 0.22 dinars. The difference is thus not very large...In trade, hostelry, and tourism, the degree of the effectiveness of investments realized during the abovementioned period is approximately the same for the Kosovo economy as for that of the country as a whole. Other comparisons are also very indicative. Thus, if Kosova had had the same structure of socioeconomic investments as the structure of investments for the country as a whole during the aforementioned 10-year period, the degree of the effectiveness of Kosova economic investments, at the volume realized, would have been over a quarter higher than what was in fact realized.

This failure was accepted also as a political fact: “The Tenth Congress of the CLY (May 1974) evaluated the results of FADURK’s nine-year program for stimulating the development of the south and concluded that the program

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277 Ibid. 190.
278 Ibid. 217-8.
279 See Rilindja, November 18, 1980, 7, cited by Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 158.
had failed to narrow the developmental gap between the north and the south - its primary objective."\(280\)

Over the years the unemployment rate in Kosova increased. The unemployment average in Kosova was always far above that of Yugoslavia’s. In 1974 unemployment in Kosova reached 31% while the average unemployment rate for the whole Federation was 8.3%, compared to 3.1% in Slovenia. During subsequent years economic crises became worse: in 1987 unemployment in Kosova reached its peak of 55.8% while Slovenia as the most developed republic within Yugoslavia reduced its unemployment down to 1.8%. Whereas according to the Developmental Plan in Kosova for the years 1976-80 there were 58,475 new jobs to be created, just 25,590 of them managed to become established, and thus only 43% of the plan was accomplished\(281\).

It is generally believed that, after year 1974 up to the mid ‘80s, Kosova experienced an unforeseen economic progress at all levels. But as Sabrina P. Ramet clearly notes, this opinion is false. In an economic analysis of development in a country, isolated figures of economic growth show nothing at all. That’s why the difference between these figures at different moments is less important than the difference in growth rates for Kosova, compared to other regions in the country. To illustrate this, let’s take years 1971-75. During this time the economic growth of Kosova was 11.6%, compared to Yugoslavia’s average of 8.2%\(282\). But the per-capita gap widened. In 1947, Kosova’s per capita social product in relation to Slovenia stood 1:3.2, in 1978 this gap had widened to 1:6.9\(283\). In 1979, the average per capita income in Kosova was $795, Yugoslavia’s average per capita income was $2,635 while that of Slovenia was $5,315.\(284\) This is clear demonstration that these comparative differences of growth between regions in the Federation are far more meaningful to understand properly the economic problem of Yugoslavia. This widening gap of economic growth between different regions remained a fundamental problem of Yugoslavia’s economy exactly as one of the World Bank early reports in 1975 warns: “Yugoslavia’s regional economic problem is “not a problem of economic stagnation in the less developed republics... [but] one of increasing regional differences between developed and less developed republics despite rapid growth in both.”\(285\)

Although during the years 1965-88 $10.5 billion were paid out in FADURK, which is $465 million per year, but this Fund didn’t manage to reduce the economic crisis in Kosova. Mirko Tepavac, Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia during 1960-72, thinks that this problem of a ‘widening gap’ became worse especially after the economic reform of 1965: “In 1965 started a vast economic reform which aimed at the establishment of a market economy through control avoidance. This brought a dramatic increase of production

\[\text{280} \quad \text{ibid.} \ 153-154.\]
\[\text{281} \quad \text{ibid.} \ 159.\]
\[\text{282} \quad \text{ibid.} \ 147.\]
\[\text{283} \quad \text{ibid.} \ 147.\]
\[\text{284} \quad \text{See Vickers, op.cit. note 139, 187.}\]
\[\text{285} \quad \text{See Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 160.}\]
and incomes; in Kosova, the poorest, unlike in other regions, it inflicted setback. 286

A parallel economic problem Kosova faced under Yugoslavia was that of discrimination toward the Albanian population. Serbs and Montenegrins were overrepresented in jobs in the public sector. While only 8 out of every 100 Albanians were employed in this sector, 17 Serbs out of every 100, and 20 Montenegrins out of every 100 were employed in the same place 287. Throughout 80-s Kosova’s economy, even though made some positive progress, in essence didn’t gain any positive momentum in its developments and structural changes, particularly comparing to other parts of the country. 288

These economic circumstances profoundly influenced the ethno-mobilization process among Kosova Albanians. It is not by chance that the demonstrations of year 1981 started because of bad conditions of accommodation and nutrition among students. On 11 March 1981 almost one year after Tito’s death, a number of students of University of Prishtina used as a pretext their bad conditions of food in dining-hall to start demonstrations against discrimination towards Kosova Albanians in Yugoslavia. All of a sudden this protest turned into a huge demonstration gathering hundreds of thousands of Kosova Albanians. Even though the worsening economic situation in Kosova during these years characterized by near 40% of unemployment rate 289 was the initial focus of the demonstrations, the slogans the demonstrators shouted also had a political content. As one of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) reports says: “(...) some of the slogans included ‘Kosovo Republic’, ‘We want a University’, ‘Down with colonial policy in Kosovo’, and ‘Long Live Albania’” 290. This happened because Kosova Albanians felt discriminated against nationally, rather than economically; or, at least, they perceived that their hard economic situation was due to the political inequality of Kosova with other republics. Sabrina P. Ramet thinks properly that this event reconfirmed the primacy of national sentiments and identity over Yugoslavism. 291

After the demonstrations of 1981, a number of Serbs left Kosova. 292 Politicians in Serbia blamed Albanians for this emigration. Political tensions were rising and economic situation was deteriorating. Worsening ethnic tensions followed this situation. No one felt safe in Kosova at that time. All these circumstances, even though statistics showed Serbs still in more privileged position, induced their emigration, which was misused by the regime in Belgrade to turn the whole Serbian and Yugoslav public opinion against Albanians in Kosova. In 1983 the ex-chief of secret police (UBD) Aleksandar Ranković expelled from CLY in 1966, died in Dubrovnik. His funeral gathered tens of thousands of Serbs, some of them shouting slogans such as ‘Serbia is rising’, giving a clear message about how and what they

286 See Mirko Tepavac, ”Jugoslavija e Titos”, in Jasmina Udovički and James Ridgeway (eds.), Makthi Etnik i Jugosllavisë: Historia e Vërtetë e Dhimbjes së Pashprehur të Evropës, Albin, Tiranë 1998., 57-72, at 66
287 See Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 192.
288 See Verli, op.cit. note 276, 240-300.
289 See Woodward, op.cit. note 100, 53.
290 See IICK, op.cit. note 44, 35.
291 See Ramet, op.cit. note 9, 198.
292 See Judah, op.cit. note 44, 43.
wanted in Kosovo. One year later, the CLY of Serbia drew up a draft law revoking the constitutional changes of 1974, dealing with Kosovo and Vojvodina, calling the 1974 changes a synchronized anti-Serbian endeavor to weaken Serbia.

b. Instruments that were used for ethno-mobilisation

i) Media (TV/radio/ printed media) used for this purpose

The Albanian media in Kosovo were mainly controlled by the state apparatus of the CLK. Therefore traditionally it didn’t play any direct role in the process of ethno-mobilization of Albanians for most of the time. However it played huge role in emancipation of Albanian society in Kosovo and generally in Yugoslavia. Media outlets served as the main institution of proliferation of Albanian music, culture, literature, etc. In addition Rilindja, the only daily in Albanian language in Kosovo in the aftermath of the fall of Ranković in 1966, played an important role in discrediting his policies against Albanians. It was about 1988 and 1989 when the Albanian media started to act more freely than before, as they started to be released from the harsh censorship and political pressure imposed by the state and party in the aftermath of the demonstration of 1981. It was about that time that these media started to support, to a certain degree, protests by the Albanian population at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989 against the suppression of Kosovo’s autonomy. Then, on 5 July 1990 after deputies of Kosovo Assembly on 2 July 1990 declared independent status within Yugoslavia, the Serbian regime shut down all the media and expelled all Albanian journalists from their jobs.

On the other side, Serbian media played an important role in the process of ethno-mobilization among Serbs in Serbia proper by using intensively as propaganda tool what they called ‘genocide’ against Serbs in Kosovo, followed by the remerging “Kosovo myth”, claiming the Kosovo as the epicenter of the Serbian nationhood. This propaganda intensified, particularly during the 1980s and after Milošević rose to power after 1987. In early 1980s, after the demonstration of 1981 took place in Kosovo, Albanians were immediately the target of Serbian media. Albanian men were declared to be rapists, although statistics showed that they have the lowest reported incidents of sexual violence in Yugoslavia, while Albanian women were portrayed as mere baby factories, even though statistics indicated that the childbirth rates of Albanian urban women were almost identical with childbirth rates of their counterparts in the rest of the country. As Julie Mertus pointed out rightly ‘Accused in past of being culturally inferior, Albanians increasingly were depicted as genetically inferior. This is racism

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293 Ibid. 47.
294 See Mertus, op.cit. note 138, 163.
295 See Lalaj, op.cit. note 14, 113 and 141-51.
296 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73; see also Pula, op.cit. note 3, 63.
297 See Judah, op.cit. note 44, 62; and Mertus, op.cit. note 138, 201.
298 See Mertus, op.cit. note 138, 8.
of the purest sort.' Media assaults against Albanians started to take extreme chauvinist tones, particularly after the rise of Milošović to power. Most active among media in that time were Radio Television of Belgrade, Politika, Borba, NIN, and Duga. They broadcasted and published regularly about what they called ‘Albanian terror and genocide’ taking place in Kosova against local Serbs and Montenegrins. How active the media were in inducing the process of ethno-mobilization is showed by the survey conducted by the Srđa Popović, Dejan Janča and Tanja Petovar about the magazine Politika as the most influential publication in Serbia during the period from 1 January to 1 July 1990. During this period 7 percent of all themes observed in one number of Politika dealt with Kosova problem. All articles related to Kosova in this newspaper more or less represented the official stance of regime on Kosova, influencing creation of a ‘truth’ about Kosova that the regime wanted the people to embrace. Thus the Serbian media started, in behalf of Serbian grievances in Kosova, to mobilize nationalistic emotions among Serbs in Serbia proper (even though, a majority of their writers and readers as well never visited Kosova and never knew anything about real life there; their knowledge was influenced mainly by other media and books) to pave a way for political action against Kosova’s autonomous position in Serbia and Yugoslavia. It was of ultimate importance for Serbian regime to convince Serbs in Serbia proper of the worthiness of these actions in Kosova. The preservation of ‘Serbian national interests’ was always among the key justification for these actions. Therefore it could be concluded that for Serbs in Serbia proper the conflict over Kosova was fabricated by the media and political elites in order to preserve control over this territory. Nevertheless after the suspension of Kosova’s autonomy, these media extended their role, influencing the growing hatred among different peoples in Yugoslavia that ended in terrible war: “Kosovo demonstrated that ethnic conflicts could be invented and exacerbated through media and propaganda. This effective tool became the principal mechanism for intensifying ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia. In essence, the media dramatically staged reality for millions of Serbs and turned whatever potential existed in Serbia for ethnic hatred into a self-fulfilling prophesy.”

As one Milošović biographer, Louis Sell concluded, control of the media was ‘one of the most consistent elements of Milošović’s rule’. Serbian media played an active role in demonizing other ethnic groups. Albanians were demonized as gangsters, terrorists and fundamentalists, inclined to kill and rape Serbs, Croats were depicted as genocidal, religious zealots that never

299 Ibid.
300 Ibid. 141-144.
301 Ibid.
303 Ibid. 99-102.
304 Pešić, op.cit. note 6, 17.
extinguished their ties with Nazism. Muslims were portrayed as fundamentalists trying to establish first Islamic state in Europe.\textsuperscript{306} As Belman put it rightly, this line of argument proper conditions for ‘Serbian perpetrators of genocide to think of themselves as the frontline defenders of European civilization against encroaching Islam’.\textsuperscript{307} Milošović was a genuine master in controlling and influencing media. His method of control was not through direct censorship, but rather by putting media in the hands of journalists who were supporters of his policies so they could influence the public with ultra-nationalist opinion.\textsuperscript{308} Thus it can be concluded that Serbian media bear a huge responsibility for what happened in Kosova at least from 1981, and from the end of ‘80s in all ex-Yugoslavia.

\textit{ii) The influence of the social environments}

Even though the multinational Federation comprised peoples with different cultural and religious backgrounds, Yugoslavia’s inner political divisions were chiefly distinguished along ethnic lines. As Michael Mann puts it, except for Bosnia, all the other seven constituent units of the Yugoslav Federation could function as common European nation-states\textsuperscript{309}. Beverly Crawford argues that gradual transfer of federal competencies to the republics deepened decentralization in such way that, after substantial constitutional changes between the years 1971-74, we can freely talk of an ethno-Federation composed of nearly sovereign states.\textsuperscript{310} This lead to what Harold Lydall called ‘feudal socialism’.\textsuperscript{311} Although to the innocent foreign eye, Yugoslavia seemed a more democratic country than other socialist states, this was not true, especially for the Albanian population. Yugoslavia was believed to have had more political prisoners than any other country in Europe with the possible exception of Turkey. During the 1980s, according to political analyst Mike Karadjis, even though Albanians comprised about 8 percent of the whole Yugoslav population, they made up about 75 percent of political prisoners of Yugoslavia. According to the scholar Alex J. Bellamy, by 1983 Kosovar Albanians (excluding Albanians from other parts of Yugoslavia) comprised 41.8 percent of all political prisoners in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{306} See Belman, \textit{op.cit.} note 299, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{307} \textit{Ibid.} 4.
\textsuperscript{311} See Ćuruvija and Torov, \textit{op.cit.} note 87, 75.
All these political circumstances laid down conditions for huge tensions in the social life of Albanians in Kosova. Permanent state pressure against Albanian political demands ensued with growing resistance by all social strata of the Albanian population. Ethno-mobilization of Kosova Albanians produced by these political and social circumstances was motivated chiefly by four main collective goals:

* Liberation from Serbian repressive control.
* Equality with other peoples of Yugoslavia. This meant demands for establishing a Republic of Kosova within Yugoslavia.
* Gaining the right of secession from Yugoslavia like other republics and eventually uniting with Albania.
* Huge dissatisfaction with economic situation in Kosova and general perception that Kosova’s economy was structured so as to be milked by Serbia in particular and Yugoslavia in general.

Traditionally, social life in Kosova was maintained and developed through respecting divisions into ethnic lines. Albanians and Serbs were accustomed to live in peace side by side but had never lived with each other. There were few cases of interethnic marriages, particularly few between Albanians and Serbs. Even though no significant clash between the two populations occurred during the modern history of Kosova, relationships were always perceived as tense. Bearing in mind that conflicts always took place in relation between Albanian population and Serbian regime, it however had effects in interethnic relationships. In the Albanian perception, local Serbs were tools misused by Belgrade to govern and control Kosova and Albanians, while, in the Serbian perception Albanians were a population determined to seize part of Serbian land in order to join it to foreign state. Thus the natural mistrust grew up through years. However until 1989, relations were maintained at the normal level, at least formally. But especially after 1989, Kosova as a society was strictly divided into ethnic lines. The worsening of relationships between Serbs and Albanians were in direct proportion to the repressiveness of Belgrade upon Kosova. Since 1991 up to 1999 the Albanian population in Kosova experienced an unprecedented apartheid in modern Europe. This new situation further deteriorated ethnic relationships and broke up any social cohesiveness among Albanians and Serbs, even formal ones.


313 See MERTUS, op.cit. note 138, 69.
314 See VICKERS, op.cit. note 139, 14-5.
315 Vickers states that majority of Albanians living either in Albania or in ex-Yugoslavia believes that on day peacefully or through war they will be united in one state, *ibid.* 13.
316 All writers of this Report experienced in their skin this period of apartheid. The have been expelled from their schools themselves and their parents were dismissed from their jobs.
iii) The role of schools and language to promote ethno-mobilisation

The struggle for education in the Albanian language played a significant role in the national conscience of Albanians in Yugoslavia. Public usage of the Albanian language was banned in old Yugoslavia, nevermind its usage in schools or in administration. After the war, three provincial statutes (1946, 1953 and 1963) even though allowed the Albanian language to be used in administration and to be taught at schools, still it was not treated at the same level as Serbo-Croatian in Kosova. The Albanian language gained equal treatment in Kosova only after the 1969 constitutional amendments and then more strongly after the approval of the Constitution of 1974.\textsuperscript{317} Education in the Albanian language gained its best momentum after the establishment of the University of Prishtina, the first university in Yugoslavia where education conducted in the Albanian language. However the establishment of this university, apart from having huge influence in flourishing Albanian culture, science and education in general, had huge political impacts as well.\textsuperscript{318} It was this time when relationships between Tirana and Prishtina were established, relationships which flourished for more than 10 years. In 1972, a congress was held in Tirana which for the first time established a unified Albanian standard language that was accepted immediately in Prishtina.\textsuperscript{319} The University of Prishtina started to serve as a base for recruitment of young Albanians who were not satisfied with political status of Kosova within Federation allowing them to demand for Kosova to become a republic.\textsuperscript{320} Therefore in 1981 in University of Prishtina was the starting point for demonstrations which first demanding better food in university cafeteria and better economic conditions in dormitories, ending with demand for Kosova Republic.\textsuperscript{321}

Giving equal treatment to the Albanian language and establishing a university in the Albanian language was perceived by part of Serbian population as first steps toward Albanization of Kosova. It was felt among Serbs that after 1974 the Albanian language was taking precedence over the Serbian language that up till than had been superior in all fields of life in Kosova. Therefore felt under huge pressure in all levels and feared that they would have to learn the Albanian language if they wanted to be employed.\textsuperscript{322} Serbian students during 1971 showed huge resentments about the fact that a huge number of Albanian students registered in University of Prishtina. In their protests, they insisted that quotas of parity (meaning that equal Serbian and Albanian students to be enrolled in UP per academic year) to be introduced in UP in order to avoid majorization of Albanians over Serbs.\textsuperscript{323} Even though these demands were not supported by official politics they were supported by Serbian media such as NIN, Politika, Večerne

\textsuperscript{317} See Article 3 of the Constitution of the SAP Kosova, op.cit. note 234.
\textsuperscript{318} See Mertus, op.cit. note 138, 17 and 28-9.
\textsuperscript{319} See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 328-9.
\textsuperscript{320} See Mertus, op.cit. note 138, 29.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid. 29-32.
\textsuperscript{322} See Horvat, op.cit. note 14. 126.
\textsuperscript{323} See Lalaj, op.cit. note 14, 168-9.
Novosti, Jedinstvo, paving way for final stage of eliminating UP and Albanian education during Milošević era. Taking into account this history of the struggle for emancipation of Albanian language in Yugoslavia as well as resentments in Serbian side when this emancipation was achieved, what happened in Kosova during the 1990-s is not surprising. All faculties of the University of Prishtina and the majority of secondary schools were closed by police forces. Albanians started boycotting the Serbian curricula in the educational system. As was mentioned above, they created a parallel educational system after 1991, organizing faculty and school classes in private homes that were bestowed from the citizens of Kosova to the UP and schools all over Kosova as sign of solidarity and political resistance toward Serbian regime. Even the first major break up within Albanian peaceful resistance movement occurred when students of the UP on 1st October of 1997 started massive demonstrations for the realizing their university goals against the Milošević regime without permission for the demonstrations from Ibrahim Rugova. These students’ demonstrations paved the way for the liberation war led by KLA.

iv) The role of the judiciary system in the process of ethno-mobilisation

From the Albanian side we can not conclude that the judiciary system of Kosova played any role in the process of their ethno-mobilization. It is true that from 1969, but particularly from 1974, Kosova had huge judicial independence in relation to Serbia. However the judiciary was permanently controlled by the state apparatus and it was not in any sense an independent judiciary. All provincial and federal organs after 1981, the Kosova judiciary in particular and the Yugoslav judiciary in general, were in charge of trying young Albanians that participated in demonstration of 1981 or that were part of illegal organizations. Moreover, the judicial system as whole (comprising that of Kosova, Serbia and Yugoslavia) served during most of time as and extended hand of Serbian interests and therefore indirectly influenced processes of ethno-mobilization among Serbs. This section concentrates only on the period after WW2 because the period prior to WW2 was marked by open discrimination against Albanians in all fields of life. Immediately after the establishment of new

324 Ibid.
325 See Kosotovičová, op.cit. note 154, 16; see also Bota e Re (New World) magazine of the Independent Students Union of the UP (September 1997).
326 See Lalaj, op.cit. note 14, 200 and 233-4.
328 As it was stated above, at that time, Albanians were not even recognized as minority in Yugoslavia. Situation at least from the legal and political point view changed after the war. However the discrimination of Albanians in the practice continued to be huge, particularly when they dealt with state apparatus; see Ibid. 62-3.
A number of trials were held against Albanians who opposed the establishment of Yugoslav communist regime in Kosova. Hundreds of people were put to trial and were sentenced to death. A particularly hard time for Albanians came under the terror of Ranković’s reign, which lasted until 1966. During this time, not only those who opposed the regime were put on trial, but members of the Albanian communist establishment also were put under surveillance by the police and UDB-a. One of the most controversial trials took place in 1956 in Prizren. This ‘Prizren trial’ accused, without any strong evidence, Nijazi Maloku, one of the senior Albanian communist leaders in Kosova, jointly with others, of being part of Sigurimi (Albanian Secret Service) and spying and plotting against Yugoslavia. They were sentenced to long prison terms... After 12 years of being held in prison, they were released, and the Kosovo Assembly passed a resolution declaring the trial ‘staged and mendacious‘. Political criminal trials were held constantly against Albanian political activists as it was case with Adem Demaçi who was tried three times by Yugoslav and Kosovo courts (1958, 1964 and 1975) imposing all together about 28 years in prison terms. However the hardest time was yet to come. After 1981, judiciary was again put under the chains of Serbian nationalism using it for judging young Albanians. From 1981 to 1989, 3,348 Albanians mostly from Kosovo were tried by ordinary and military courts holding political criminal trials. In 1981 and in 1989 the Serbian regime used a special, unlawful, tool to intimidate the Albanian intelligentsia, better known as ‘isolation’. ‘Isolation’ meant temporary unlawful detention, without any judicial procedure, of those who were considered to constitute a major threat to public order. The measure of ‘isolation’ was undertaken by direct political orders. About 237 different intellectuals were put under ‘isolation’ in 1989 along. After 1989 criminal political trials against Albanians openly biased against Albanians. This was the time when virtually all Albanian judges were expelled from the judiciary system in Kosovo. Accordingly political criminal trials were organized in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and two massive trials were held in 1997. All this organized terror didn’t bear the results that the Serbian regime wanted - the pacification of Albanians and Kosovo. Instead it further mobilized Albanians in their struggle for independence and self-determination. Accordingly this kind of judiciary system indirectly influenced also the process of ethno mobilization among Albanians.
Milošević mobilized Serbs around a nationalist project which consequently harmed non-Serbs but also harmed Serbs themselves. This ethno-mobilization shifted from what the great theoretician of nationalism Anthony D. Smith called ‘defensive nationalism’ toward ‘offensive nationalism’. Defensive nationalism has greater mobilizing force. It is built upon the supposed existence of one or more enemies whose goal is the destruction of one’s nation. Most of the Serbs started thinking that Tito’s Yugoslavia was an anti-Serbian political construction which intended their destruction. These victim-based sentiments and discourse were so deep that everything was marked by it. Suffice it to mention that, the Djordje Martinović case, in which a Serbian farmer was found with a broken bottle in his anus on May 1985. Immediately after this, politicians, intellectuals and press in Serbia were mobilized to identify it as the result of a pure ethnic attack by Albanians. One isolated incident which could have been either an individual criminal act or perhaps, as some of the medical investigations indicated, sexually masochistic performance (this was more an Albanian version of the story) suddenly was turned into a fabricated anti-Serbian campaign in Kosova. This highly tense situation worsened. And this was not just because of the common prejudices ordinary Serbs share. Unfortunately these racial prejudices were in bloom especially among intellectual elites in Serbia. In 1988, in the famous Serbian cultural journal Theoria (Nr. 3-4), on page 120, the well-known psychologist Vladeta Jerotić, wrote: ‘Albanians rape every day and everywhere: in the streets, in the fields, in buses, hospitals, factories’. These prejudices influenced the establishment of this kind of thinking also among ordinary people within Serbia. In 1993, one research study conducted in Serbia showed that ‘more than 50% of respondents accepted the stereotype that ‘all Albanians are primitive and uncivilized”. There were dozens of academics who proclaimed during the 1980-s that there was huge intentional Albanian campaign of terror against local Serbs in Kosova, forcefully pushing them to leave Kosova. An appalling remark reported by Warren Zimmerman illustrates general anti-Albanian views of virtually of circles of society in Serbia. He recalled a conversation with an art historian about Albanians: “A tall, attractive, and sensitive woman, she had been to New York many times and loved America and its culture. After a wide-ranging and fascinating conversation on a variety of subjects, I asked her how she would deal with...”

340 For this case, see Mertus, op.cit. note 138, 95-114; and Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 338 - 340.
341 Ibid.
342 See Clark, op.cit. note 12, 19.
344 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 329-333.
the Kosovo problem. ‘Simple,’ she said. ‘Just line all the Albanians up against a wall and shoot them.’”

Accordingly the role of the Serbian intellectuals in inter-ethnic relationships in Kosova was more than destructive. If Albanian intellectuals were mostly in defensive positions and from those positions they also played a role in Albanian ethno-mobilization, Serbian intellectuals were, at least from the 1980-s on, in an offensive position. Unfortunately, instead of using their influence in society to ease ethnic tensions and putting all their efforts toward solve political and economic problems of different nationalities in Kosova in particular but also of Federation in general, a good number of Serbian intellectuals laid down conditions for bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia.

vi) The role of religious communities in the ethno-mobilisation process

Two major religions - Islam and Christianity (with its Orthodox and Catholic rites) are present in Kosova, coexisting side by side for centuries. A large majority of Kosova Albanians consider themselves, at least nominally, to be Muslim, 3 percent of them (about 60.000) consider themselves as Christian Catholics and most Kosova Serbs consider themselves to be Christian Orthodox. Serbs consider their religion as a very important component of their national identity. Other ethnic groups in Kosova also belong to these three categories of religion, mostly to Islam. Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani and part of Roma community are Muslims. Within the Roma community can be found also orthodox and catholic communities.

Unlike for Serbs, religion didn’t play a significant role in the process of constituting the Albanian nation, since they do not define their national identity through religion, but rather through ethnicity and language.

Bearing in mind that Albanians belong to two religions, Islam and Christianity with both its rites, their deep rooted religious tolerance is understandable. Their hesitation to assume a complete Islam identity is also rooted in their long and persistent resistance to the Ottoman Empire. Also the orthodox and catholic communities played a huge role in wars that led to the independence of Albania. Moreover the Catholic Church and Catholics also played a role in maintaining religious harmony among Albanians as Albanians struggled for national liberation of Albanians in Kosova. Also the figure of Mother Theresa in this direction is very important since it is deep rooted in Albanian identity all over the world.

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345 See Zimmermann, op. cit. note 8, 17.
346 See ICG, op. cit. note 8, 1.
347 Ibid. 2.
349 See Stefanaq Pollo, Në gjurmë të historisë shqiptare 2 (Tracing Albanian History 2) (Akademia e Shkencave të Shqipërisë, Tiranë, 2003), 35-42; See also Donia, Ibid.
350 See ICG, op. cit. note 8, 3 and 7-8.
boulevards in Tirana and in Prishtina are named for Mother Tereza as well as the Tirana airport. Thus the role of Islamic religion in Albanian political movement in Kosova was always very limited. Nevertheless, the Serbian regime, some Serbian scholars, and—particularly—the Serbian Orthodox Church tried to persuade Serbian, Yugoslav and world public opinion that the root of conflict in Kosova was religious, putting the Serbs in the position of defending European civilization in Kosova.\textsuperscript{351} The truth lies far from this conclusion. As historian Robert Donia rightly concluded “Neither the Bosnian nor the Kosovo conflict was a religious war, but religious symbols were seen by many actors as targets worthy of destruction”.\textsuperscript{352} In this report we argue that the Kosova conflict is neither a religious conflict nor a pure ethnic conflict. In our view it was a permanent conflict between an occupied Albanian population and Serbian chauvinist regimes that occupied Kosova in 1913. These regimes in order to justify their misdeeds in Kosova, tried to gave to this conflict features of an ethnic conflict, using the Serbian minority in Kosova as a tool to achieve their objectives. Strong evidence that the Albanian side considered Serbia as the problem and not Serbs and their religion affiliation, exists in the form of the first two points of a general set of rules for an uprising in Kosova in 1919 drawn up by the Kosova Committee, led by Hasan Prishtina and Bajram Curri:\textsuperscript{353} “1. No rebel will dare to harm the local Serbs, but only those who stand with weapons in the their hands against the will of the Albanians. 2. No rebel will dare to burn down a house or destroy a church.”\textsuperscript{354} During the 50 years of the second Yugoslavia, the Albanian resistance movement - legal and illegal - was more than secular. In addition, it was, from time to time, influenced by strong anti-religious sentiments influenced by communist ideology. Afterwards, during the 1990s, it showed great affection toward Western civilization and culture.\textsuperscript{355} In its report about the role of religion in Kosova in 2001 the International Crisis Group pointed out that ‘Islamic involvement in politics is entirely unknown within the Kosovo Albanian political hierarchy’.\textsuperscript{356} In 1987, however Patriarch Germanus the head of the SOC at that time said in an interview that the influence of Islam on the situation where Albanians live was enormous and blamed Muslim leaders for ‘doing nothing to keep Albanian separatism under control’.\textsuperscript{357} However as Vjekoslav Perica carefully noticed ‘pro-regime officials of the

\textsuperscript{351} See Perica, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 84.
\textsuperscript{352} Donia, \textit{op.cit.} note 348, 6.
\textsuperscript{353} Hasan Prishtina and Bajram Curri were among most prominent figures in the war for the independence of Albania against Ottoman Empire. After 1913 they were engaged in the war for the Kosova liberation and founded in November 1918 in the town of Shkodra in northern Albania ‘Committee for the National Defense of Kosova’ (hereinafter CNDK) known as Kosova Committee. They were also actively engaged in Tirana politics in the side of democratic forces. They have been killed by agents of King Zogu I of Albania in 1933 respectively in 1925.
\textsuperscript{354} See AQH, fondi KMKK, dosje nr. 2, dok. 708045 (Central Archive of History in Tirana, fund CNDK, file no. 2, doc. 708045) cited by Limon Rushiti \textit{Lëvizja Kaçake në Kosovë (Kaçak Movement in Kosova)} (Instituti i Historisë, Prishtinë, 1981), 94-5; see also Malcolm, \textit{op.cit.} note 73, 274.
\textsuperscript{355} See AQH, fondi KMKK, dosje nr. 2, dok. 708045 (Central Archive of History in Tirana, fund CNDK, file no. 2, doc. 708045) cited by Limon Rushiti \textit{Lëvizja Kaçake në Kosovë (Kaçak Movement in Kosova)} (Instituti i Historisë, Prishtinë, 1981), 94-5; see also Malcolm, \textit{op.cit.} note 73, 274.
\textsuperscript{356} ICG, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 1-9.
\textsuperscript{357} Quoted by Perica, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 145.
Islamic Community, urged by the state, labored for years to mitigate tensions in Kosovo’. But he also rightly observed that their political influence was rather limited because ‘Albanian nationalism was ethnic and tribal, not religious’. In Perica’s word ‘Islam was quite influential in Bosnia but not in Kosovo’. Furthermore Albanian political resistance, particularly during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was led by pro-Tirana Marxist students and intellectuals. As the ICG report pointed out also, the military resistance of KLA was free of any religious influence. Moreover on 29 December 1999, the Kosovapress news agency founded by KLA, issued an extremely critical statement against Islamic fundamentalists involvement in Kosova society:

For more than a century civilized countries have separated religion from the state...However, we now see attempts not only in Kosovo but everywhere Albanians live to introduce religion into public schools... Supplemental courses for children have been set up by foreign Islamic organizations who hide behind assistance programs... It is time for Albanians mosques to be separated from Arab connections and for Islam to be developed on the basis of Albanian culture and customs.

The dominance of secular politics in all wings of Albanian politics in Kosova continued to prevail after the war in 1999 as well. None of major political actors had any use for Islamic values in their political activity, not to mention any appeal to Islamic Fundamentalism. Only two political parties appealed to certain religious values among Albanians. Those parties are Kosova Albanian Christian Democratic Party with two deputies in parliament and Kosova Justice Party with one member in parliament. The Kosova Justice Party, which demanded for Islamic values to be cultivated into Kosova’s society, also proclaimed moderate Islam accompanied with liberal-democracy. Thus it can be concluded that up till now the history of the Albanian political movement is not marked by the influence of religion. In this line of argument, it also can be observed that the Islamic religion also didn’t play any significant role in the process of ethno-mobilization of Albanians in Kosova. National ideals of self-determination, equality with others, cultural and educational emancipation were more important than religious affiliation., On the other side, a different picture appeared, regarding the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in the processes of ethno-mobilization, in

358 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
360 Ibid. 84.
361 Ibid. 145.
362 See ICG, op.cit. note 8, 5
363 Quoted by ICG, op.cit. note 8, 6.
364 See Donia, op.cit. note 348, 6.
the creation of the Serbian nation, in the political life of the Serbian nation and afterwards, during the process of dissolution of SFRY. The SOC is a national religious community that claims to embrace all Serbs. For Serbs, Kosovo and its Orthodox monasteries and churches remain very important symbols of their national identity. The role of the SOC in political life of Serbia has been traditionally significant. The same can be said about its role in the political processes in Kosovo, even though generally it was subordinated to official politics. As ICG argues ‘It (SOC) played an important role in the wave of nationalist euphoria in Serbia in the late 1980s, which Milošević partly stimulated and partly exploited to consolidate his power’. SOC was active with filing petition to state authorities since 1966 claiming that religious sites and Serbian population are under the permanent pressure of Albanian nationalists. Also the SOC magazine Pravoslavlje occasionally published reports after 1968, listing violent assaults, including rape, murder, theft, arson, intimidation, threats, discriminatory policies, desecration of cemeteries and holy places, allegedly committed by Albanians against Serbs, their property and their church in Kosovo. Moreover, SOC activities gained importance in the process of Serbian ethno-mobilization, particularly after 1981, reasserting and strengthening its position in Serbian society. On 15 March 1981 the patriarchate at Peja was set on fire. Even though the cause of fire was never determined, church circles and Serbian media accused Albanians for this act. On Good Friday 1982, 21 prominent orthodox clerics led by Archimandrite Atanasije Jevtić sent an open letter to the Presidency of Yugoslavia, Presidency of Serbia, the People’s Assembly of Serbia and the Holy Bishops’ Sabor of the SOC. This letter was entitled “Appeal for the Protection of the Serbian Population and Their Sacred Monuments in Kosovo” (also known as the Appeal of 21 Serbian Priests). Letter was published in Pravoslavlje and in short version in other media in Serbia. Among others appeal stated that:

Kosovo issue is the issue of the spiritual, cultural, and historical identity of the Serbian people...Like the Jewish people who return to their Jerusalem in order to survive, the Serbian people are fighting once again the very same battle of Kosovo that our ancestors began to fight in 1389 at the Kosovo field....And when it seemed that the battle has been won once and for all, Kosovo is being taken away from us and we are no longer what we are!...

365 Ibid. 3 and 9.
366 See ICG, op.cit. note 8, 9.
367 Ibid. 10; see also Pešić, op.cit. note 6, 16; and Donia, op.cit. note 348, 3.
368 Ibid.
369 See Perica, op.cit. note 8, 45.
370 Ibid. 123-4.
371 Atanasije Jevtić will be one of the most radical clerics in SOC during the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia. For more information about his activities see Tomanić, note 374.
372 See Perica, op.cit. note 8, 124.
Without an exaggeration, it could be said that a planned genocide has been carried out against the Serbian people in Kosovo. The Albanian quest for an ethnically homogenous Albanian Kosovo free of Serbs is the evidence of genocide.\(^{373}\)

In the beginning of ’80s SOC forged an alliance with two other very important institution in Serbia in the realm of influence in public opinion, Serbian Writers Union (hereinafter SWU) placed in the famous street \textit{Francuska 7} and SASA.\(^{374}\) These three influential institutions started to serve to the public opinion their truth about Kosova, particularly about what they called ‘genocide against Serbian and Montenegrin population committed by Albanians in Kosova’. As result of this coordinated propaganda as early as the mid 1980-s Serbian press started to report daily from what is happening in Kosova. It was Belgrade press according to Archimandrite Atanasije Jevtić that “made the decisive shift in favor of the struggle for the Serbian truth about Kosovo.”\(^{375}\) Very soon after Milošević raise to power in 1987 this approach started to be supported, even to be streamlined by official politics.\(^{376}\) Unfortunately even though there had been some dissent voices within SOC in relation to official policy of SOC toward Milošević regime, particularly in the beginning SOC supported its political actions in Kosova and afterwards in other parts of Yugoslavia.\(^{377}\) The truth that this alliance delivered to the Serbian public opinion, inducing its homogenization and mobilization, supported and headed from 1987 publicly by the regime, could be comprised in the words of Olivera Milosavljević: “For Kosova only historical principle is democratic, for Serbs in Croatia ethnic principle, and for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina cadastral principle. For Dubrovnik justification were required in fact that he was for a short period of time included in Croatia, for Vojvodina was again in force ethnic principle, while for Zadar, Karlovac, Vukovar… justification were not even required.”\(^{378}\)

During the war in Kosova in 1998-99 two Serbian clerics started to take more moderate posture. They were Bishop Artemije (once one of the most radical clerics but who started to realize that Milošević’s policies are only bringing disaster to the Serbian people) the leading Orthodox figure in Kosova and father Sava, deputy abbot of the Deçani Monastery. After the war in Kosova they assumed the leadership of those Serbs who were willing to cooperate with international community in Kosova.\(^{379}\) Father Sava even made steps in

\(^{373}\) Cited by Perica, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 124.
\(^{375}\) Cited by Perica, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 125.
\(^{376}\) \textit{Ibid}. 16.
\(^{377}\) \textit{Ibid}. 22, 23-5 and 44-7; see also Perica, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 123-132.
\(^{378}\) Cited by Tomanic, \textit{op.cit.} note 374, 95.
\(^{379}\) See ICG, \textit{op.cit.} note 8, 11.
recognizing Serbian regime had committed atrocities against Albanians in Kosova. In an interview in the Belgrade magazine *NIN* in July 1999, he declared:

Together with the regime in Belgrade, local Serb authorities systematically carried out violence against Kosovo Albanians, as well as against Serbs, who were also mistreated and robbed at the very end… Milošević’s supporters participated in forced expulsions of the Albanian population which otherwise would not have fled the province. In most cases they did not flee because of the bombardment, but because of systematic deportations, looting and other sorts of violence. We have been finding daily bloody tracks of that violence, and the unfortunate Serb people in Kosovo must now account for it…Simply, there is no future for the Serb people, nor the whole region of South Eastern Europe as long as such dictatorship survives in Belgrade”

In June of 1999, the synod of the SOC required from Milošević to resign. After two months of this request, it was reiterated even by the Patriarch Pavle. Kosova again played crucial role in this changing attitude of the SOC, fearing that they will loose everything in Kosova, if their ex-favorite will remain in power. However, even today SOC is internally divided about the role that the church should play in political life. Efforts made by Artemije and Sava to establish dialogue and normal links with Albanians have been under attack time to time even within the SOC’s circles. However the influence of the SOC in Kosova, in Serbia and among Serbs in general still remains very strong. Furthermore even in the Ahtisaari Plan that was result of more than one year negotiations for the status of Kosova, SOC and its sites gained a special position and status in the future Kosova.

c. The role of the traumatic experiences in the past as factor to foster ethno-mobilisation and conflicts

When one reads Yugoslavia as history, and recognize how it was ruined, one can understand very well what the great writer Mark Twain had in mind about history when he said: ‘history doesn’t repeat itself; it just rhymes’. The state of South Slavs was created and disappeared twice in previous

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381 See Tomanić, *op.cit.* note 374, 161.
382 See ICG, *op.cit.* note 8, 12-3.
century. Twice it was created and dissolved out of blood of its peoples. The first one known as a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, a country widely dominated by Serbia, was created on 1 December 1918. Its main constitution called St. Vitus Constitution (Vidovdan Constitution) was approved purposely on 28 June 1921, a date of symbolic meaning in the nationalist rhetoric of Serbian political elites used against Kosova and Albanians. Serbian myth about Kosova was build upon this date when on 28th June of 1389 Kosova Battle took place in Gazimestan, near Prishtina, at which Balkan people fought to death with the army of Ottoman Empire. This knee-deep bloody battle was won by Ottoman Turks. This event gained absolute importance in the collective Serbian memory as national myth. This myth turned to be ethno-mobilization key in Kosova. Even though Albanians and Serbs were keen allies in this battle, there is a common believe among considerable number of Serbs that Albanians in that historic decisive battle were traitors therefore Serbs perceive themselves as the last defenders of Christianity.

As Howard Clark puts it, myth became even more important than reality itself:

"Stories of the past build today’s nation: the historical record is less important than what the legend offers. What does it matter if there were battles more decisive than the battle of 1389? Or if the evidence indicates that Albanian Catholics were more active allies of the Austro-Hungarians in 1689 than were the Serbs? What matters is what is imprinted on the Serbian collective memory."

Maybe in this kind of approach held by Serbian political and intellectual elite can be revealed why Kosova served as focal point for the first stage of the ultimate destruction of Yugoslavia. It was this myth Milošević revived in Gazimestan on 28 July 1989, 600th anniversary of Kosova Battle. It was this event that marked beginning of his march in establishing Greater Serbia but which concluded with dissolution of Yugoslavia. In whole history of the existence of Yugoslavia as a state since 1918, Kosova myth had played the most significant role in the process of ethno-mobilization of Serbs as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia. That’s why without knowing the history of Yugoslavia it is almost impossible to comprehend anything from its dissolution. History is its life no less than its death.

Under the first Yugoslavia, the majority of Kosova Albanians suffered the cruel repression of state apparatuses of Serbia since it occupied a major part of Kosova during Balkan Wars in 1912 (another part of it was conquered by Montenegro). During first year of administration of Kosova according to

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384 See Glenny, op.cit. note 40, 367.
385 Ibid. 402; more about Kosovo myth see in Kühle and Laustsen, op.cit. note 343, 19-36.
386 See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 62.
388 Something interesting to be mention here is the fact that 28 June coincidentally happened to be the date when Archduke Frantz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo (Bosnia) by Gavrillo Princip on 1914, event that sent to the beginning of the WW I.
the estimation of Catholic Church of Kosova and European observers of that time 20,000-25,000 Albanians were killed by Serbian army.\textsuperscript{389} As John P. Lampe puts it:

Kosovar Albanians were instead placed under a regime of military occupation that was resumed after both world wars and reappeared in the decade 1989-99. [...]. Some Albanians emigrated to the new Albanian state or to elsewhere in the shrinking Ottoman Empire. Those who stayed in Kosovo resisted recognition of Serbian authority whenever they could, starting a tradition that has also persisted to the present.\textsuperscript{390}

When the Axis Powers occupied whole Yugoslavia within eleven days without encountering serious resistance (6 April 1941 - 17 April 1941), Kosova was divided between the Germans who controlled the northern part of the country (since in this place there were and still are concentrated rich mines), Bulgaria was concentrated on the eastern part, and the Italians controlled the southern part.\textsuperscript{391} Since Italy annexed Albania on 1939, for technical mitigating reasons of control they attached Kosova to Albania. This was an important historical moment for Kosova Albanians since they remember it as a period when their collective political will was somehow fulfilled. They always saw Albania as their motherland and savior, and this is quite understandable bearing in mind the humiliation they were facing during repression under Serbia’s rule in Kosova. Some authors find in this affiliation of Kosova Albanians toward Albania the crucial reason why they mostly avoided joining partisans in the antifascist war:

Tito’s partisans, therefore, experienced considerable difficulty recruiting Albanians in Kosovo and only a few joined the partisans. Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, who was in charge of organizing partisan activity in Kosovo later recalled that “the Albanian population remained suspicious toward all those who fought for resurrection of Yugoslavia, whether it was a question of old or new Yugoslavia. In their eyes, that was less than what they [had] received from the occupiers.\textsuperscript{392}

Here we find why Kosova Albanian distrusted Tito’s Yugoslavia: under idea of Yugoslavia they perceived the restoration and continuation of cruel

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{389} See Malcolm, \textit{op.cit.} note 73, 254.
\item \textsuperscript{390} See Lampe, \textit{op.cit.} note 10, 97.
\item \textsuperscript{391} See Malcolm, \textit{op.cit.} note 73, 289-313.
\item \textsuperscript{392} See Ramet, \textit{op.cit.} note 9, 187.
\end{itemize}
Serbian dominance over them\(^{393}\). Although some Kosova Albanians were abreast fighting together with partisans against fascists, they also endorsed idea of uniting with Albania after the war ended. It was also Communist Party of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito that hinted that if Albanians will participate in the liberation war they will gain the rights for self-determination and unification with Albania.\(^{394}\) It is important to note that anti fascist movement in Albania led by Albanian Communist Party was very strong and very active in Albania proper. In the Bujan Conference, which gathered Albanian and Serbian communist representatives from Kosova held from 31 December 1943 to 2 January 1944, was adopted the Resolution of the Conference which openly supported option of joining with Albania\(^{395}\). In this historical Resolution, which up to these days has huge resonance in Albanian political aspirations, communists confirmed that Albanians have the right of self-determination and that of secession and unification with Albania:

Kosovo-Metohija is an area with a majority Albanian population, which, now as always in the past, wishes to be united with Albania... The only way that the Albanians of Kosovo-Metohija can be united with Albania is through a common struggle with the other peoples of Yugoslavia against the occupiers and their lackeys. For the only way freedom can be achieved is if all peoples, including the Albanians, have the possibility of deciding on their own destiny, with the right to self-determination, up to and including secession.\(^{396}\)

But in late 1944 everything became clear: Yugoslav Communist Party denied Kosova’s right to unite with Albania, a promise given just to mobilize Albanians in the antifascist war.\(^{397}\) As Enver Hoxha the leader of Albanian Communist Party explained latter on in 1945 in their first meeting in Belgrade, when Hoxha put on table to deliberate the Kosova question, Tito replied that the right solution for Kosova is to be united with Albania but this should occur in the future and not know out of fear of Serbian nationalist reaction.\(^{398}\) However the denial of the right to self-determination was sufficient signal and Albanians started again to be mobilized opposing the establishment of Yugoslav regime in Kosova. In Drenica region as it was indicated, Shaban Polluzha led Kosova partisans and other disappointed people against Tito’s divisions. In March 1945 this revolt was suppressed.

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\(^{393}\) See Clark, op.cit. note 12, 12.

\(^{394}\) See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 307.

\(^{395}\) See Lampe, op.cit. note 10, 228.


\(^{397}\) See Malcolm, op.cit. note 73, 307-8.

\(^{398}\) See Enver Hoxha, Titistët (Titoists) (Naim Frashëri, Tirana, 1982), 260.
The pressure of Yugoslavia’s communist leadership upon communists in Kosova resulted in the creation of the Provincial Popular Council in which the non-elected representatives of 2,250 communist voted for an option which included Kosova within Serbia. After Yugoslavia proclaimed its total liberation from Germany, Serbia’s rule in Kosova was restored. Thus second or socialist Yugoslavia in 1945 was created again without taking into account the will of Albanian population. A resistance to restoration of communist Yugoslav regime has been encountered in other parts of Yugoslavia, but as Noel Malcolm put it ‘nowhere, however, did it last as long as in Kosovo’.

In 1975, Milovan Dilas, once vice president of Yugoslavia who later was expelled from the communist party for his critique on Tito and was jailed, predicted that Yugoslavia would cease to exist in the year 2024. Just 15 years after he gave this wrong prediction, it became clear to everyone that this creature called Yugoslavia was living the last days of her life. The causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia are inherent in its very structure as asymmetric Federation. It was comprised of peoples whose politicians cared more to foster and nurture in peoples collective memories enmities and hatred between each other than respect and closeness. Moreover, especially for Albanian people this Federation was perceived with suspicion and dissatisfaction since they were placed under their age-old enemy, Serbia, which during the existence of second Yugoslavia again didn’t gave any sign that in essence changed its attitude toward Albanians and the way how should deal with them. Apart from Albanian-Serbian conflict over Kosova, other conflicts raged in Federation in the course of its existence. Most enduring and destructive one was that between Croatian and Serbian interests. The problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also playing significant role in keeping under control the fragile balance of the Federation. Therefore at the moment when peoples of Yugoslavia sought more freedom and independence all of a sudden the whole edifice collapsed. This bloody destruction and the errors of the past must serve as a lesson for the future: every Federation, confederation or whatever political regulation of relations among peoples gathered in a common community will fail if it is not founded on complete equality between these peoples. Their act of agreement to become members of the broader community must be founded upon their free will to decide on their own fate whether they want to join or instead pursue their own collective destiny.

399 See Malcolm, *op.cit.* note 73, 315.
401 See Ramet, *op.cit.* note 9, 24.
II. EHTNO-MOBILIZATION AND VIOLENCE:


In previous parts of this report we have mentioned permanent violence committed by Serbian and Yugoslav regimes since 1912/13 when Kosova was occupied by Serbian state. However in this part we will be more concentrated in the period from 1981 to 1997. We decided to start with 1981 since events taking place in Kosova in that year are estimated to be the beginning of the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. Immediately after the demonstration of 1981 took place, state violence against Albanian political activists and people that participated in those demonstrations increased dramatically. According to official statistics of the Kosova Secretary of Justice used by Amnesty International (hereinafter AI), from 1981 to the end of 1985, 1,200 people had been sentenced for political crimes and a further 6,440 people summarily sentenced for minor political offences.\(^{402}\) Other official figures showed that in 1984, 218 adults and 29 minors had been convicted of political crimes in Kosova, and the average sentence imposed to was six years’ imprisonment.\(^{403}\) In May 1985 eight secondary school pupils aged between 16 and 19 were sentenced to between three and eight years’ imprisonment. They were charged under Articles 136 and 114 of the criminal code with belonging to ‘hostile’ organization, and with writing slogans and distributing leaflets demanding Kosova to become republic within Federation.\(^{404}\) A school treasurer Gani Kadriu, aged 39, in March 1985 was sentenced with three years’ imprisonment under Article 133 of the criminal code on charges of ‘hostile propaganda’. He was found guilty of having recorded songs broadcasted by radio stations in Albania, which glorified Albania and then Albanian leader Enver Hoxha.\(^{405}\) According to AI they received a number of allegations that political prisoners had been ill-treated during investigations and also it showed concern about the conditions and treatments in some prisons where political prisoners were placed.\(^{406}\) The situation of Albanian political prisoners was especially difficult. As one of the most known Albanian political prisoner, Hydajet Hyseni, confirms ill-treatments of all kind, including torture, inhuman and degrading treatment during investigations but also during serving the sentence, committed to Albanians were customary.\(^{407}\) Because of this ill-treatment in prison, died one of the most prominent Albanian political prisoners, Zija Shemsiu in 1985. Zija Shemsiu was beaten to death because he was one of the political prisoner that signed the letter written to

\(^{403}\) Ibid. 318.
\(^{404}\) Ibid.
\(^{405}\) Ibid.
\(^{406}\) Ibid. 317.
\(^{407}\) Interview with Hydajet Hyseni, op.cit. note 17.
Presidency of SFRY by most notable Albanian political prisoners ‘Events in Kosova are not Contrarevolutionary’.  

According to official statistics the number of Albanians sentenced on the basis of political offences in Kosova continued to increase. From 1981 to 1988 1,750 Albanians were convicted in regular courts of political crimes and 7,000 were summarily jailed for minor political offences. In the same period according to military sources 241 illegal groups composed of 1,600 Albanians had been discovered in the army and they were subject to the military court jurisdiction. 

According to AI:

Ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo suspected of political offences were frequently denied access to their lawyers during investigation proceedings which were carried out by state security officials and it seemed that the resulting lack of legal safeguards facilitated human rights abuses against defendants. In particular, several allegations were received during 1988 from ethnic Albanians who stated that following arrest on political charges they had been detained in Peja, Kosovo, where they were beaten, punched and tortured with an electric baton.

Because of the abolition of the Kosova’s autonomy, situation deteriorated further in 1989. In Yugoslavia in this year 4,500 people were detained for political reasons: the great majority of whom were Albanians. Some 1,700 of them were prisoners of conscience, of whom about 1,000 were imprisoned for up to 60 days for taking part in non-violent demonstrations and strikes in February 1989. In March a lot of Albanians were held in administrative detention better known as ‘isolation’ and were severely beaten by prison staff. Xhemajl Berisha died in custody in Prizren on 6 April after he threw himself from the second floor of the police station. Unofficial sources alleged that since he was well known political activist, he was physically and psychologically ill-treated before his death. It is interesting to note, that in Kosovo in that time, people still continued to be prosecuted for ‘hostile propaganda’ under Article 133 of the federal criminal code, even though rare elsewhere in Federation. In July 1989 in Prishtina district court Rexhep Bislimi was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for having given to his friends three books which in the court’s view presented the situation in Yugoslavia in a ‘malicious and untrue way’.

According to AI 27 persons were killed and 1,000 people were arrested during demonstrations against

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408 Ibid. See also Hyseni et al. op cit. note 46.
410 Ibid, 244-5.
suppression of the autonomy in March 1989. According to Human Rights
Watch during these demonstrations were killed approximately 30 people. In
the other hand in a list published by the CDHRF in Prishtina, 37 people
were killed during these demonstrations. In December of 1989 was
founded the DLK under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova which sough
independence for Kosova by peaceful means and resistance. This nonviolent
resistance was passive in its strategy. It aimed at internationalizing the issue
of Kosova through conferences and at different meetings with international
officials who were politically engaged during that period of time. After 1991
these efforts were supported also by the work of the government in exile.
Kosova gained almost nothing through this strategy. Occupation became
harder. In 1995 the relationships between the head of government in exile
Bujar Bukoshi started to became tense. Bukoshi asked for more active
resistance and at this point he even started to support Adem Demaçi who
was at at that time advocating the idea of active peaceful resistance in
contrast to passive peaceful resistance led by Rugova. The relationships
deteriorated further in 1996 when Bukoshi didn’t give permission to send
money to cover some DLK unjustified costs. Nevertheless Bukoshi was not
committed to radically change the course of its politics; thereby he didn’t
give fully support to KLA or NMLK either. Furthermore in the beginning of
the war in Kosova in 1998 his relationships with the KLA leadership were
damaged seriously since he didn’t support the KLA organizational structure
setting separately the army called FARK (Armed Forces of Republic of
Kosova). Nevertheless due to political circumstances DLK, which gained lot of
support in the beginning of 1990s, maintained to uphold its popularity until 1997,
when this policy was discredited due to failures to yield concrete results in
ending the Serbian rule in Kosova. Also the huge continuous violence
committed by Serbian regime to Albanian population, and impossibility of
this movement to protect civilians, was one of the factors that weakened
the influence of DLK. The role of international community in this field is
important too. Even though publicly the non-violent policy of Rugova was
supported by international community, its aim independence was rather not
supported. This further undermined the position of DLK among Albanians.

During 1990 over 1.000 Albanians were imprisoned in Kosova for up to 60
days for participating in peaceful demonstrations or taking part in general
strike held in September 1990. Even though the number of political
prisoners decreased significantly during 1990 as a result of pardons, early
releases and acquittals (by the end of that year they numbered some 35),
there were allegations that people which were arrested during that year as
result of participating in strikes or demonstrations were beaten by police
and ill-treated under arrest. During clashes between Albanian demonstrators

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412 Ibid. 263.
413 See Human Rights Watch World Report 1989 Yugoslavia, in
415 See Judah, op.cit. note 44, 61-98.
416 See Stefan Troebst, Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention, An Analytical
(ECMI), Flensburg, May 1998), vii and 8-11.
and police forces according to AI were killed at least 30 Albanians.\footnote{417} According to HRW this number was estimated at being 50 people in 1990 alone.\footnote{418} However according to list of killed persons published by CDHRF 34 Albanians were killed in 1990 and 248 were wounded by police forces.\footnote{419} It is interesting to note that by June 1990, 391 Albanians in Kosova had been arrested and proceedings had been initiated against 433 people for making ‘V’ (sign for victory) as sign of their disagreements with official policy of Serbia in Kosova. The official justification for these deeds was that these people ‘offended the socialist and patriotic sentiments of citizens’ and ‘disturbed public order’.\footnote{420} In the course of 1990 some major institutional changes that influenced that deterioration of the situation of human rights happened in Kosova. The Serbian government suspended the Kosova parliament after it declared independence from Serbia on 2 July 1990. Serbia suspended also other governmental institutions, shut down main Albanians daily paper Rilindja, and closed down Albanian language programs on radio and television.\footnote{421} Also during this year, Albanian doctors were forcibly removed from Pristhina Hospital, and even directly from operating rooms. No doubt, as stated by the HRW, the removal was imposed as “a military occupation on the civilian population”.\footnote{422} HRW noted that “it embarked on a program to disfranchise and marginalize the ethnic Albanian population in ways constituting racism, impermissible ethnic discrimination, and grave violations of the rights of ethnic Albanians to free expression and equal political participation”.\footnote{423}

In the second half of 1991, up to 6.000 Albanian school and university staff was dismissed from their posts for refusing to teach a curriculum lay down by the Serbian authorities. In October, some 30 school directors and teachers were imprisoned up to 60 days for participating in demonstrations that demanded the release of school buildings. Throughout this year police forces started massive searches for illegal arms in Albanian homes. During these searches, there were allegations of mistreatment and beatings against the families by the police; the police made no distinction between adults and children.\footnote{424} Over 20.000 Albanians lost their jobs because of ethnic discrimination.\footnote{425} On the other hand, the Serbian regime started to arm the Serbian civilian population, who in turn started to intimidate the Albanian population.\footnote{426} From September 26th to the 30th, Albanians in Kosova conducted a self-styled referendum for the total independence of Kosova.

\footnote{419} See CDHRF, op.cit. note 414, 21-6.
\footnote{420} See AI, op.cit. note 414, 21-6.
\footnote{421} See HRW, op.cit. note 410.
\footnote{422} Ibid.
\footnote{423} Ibid.
\footnote{426} Ibid.
from Serbia.\textsuperscript{427} It is worth noting that CDHRF in 1991 published a list of 51 Albanians that died in very suspicious circumstances while serving in the YNA during the period of 1981-1991.\textsuperscript{428} Allegations that these people were killed intentionally as part of an official anti-Albanian state policy increased the Albanian population’s resentment against YNA. Additionally, Albanians increasingly became apprehensive about serving on the YNA. During 1992, the state-based violence of basic human rights continued unstoppably. Hundreds of Albanians were beaten and mistreated by the police. Albanians continued to be sentenced to up to 60 days of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. Political processes against Albanians involved in different resistant groups started to be held again. These processes generally were viewed as unfair. About 16 Albanians were killed by police in disputed circumstances.\textsuperscript{429} During 1993, the situation furthered deteriorated.\textsuperscript{430} During this year, two Albanian illegal political-military organizations appeared to be active: the KLA and the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova (NMLK).\textsuperscript{431} KLA’s activities started with some limited armed action against Serbian police stations, while NMLK’s activities were more concentrated in propaganda, strengthening its organisational structure, and illegally publishing and distributing \textit{Çlirimi} (\textit{Liberation}) magazine which propagated popular uprisings against the Serbian regime and unification with Albania.\textsuperscript{432} The roots of the KLA can be found in previous Albanian leftist oriented illegal movements that resisted the Yugoslav regime. More precisely, KLA had direct links with the PMK, the oldest Albanian illegal movement. The public opinion it is still very blurred as to how the KLA emerged. Some speculate that the KLA emerged directly from the PMK, while other speculate the formation was a result of a disagreement in 1991 between some of the PMK members with the leadership. The disagreement was over the road that PMK should choose after realizing that DLK and its peaceful strategy had prevailed as the political mainstream among Kosova’s Albanians. However, the truth is somewhere in between. It is true that many disappointed members of PMK started to organize some small military cells as late as 1991. At the same time, other independent groups joined these cells, which around 1993 started to identify themselves as the \textit{Kosova Liberation Army} through attacks carried out on Serbian police stations. Finally in 1995, these cells consolidated into the basic structure of the KLA. According to one of the leaders of PMK, Muhamet Kelmendi, the Presidency of PMK, the branch outside the country, named these cells or units the \textit{Kosova Liberation Army}.

\textsuperscript{427} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{428} See CDHRF, \textit{op.cit.} note 414, 35.
\textsuperscript{430} For the human rights violation in Kosovo during 1993, 1995 and 1997 see also Fondi për të Drejtën Humanitare (Fund for Humanitarian Right), \textit{Të drejtat e ndyerut në Kosovë (Human Rights in Kosovo)} (FPH, Beograd, 1998).
\textsuperscript{431} See Gafur Elshani, \textit{Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: Dokumente dhe Artikuj} (Kosova Liberation Army: Documents and Articles) (Zëri i Kosovës, Prishtinë, 3\textsuperscript{rd} edition, 2003); and Redaksia e Çlirimt, \textit{Liri a Vdekje: Përmbledhje Artikujsh nga Gazeta Çlirim} (Freedom or Death: Collection of articles from Liberation magazine) (Eurorilindja, Tiranë, 1998).
\textsuperscript{432} See \textit{Ibid.}
Army. Since 1991-1992, different cells within Kosova established contacts with PMK, to publish the magazine Zëri i Kosovës (The Voice of Kosova). At this time, PMK was primarily active only in Western Europe. By the time PMK achieved control over KLA, PMK established the fund Homeland Calling. The purpose of the fund was to support KLA, and particularly since 1995, to serve as the spokesman of KLA’s magazine. However, despite increased state terror, DLK and its peaceful tactics were still overwhelmingly supported by the Albanian population in Kosova. In this year, several police officers, and more than 12 Albanians, were killed by police in disputed circumstances. About 90 Albanians were detained on charges of seeking secession of Kosova by violent means. By the end of the year, at least 18 had been brought to trial and sentenced to up to five years imprisonment. Teachers and professors that worked in the parallel education system that was established in private houses were under permanent attack by the Serbian police. They were regularly detained and ill-treated in police stations, where they were held for periods ranging from a few hours up to several days. Additionally, searches for illegal weapons continued, followed by the mistreatment of the families that were searched. As of late 1995, eleven people ranging from 10 to 66 years of age had been arbitrarily killed, 11 others wounded, and 2,400 Albanians were arbitrarily arrested by Serbian authorities; thousands more were summoned for ‘informative talks’. Many of these persons were beaten and ill-treated by police forces during Serbian police raids on Albanian villages. The indiscriminate and brutal house raids were conducted without official search warrants, and the police would arbitrarily arrest and imprison individuals. Until 1995 it is estimated that three-quarters of the overall number of formerly employed Albanians had been dismissed from their jobs in the public sector. As part of their policy, Albanians continued recognizing Serbian rule in Kosova. The situation started to worsen in 1996. After the Dayton Accords ignored the Kosovo problem, the pacifist movement in

433 See Muhamet Kelmendi, Pse nuk u ndërtua Fronti për Çlirimin e Kosovës (Why the Front for the Liberation of Kosova was not established) (Iliria, Tiranë, 1999), 18.
436 Ibid. 320.
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid.
Kosova started to lose its grounds. As the pacifist movement weakened, the military option started to gain momentum.\textsuperscript{441} Since 1989, because of constant political and police repression, and hard economic and social conditions due to the marginalization of Albanians in all areas of social life, an estimated 350,000 Albanians left Kosova. At the same time, the Serbian regime encouraged the settlements of Serbs in Kosova, including 16,000 Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia.\textsuperscript{442} On 1 September 1996, Milošević and Rugova signed an agreement that would have allowed Albanian pupils to attend education in the school objects. However when it came to implement the program, it faced difficulties that showed that the agreement was more of a bluff by Milošević than a genuine effort to ease tensions.\textsuperscript{443} As late as 1996, about 200 Albanians were in prison for political reasons, and as it appeared from their admissions, torture was used by the police and investigators to extract confessions.\textsuperscript{444} In 1996, CDHRF registered 14 cases of Albanians killed by police forces, 14 wounded and 5,197 tortured and beaten.\textsuperscript{445} Of those tortured, 136 were inflicted with serious bodily harm.\textsuperscript{446}

As result of the increased resistance against the Serbian regime, the increased armed action of the KLA against police targets, and the boosted political activity of NMLK, the regime's terror increased indiscriminately. In January 1997, Serbian police arrested around 100 Albanians accused of working with KLA and NMLK.\textsuperscript{447} The first group of 20 NMLK activists was sentenced to a total of 107 years imprisonment. The accused from the second and third groups belonged to the KLA and were charged for terrorism. In the second group, only three of the accused had been captured. Thirteen other activists in the second group were sentenced in absence. This group in total was sentenced to 264 years imprisonment. The third group in total was sentenced to 186 years imprisonment.\textsuperscript{448} Serious violations of due process, and the use of torture to extract confessions, prevented the defendants from organized demonstrations in order to release university objects. This massive student demonstration, which was not supported by Rugova and DLK, was brutally crushed by police forces.\textsuperscript{449} This demonstration, and others that followed, marked the fall of the period of pacifist movement as it had operated until then in Kosova. The same year, on November 28\textsuperscript{th}, the KLA appeared publicly for the first time and addressed the crowd that was gathered at the funeral of the teacher Halit Geci. The teacher had been killed by police forces one day earlier in Llausha village in Drenica (central Kosova), after the first serious fight


\textsuperscript{442} \textit{Ibid.} 8.

\textsuperscript{443} \textit{Ibid.} 4.

\textsuperscript{444} \textit{Ibid.} 3.


\textsuperscript{446} \textit{Ibid.} 21.


\textsuperscript{448} See Murati, \textit{op.cit.} note 328, 66.

between KLA units and Serbian police.\textsuperscript{450} The reaction of the mass of people gathered at the funeral was enthusiastic, and after the KLA fighters’ speech, people began chanting: ‘KLA! KLA!’\textsuperscript{451} Undoubtedly, the collapse of the pyramid schemes in Albania, followed by the collapse of some of the state structures, and broken up by the civil population of the military storages taking thousands of arms and ammunitions in their hands, created a proper environment for the KLA to ease its supply with light weapons.\textsuperscript{452} However, it is important to clarify here the issue of the links between KLA and organized crime. This issue tends to be raised in different circles. First of all, the KLA was a political and military organization with the aim to liberate Kosova from the Serbian rule. In the beginning, prior to the start of open war with Serbian forces, KLA was financed mainly through the support of its followers working abroad. Sometimes, even during 1997, support came through organizing concerts for Albanian diaspora in the West.\textsuperscript{453} Since 1998, the main financial source for the KLA activities was the fund \textit{Homeland Calling}. This fund, which was set in the European Western countries and the USA, was maintained on a voluntary basis through donations of huge Albanian diaspora in these countries.\textsuperscript{454} In this sense, it is possible that different Albanians throughout the world who were linked to organized crime donated some money to this fund. These donations, however, were their personal choice, and not a sign that they had any influence in the KLA ranks or a sign that KLA was using criminal networks in order to finance its activities. There is not sufficient evidence to link the KLA with criminal networks. The fact that the Albanian criminal network in Europe was quite strong at that time does not prove a link. As Mike Karadjis rightly pointed out, “the main connection between KLA and drugs seems to be ethnicity.”\textsuperscript{455}

In an effort to conclude this part of the report, here is some additional data about the repression and discrimination in Kosova during the ‘90s. According to official statistics, prior to 1989 every 16\textsuperscript{th} Albanian, every 7\textsuperscript{th} Serb and every 4\textsuperscript{th} Montenegrin was employed. In the beginning of 1990, 61.3\% Albanians, 34.9\% Serbs and Montenegrins, and 5.8\% Muslims, Turks, Roma, Croats etc. were employed in the state sector.\textsuperscript{456} Even though Albanians were more than 80\% of the population, their share in the state jobs was only 61\%. The percentage of Albanians in the state sector was an indication of the obvious favouritism of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosova, despite the Serbs allegations that they are discriminated in Kosova. From July 1990, to July 1997, about 137.000 Albanians were expelled from their jobs, and only 30.000 of them remained at their previous jobs. As a result of constant discrimination by the Serbian regime, at the beginning of 1998 unemployment among Albanians in Kosova was higher than 70 percent.\textsuperscript{457} Since 1991, about 60.000 students of secondary schools and about 15.000 university students were holding their classes in private homes, churches,

\textsuperscript{450} See Judah, \textit{op.cit.} note 44, 136-7.
\textsuperscript{451} See interview with Selimi, \textit{op.cit.} note 4; see also Judah, \textit{op.cit.} note 44, 136-7.
\textsuperscript{452} See Judah, \textit{op.cit.} note 44, 128-9; and Karadjis, \textit{op.cit.} note 312, 139-140.
\textsuperscript{453} \textit{Ibid.} 129.
\textsuperscript{454} \textit{Ibid.} 118; and Karadjis, \textit{op.cit.} note 312, 145.
\textsuperscript{455} Karadjis, 176.
\textsuperscript{457} \textit{Ibid.} 13; see also Bellamy, \textit{op.cit.} note 312, 116.
mosques, basements and other improvised environments.\textsuperscript{458} Also, 2.500 health workers were expelled from health institutions.\textsuperscript{459} According to CDHRF, its figures show that from 1981 to 1997 209 Albanians died. The deaths were a result of either being tortured, or being killed by police and military forces of Yugoslavia respectively by Serbia.\textsuperscript{460} The massive violations during this period of war, starting in 1998, will be described in the forthcoming report.

2. Albanians as main target group of state violence

As it is presented throughout this report, the main target of violence by the Yugoslav and Serbian state was the Albanian population. The violence was specifically targeted at those groups and individuals who politically confronted and opposed the regime through political activities or even through publicly expressing different opinions. Students and intellectuals were among those most affected by this state policy, followed from time to time by violence. The restriction of the sphere where they could freely express their attitudes was especially harmful to the development of normal debate within a society with many burning issues. Due to this permanent conflict between the Yugoslav and Serbian regime and the Albanian population in Kosova, the position of Serbian minority within Kosova was also uncertain. The position of the minority was uncertain because they were in the middle of the conflict, and were primarily used by the Belgrade regime for its own interests.

3. Ethnic distance and the lack of understanding of the others’ sufferings from state violence

It is interesting to note that the level of communication between Albanian and Serbian communities was almost non-existent, particularly in the years following the Second World War. A Yugoslav-wide survey conducted in ‘70s examining ‘ethnic distance’, indicated that “Albanians did not accept others, and that others did not accept Albanians.”\textsuperscript{461} The data also indicated that ‘ethnic distance’ between Albanians and other nationalities in the Federation was higher compared to other nationalities. Also, as was indicated, the intermarriage levels between Albanians and other nationalities were extremely low. In addition, research done between 1966 and 1990 showed that Albanians exhibited the greatest levels of ‘ethnic

\textsuperscript{458} Ibid. 15.
\textsuperscript{459} Ibid. 16.
\textsuperscript{460} See CDHRF, \textit{op.cit.} note 449, 71-8.
distance’ in Yugoslavia, at 69 percent.\textsuperscript{462} In 1987 a study of school-age youth in Serbia was conducted which indicated that a lesser percentage of respondents accepted the possibility of marriage with an Albanian than with a Turk, an Arab, a Roma, or a ‘black’. In contrast to other groups, respondents considered that Albanians do not like other nations (54 percent), are underdeveloped (51 percent), are deceitful (34 percent), reserved (33 percent), rough mannered and homogenous (20 percent), and rash (16 percent)\textsuperscript{463}.

A survey taken by an independent Slovenian group in 1989 shows the extreme level of polarization between Albanians and Serbs in Kosova.\textsuperscript{464} In most of the important questions, Albanians and Serbs displayed totally opposing perspectives. On questions regarding the political status of Kosova, vis-à-vis Serbia, over half of the Albanian respondents answered that Kosova should have “much more autonomy than at present.” In contrast, over half of Serb respondents answered that Kosova should have “much less autonomy than at present.” On the question whether the non-Albanian population of Kosova is suppressed, 85 percent of Serbs responded affirmatively, while 73 percent of Albanians answered that there was no oppression. According to this survey, only 33 percent of Serbs said that they had experienced that oppression personally. Completely different answers were given to many of the other questions. Those questions included: whether there are ethnically motivated rapes in Kosova, whether immigrants from Albania living in Kosova should be expelled from Kosova, what are the causes of the Serb migration from Kosova, how responsible is the individual leader for the problems, and on the causes of the crisis.\textsuperscript{465}

Consequently, Albanians and Serbs used to live in their own world ignoring the realities of other communities. Information that was obtained regarding the harassment of others, and violations of human rights by the state, was considered by the vast majority of people as false and hostile propaganda against the interest of their nation. Thus, the Kosova problem was and still is political one. According to the political will of the majority of Kosova’s population, the problem should be resolved in the political realm. However, when solving the problem, the majority believe that the leaders must be sure to respect the rights of minorities as well. As Ukishin Hoti analyzing Albanian-Serbian relationships, rightly pointed out:

\begin{quote}
Relationships between Albanians and Serbs cannot be hierarchical relations but those of total equality; not relations of disdain but of overall and mutual respect of their identities. Geographical space dictates folksy rapport for both parties, but amity doesn’t stand if it’s not depended on full equality and on everybody’s
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{462} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{465} Ibid.
right to development in accordance with its free possibilities within broad community.\textsuperscript{466}

This lack of communication between the two ethnic groups, and the lack of understanding of the others’ pain and difficulties, does not mean that there were no efforts to spread the truth about what was happening in Kosova and that there were not attempts to establish links between the two communities. One outstanding example was and still is, Nataša Kandić of the Fond za Humanitarno Pravo (Fund for Humanitarian Right) which had the courage to present what was happening in Kosova to the Serbian public during the most dangerous periods. However, up to date their impact in public opinion has been rather limited. As a survey conducted in Serbia in 1997 about the readiness of Serbia’s citizens to solve ethnic conflicts shows, “a vast percentage (41.8%) believes that the solution is to be looked for in the forcible or ‘peaceful’ expulsion of the Albanians. On the other hand, 27.2% of those manifesting `democratic tolerance’ would be willing, at best, to grant the Albanians their cultural autonomy... In other words, in the case of Kosovo, the Serbian public opinion is neither willing to search for a compromise nor even for a minimum democratic solution”.\textsuperscript{467} Nevertheless, there are good examples of courage on both sides. These examples include telling the truth about sensitive issues in Kosova and Serbia, making public gross human rights violations that occurred in Kosova in the past, and working in a direction that will not allow history to be repeated. All of these examples are good signs that improvement of ethnic relationships may occur in the near future. However, at the end, they will be dependent on the political will of political actors and the political solutions that will be introduced to Kosova.

\textsuperscript{466} See Hoti, \textit{op.cit.} note 111. Ukshin Hoti was a well-known and respected professor of Political Thought and International Relations in UP. He finished his specialization in the field of International Relations on Harvard University and Chicago University. He was very active in the political life and scientific life in Yugoslavia during ’70s. He was the first secretary of foreign relations in Kosova and remained there until the end of 1979. He was jailed twice by the Yugoslav and Serbian state. Since he openly supported demonstrations of 1981, and demanded a Kosova republic, he was jailed in 1981 and sentenced to four years of imprisonment. The second time he was sentenced with 5 years in prison because of his patriotic activity on 28 September 1994 as being the leader of the Party for National Unification UNIKOMB. In May 1999, while NATO bombardded Dubrava prison, some Serbian soldiers took Ukshin Hoti out of prison. From that day he hasn’t been found.

\textsuperscript{467} “Readiness of Serbia’s Citizens to Solve Ethnic Conflicts (A Public Opinion Survey)” (November 1997), at \texttt{www.helsinki.opennet.org/elvz4.htm}. 

83
III. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION

1. The role of individual state interests (states outside former Yugoslavia) and the role of regional concerns (Europe) in the process of the ethno-mobilisation

a. The interests of Albania in Kosovo and instruments that it used to intervene and influence the process of ethno-mobilisation in period after 1991

Since the beginning of the Kosovo crisis, it was Albania that openly showed interest and concern about the situation of Albanians in Kosovo and Albanians in all ofof Yugoslavia. Because of the historical ties that existed between Albanians in Albania and Albanians in Kosovo, the reaction of Albania was natural and expected. Also as the first neighbour of Kosovo, every destabilisation in Kosovo had a direct impact within Albania. In the beginning of the ‘90s, Albania openly supported Albanians in Kosovo in their struggle for the right to self determination. In 1992, the Kosovo Albanian shadow state was recognized de facto by a decision of the Albanian parliament. This decision asked the Democratic Party government of the day to recognize the Republic of Kosovo. Although the government did not act upon the resolution of the parliament, the government did remodel the concept of Albanian citizenship. The concept was remodelled along jus sanguinis lines to include all ethnic Albanians regardless of their country of residence. Official support for Kosovo’s independence from the Albanian government, however, did not extend far beyond verbal declarations. Even these declarations stopped after the government recognized the existing borders with the FRY in the wake of the escalating war in the neighbouring country in 1994.

Before the first free elections were held in Albania, there were a few voices that were in favour of the unification of Kosovo with Albania. Sali Berisha, the leader of Democratic Party before he was elected as a president of Albania, was in the same line with these voices. After the Democratic Party won free elections in Albania, and under the pressure of the international community, Albanian’s official policy became more reserved. The best way to describe Albania’s policy is that “since 1990, Albania’s policy toward Kosovo was characterised more by cautiousness than by greater Albanian ideas.

Just after Berisha was elected as President, and he saw the catastrophic economical situation of Albania, he quickly reviewed his preferences. Also, after Albania started to participate in very difficult talks related to the

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469 Ibid.

470 Stefan Troebst, op. cit. note 416, 69.
Yugoslavian conflict, a great amount of pressure was put on him to soften his nationalistic declarations and as a reward for this, financial support was promised to his administration.\(^\text{471}\) The Albanian state was officially against changing borders with and within Yugoslavia, however, it continued to support Albanians in Kosova and their right for self-determination. In the international world, Albania continued to lobby for Kosova, for their right to self determination, and also to condemn the Serbian policies and terror abuses in Kosova. Albania became the voice of Kosova in international organisations because Kosova did not have access to these institutions.

2. The role of the EU

The European Union\(^\text{472}\) was one of the most important international organizations playing a leading role in the Yugoslavian conflict. The EU, a very strong non-military economical organization, tried to mediate the Yugoslavian conflict. However, its intervention in the Yugoslav crisis came too late. It is very hard to understand why the EU was not involved in the Yugoslav crisis much earlier. The EU should have at least become involved at the moment it realized that the crisis in Kosova was deepening and that this was threatening to undermine the stability of the Federation. One explanation could be that at the end of 1980s Europe was too busy dealing with its own problems involving attempts to deepen the integration processes within the EU. Nevertheless, this late involvement in the Yugoslav crisis was until recently followed by weakness to resolve the crisis on the EU’s own soil. In contrast to the EU’s lack of involvement, the US was heavily involved and used its strength to impose its policies on the opposing sides.

From the beginning of its involvement, the EU tried to motivate its counterparts in Yugoslavia to reach a peaceful solution by promising economic help and economic benefits for the whole country. The leading role of the EU in the dissolution process of Yugoslavia had a direct impact in Kosova. Through the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia (hereinafter ECCY), and Badinter Commission on Arbitration (hereinafter BCA), Kosova was excluded from the negotiation table. The Kosova problem was reduced simply to a human rights problem, ignoring the constitutional status that Kosova had in former Yugoslavia. The real cause of the Kosova problem was ignored for a long time, and because of the intensity of the war in other parts of Yugoslavia “Kosovo was not a priority for the international community before 1998.”\(^\text{473}\)

Only after the conflict in Kosova had escalated did the EU prioritize the Kosovo issue in its foreign policy. Accordingly, the EP made resolutions, the European Council issued declarations, and economic and military sanctions against FRY were adopted. These actions did little to prevent or stop the

\(^{471}\) See Vickers, op.cit. note 139, 313.

\(^{472}\) Since European Community latter become European Union. For the purpose of this report we will use the abbreviation EU even when indicating European Community.

\(^{473}\) IICK, op.cit. note 44, 55.
conflict. Too many years were lost, and the conflict has developed to such a level, that the EU’s active involvement in the last years of the conflict was too late to prevent the war.

a. EU dialogue partners prior and during the escalation of crisis

When the crisis in Kosova began, the EU partners with whom they negotiated at the beginning was Yugoslavian and Serbian authorities. In Kosova, when the conflict began, the negotiation partner of the EU was DLK. After the free elections in Kosova were organized in 1992, which were never recognized by the international community, DLK won the vast majority and Ibrahim Rugova was chosen as a President.

After the Dayton Agreement, Rugova’s reputation among Albanians was decreasing. As a result, a new force appeared to win the sympathy of the Kosova Albanians, the KLA. Until the end of 1997 and beginning of 1998, the EU tried to keep Rugova as the negotiating partner; however, they could not ignore the reality in Kosova any more.

Finally in October 1998, the international community recognized the KLA as a powerful political factor not to be ignored. The KLA, not Rugova’s LDK, was increasingly accepted as the legitimate representative of Kosovar Albanians in any possible peace talks between Serbian and Kosova Albanians representatives. When negotiations in Rambouillet were organized, it was obvious that the KLA was a leading force in Kosova, the KLA was the leading Albanian negotiation team.

b. EU institutions that were involved in crisis management

EU institutions became involved in the Kosova crisis from the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. While at the beginning of the 90s, the EU was in the final stage of negotiations on a new treaty, the crisis management institutions were not as developed as they are today. Among the EU institutions that were deeply involved in the Kosova crisis were the European Parliament, Council of Foreign Ministers, European Commission and highly expected new pillar since the Maastricht Treaty, Common Foreign and Security Police. The problem was that EU was doing deep institutional reforms and was still searching for new identity in foreign policy.

Another sign of increased EU interest in the Kosova issue, was the setting up of a Conflict Prevention Network (hereinafter CPN) under the auspices of the European Commissions Directorate General IA. CPN is a network of academic institutions, NGOs, and independent experts that form a part of the EUs Analysis and Evaluation centre. Even with the creation of CPN, however, member states of the EU once again were main actors of the event.

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474 Dejan Guzina, “Kosovo or Kosova - Could It Be Both? The Case of Interlocking Serbian and Albanian Nationalisms”, in Bieber and Daskalovski (eds.), 44.
475 Ibid.
476 See Troebst, op.cit. note 416, 51
c. Instruments applied by EU

Declarations, resolutions, organization of conferences for former Yugoslavia, and sanctions were instruments that the EU used and applied in the Kosova crisis. The European Parliament (hereinafter EP) adopted several Resolutions concerning Kosova, even though sometimes EP resolutions were not in the same line with EU foreign policy. The EU organized a peace conference on Yugoslavia, and later created the BCA within ECCY, leaving Kosova outside.

The creation of the ECCY in August 1991, two months after fighting broke out in Slovenia and Croatia heralded a new approach to the growing conflict in the Balkans. The EP fully supported the creation of the ECCY and expressed its desire to allow participation of Kosova and Vojvodina, who had been excluded from the European Political Cooperation (hereinafter EPC) statements list of participations. Parliament explicitly endorsed the claim that the republics and the autonomous provinces enjoyed the right of “... democratic self-determination...” which could only be negotiated within “...new processes of voluntary cooperation”.

Economic sanctions were imposed after FRY refused Lord Carrington’s peace plan. The most powerful tool that the EU had, and used, was economic sanctions, but even these were withdrawn in 1996 after the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereinafter FYRM). In 1996, after the Dayton shock in Kosova, the withdrawal of economic sanctions was another bad omen for Albanians. Implicitly, the EU was rewarding those who had chosen a military strategy for their cause, rather than those who chose a peaceful strategy.

d. Approaches that EU did have for financing the different countries

During the conflict in Kosova, the European Union was very careful in its policy of financing any of the parties involved in the conflict. While Kosova Albanians didn’t have a government that was officially recognized by the international community, the EU could not give financial support even if they wanted. The help that came from the EU to the FRY was aimed at humanitarian help, support for free media, and democratic structures of civil society etc. The EU established military and economic sanctions against FRY, and these sanctions had a direct impact in Kosova. The EU promised financial help if the conflict between the parties could be settled through a peaceful agreement.

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477 See Terrett, op.cit. note 258, 78.
478 Ibid. 77-8.
e. Expectations of different actors from EU involvement

In the Kosova conflict, Serbs and Albanians had different expectations from the EU. The Serbian state was hoping that the EU would not interfere in its internal state problems as it considered the Kosova issue. Albanians, through their policy of internationalizing the Kosovo problem, were hoping that the EU would use its influence and economic power to pressure Serbia to find a peaceful settlement for Kosova. As has been indicated several times in this report, Albanians wanted to win EU sympathy and support for their struggle for self determination through their peaceful movement. After the Dayton agreement, where Kosova was not included in negotiations, disappointment among Albanians was very high. At the end, both sides’ expectations were not fulfilled. On one side, the EU regarded Kosova as an internal problem of FRY; but, on the other side, the EU required FRY to restore the autonomous status of Kosova inside FRY.

Due to the excessive use of force by the Serbian security forces in the Drenica region and in Pristina from 28 February to 2 March 1998, EU External Relations Commissioner Van den Broek called upon Milosjevic on 3 March to initiate a dialogue with the Kosovo Albanians and to restore their autonomy. Due to possible spill over effects, Van den Broek no longer viewed the Kosovo conflict as an internal affair of the FRY. However, disappointment among Albanians toward the EU was very high. A peaceful movement that was fighting for their right to be free, did not get full support of the EU. Moreover, the movement was ignored in its demand for independence.

f. The effects of EU policies

For a better understanding of the effects of EU policy in Kosova, we have to see how EU policy developed from the beginning of the Yugoslavian crises. When the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia started, the US and the majority of the countries within the European Community openly supported the maintenance of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. Preservation of the SFRY was the chief aim of the EU, as agreed in an EPC meeting on 26 March 1991. However, in pursuing this aim it was made clear that the EU would not accept the legitimacy of force by any of the parties to the crisis.

At the very beginning of Yugoslavian crisis, the EU did not deal directly with Kosova. In July 1990 the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved despite provisions in the 1974 Constitution, requiring Assembly consent for its own dissolution. Arguably, this act signaled the end of the 1974 Constitution, and, according to some, the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It is difficult to explain why the EU was so in favor of preserving the SFRY. If the EU wanted to keep Yugoslavia alive, they would have had to intervene much earlier when Serbia forcefully abolished the autonomy of Kosova. Former ambassador in SFRY,

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479 Ibid. 56.
480 Ibid. 72.
481 Ibid.
482 IICK, op.cit. note 44, 41
Zimmerman, agrees that it was the Serbian aggression in Kosova that caused the chain-reaction of dissolution of Yugoslavia.\footnote{See Meier, \textit{op.cit.} note 30, 318.}

In the beginning of the 90s, the EU’s policy toward Yugoslavia could be summarized in three main points; a) maintenance of Yugoslavian territorial integrity, b) disputes within Yugoslavia should be solved in a democratic way c) and human rights. This policy was supported through different initiatives and resolutions from different institutions of the European Community. At the beginning, the EU approach to the Kosovo problem was reduced only to the human rights violence as demonstrated by the EP resolution on 11 October 1990 pointing out that they were “deeply concerned over the situation of human rights in Kosovo.”\footnote{“Resolution on Kosovo” (11 October 1990) (B3-1747, 1759, 1786, and 1820/90).} More or less in the same line, was the EP Resolution adopted on 15 March 1991. This resolution called for the creation of a constitution which would “...by respecting the rights of all peoples in Yugoslavia...enable the State of Yugoslavia to continue. It accepted that the constituent republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right freely to determine their own political future in a peaceful and democratic manner...it condemned...the continuing violations of the human rights of the ethnic Albanians population in Kosovo.”\footnote{See Terrett, \textit{op.cit.} note 258, 73.} The ambiguity of the EP Resolution and the EU policy gave the counterparts in Yugoslavia space for varying interpretations. On the one side, republics and autonomous provinces wanted to believe that they had a right to self-determination. On the other side, Serbia perceived this as the way of preserving Yugoslavia under forceful domination, without the fear of stronger international political and military involvement.

The EU created the BCA in August 1991. The BCA was the first international judicial commission dealing with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and self-determination of federal units up to the right of secession. The BCA dealt with the question of self-determination in SFRY by relying on different materials submitted from Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, the President of the SFRY, and the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina. No materials Kosova or Vojvodina were used in coming to a decision.\footnote{Ibid. 125.} The BCA’s way of handling the situation, “...indicates how the formerly autonomous regions were effectively given less access than the Republic Srpska, which enjoyed no formal status under Yugoslavia’s constitution and was the creature of nationalist military conflict.”\footnote{Ibid. 154.} The approach of the BCA, giving more space and attention to Republika Srpska which was created with the use of military force and leaving aside autonomous regions that already existed in SFRY, was seen as a reward for those who had been aggressors and who had conducted ethnic cleansing.

The EU policy was very slow. The policy was running behind the reality, which in meantime, was created on the field. The EU \textit{Declaration on Yugoslavia} considered Kosova and Vojvodina as an exclusive inner problem of Serbia: “Kosovo and Vojvodina would thus be left to resolve their political
differences within Serbia and would be required to endure the same political repression and domination which the other republics sought to avoid by seeking independence.”

In order to manage the Yugoslavian crisis and Serbian aggression, in September the EU organized its Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY). Meanwhile, the Security Council of the UN stated that every territorial benefit gained with violence would be unacceptable. The main failure of the ECCY was its approach; it clearly discharged realities created violently by Serbia after Milošević came into power. Despite the fact that the two autonomous regions of Kosova and Vojvodina were equally represented in the federal presidency in the 1974 constitution, the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICFY) did not include these federal units within the so-called ‘relevant authorities’.

The ECCY recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states on 15 January 1992. Bosnia also applied to this Conference aiming at independent status. The ECCY recognized the sovereignty of Bosnia on 6th April: “When EC recognition was granted on 6th April 1992 conflict erupted immediately. The pattern of conflict was similar to that in Slovenia and Croatia. Local and regional militia, supported by YNA, attacked and ethnically-cleansed areas such as Zvornik, Banja Luka, Bijelina, Brcko, Doboj, and the capital, Sarajevo, to secure a corridor between Serb-occupied areas in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia.”

The successor of ECCY was ICFY held on 26 August 1992. The ICFY was a joint effort of the European Community and the United Nations. The co-chairman of the ICFY, David Owen, explained that the Conference offered for Kosova only autonomy within Serbia and Kosova. Albanians were not ready for autonomy only within Serbia and Kosova. In December 1991, the exiled Kosova government addressed a letter to Lord Carrington. In the letter it stated a demand for the self-determination of Kosova. Additionally, the letter demanded equal access with other constitutive units of the Federation when determining the inheritance process in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Mr. Carrington opposed this demand by rejecting Kosova as a part that could decide on its own fate. This starting point, founded on fait accompli, disillusioned Kosova Albanians.

In regard to the Kosovo conflict, the European Council issued two declarations in June 1992 and in December 1992. In its Lisbon Declaration on June 1992, the European Council stated: “With regard to Kosovo, the European Council expects the Serbian leadership to refrain from further repression and to engage in serious dialogue with representatives of this territory. The European Council reminds the inhabitants of Kosovo that their legitimate quest for autonomy should be dealt with in the framework of the

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488 Ibid. 81.
489 Enver Hasani, Shpërberja e Jugosllavisë dhe Kosova (Kosova and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia) (Instituti Shqiptar për Studime Ndërkombëtare, Tirnë, 2000), 36.
490 See Terrett, op.cit. note 258, 33.
491 See David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (Harcourt Brace and Company, Florida, 1995), 76.
Conference on Yugoslavia.” In the Edinburgh Declaration of December 1992, the Council demanded that “the autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia must be restored.” These declarations did not have any impact on FRY policy toward Kosovo.

It has to be noted that after the Dayton peace agreement the “... international community generally viewed Yugoslavia as a peacemaker after Milošević lent his support to the Dayton peace accord on Bosnia. Most EU countries reestablished diplomatic relations with Belgrade and on 2 October 1996, the UN lifted sanctions that had been in place for the previous four years.” The EU diplomatically recognized the FRY after the FRY recognized the FYRM. In contrast to the US doctrine of keeping up an “outer wall of sanctions” to the Belgrade regime, some European countries such as Germany prioritized its national interest by sending back refugees to the FRY.

Another reality that had a negative impact on the Kosovo issue was disunity among EU states. Changes in EU policy toward Kosovo could be seen from the spring of 1997. Up until 1997, the official stance of the EU had been that the Kosovo issue should be dealt with within the borders of the Republic of Serbia and that Kosovo should obtain greater autonomy inside Serbia. From 1997, the EU was no longer supporting Kosovo’s autonomy inside Serbia, but advocating larger autonomy within FRY. The last initiative in 1997 directed at finding a peaceful solution for Kosovo, was an initiative of German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, and French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine. The answer from Belgrade authorities was negative, while Minister of Foreign Affairs Milutinović declared that “Kosovo is an internal affair and nobody else’s business.”

All these declarations and resolutions did not change anything on the field. Serbia continued its policy of terror in Kosovo, and there was no sign from its side to restore Kosovo’s autonomy. As a back up to its policies, the EU tried to use its economic power. Sanctions imposed against the SFRY, were later removed except for Serbia and Montenegro. With no military capacity, however, the EU was left with only diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal. As war later erupted, it was clear that these tools were insufficient. “Time of Europe,” which was announced by some key figures of the EU, found Europe not prepared for a conflict of such a large scale. There are several factors that impeded the EU’s involvement in Yugoslavia in general, and particular in Kosovo. The first is the lack of EU policy coherence. In the EU level many times the political interests of member states are contradictory. Also, these different interests do not only contradict each other in the EU level; sometimes the interests are even at odds with the policies of EU institutions such as the EU Commission or the European Parliament. The second is the lack of independent and unified

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495 HRW, op.cit. note 432, 3.
496 See Troebst, op.cit. note 416, 49.
497 Ibid. 62.
498 See Terrett, op.cit. note 258, 76.
military capacities of the EU to deal with a complex situation like the situation in the Balkans. And third is the role of the US and Russia in the European integration process. It is likely that both the US and Russia are interested in EU integration, but they do not want the integration to be so successful so as to pose a real threat to their political, economic and military interests.

3. The role of other international organisations and institutions

a. Council of Europe

FRY was not a member of the Council of Europe (CoE). This was a reason why the CoE did not deal with the Kosova issue for several years. Despite this fact, the Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted “Resolution 1077 (1996) on Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo.” The Parliamentary Assembly sought to stop the repatriation of Kosovo-asylum seekers whose human rights were violated in Kosova. However, this resolution was not approved by the member states. Germany and Switzerland were two of the stronger opponents, most likely because these two countries had the largest number of Kosovo asylum seekers in Europe. On 28 January 1998, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe approved a resolution calling for an end to the repression of ethnic Albanians and immediate dialogue between the parties, highlighting the fact that the province was on the brink of civil war. Leni Fischer, President of the Parliamentary Assembly, visited Belgrade and Prishtina in March 1998 in an attempt to mediate between the two conflicting parties. The CoE did not succeed in bringing both sides to the negotiating table. At that time, other important international actors became involved in Kosova; CoE was not able to deal with such a large-scale conflict.

b. NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter NATO) was not actively involved at the beginning of the Kosova crisis. As long as other relevant international institutions such as the EU, the UN, and the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter OSCE as it was renamed latter on) were handling the Kosova question, NATO was not engaged. However, at the end of 1997 the situation in Kosova was becoming more dangerous. Because the threat of an open war also put regional security at risk, NATO became involved. By the end of 1997, NATO was actively involved in the Kosova crises. NATO’s involvement began with declarations and statements. Involvement increased starting in 1998 with a NATO

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500 See Troebst, op.cit. note 416, 35.
501 IICK, op.cit. note 44, 137.
military presence in the region, which in turn led to the NATO military intervention in Kosova in 1999.\textsuperscript{502}

c. OSCE

OSCE was among the first international bodies to deal with Kosova. The first serious European response to this wide-scale bloody conflict was the engagement of the OSCE. It failed to prevent further escalation of the conflict or to create conditions for peace: “Of course, in practice, CSCE and its mechanisms on ‘conflict conclusion’ (some unarmed men with white clothes and diplomatic passports, with instructions of helping all parties equally) soon gave up from this commitment.”\textsuperscript{503}

On 19 June 1991, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in European issued a declaration which backed the sovereignty of Federation. Two days later, James Baker, Secretary of State in Bush’s administration, visited Belgrade and supported the OSCE declaration.\textsuperscript{504} In 1992 OSCE opened its office in Kosova. The decision to let the mission into FRY was made by an American businessman of Serbian origin, Milan Panić. Panic was the candidate of the newly elected FRY President Dobrica Ćosić, and on 14 July 1992 he took over the office of Federal Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{505}

During its mission, OSCE monitored the human rights situation in Kosova and reported this to OSCE headquarters in Vienna. In 1993 when Zoran Lilić was appointed as a president of FRY, Milošević did not extend permission for the OSCE mission in Kosova. Because Milosevic would not grant permission, the OSCE had to leave the country in July 1993. The departure of the Kosova branch of the mission had an immediate and negative impact on the human rights situation in the region; former local staff of the mission and other Kosova Albanians who had been in contact with the mission were interrogated, detained, and beaten.\textsuperscript{506}

Later, the OSCE appointed Mr. Max Van der Stoel as the Personal Representative of the Chairman-Office for Kosovo. Van der Stoel was unable to make any progress because on only one occasion did Serbia issue him a visa. Even when the visa was issued, the trip was considered a “private visit” in Kosova. Because he was unable to visit Kosova, he could not perform his job efficiently. Also, former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales was appointed as the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for the FRY. Unfortunately, Gonzales had the same problems as Van der Stoel because he could not obtain a visa.

\textsuperscript{502} See Troebst, \textit{op.cit.} note 416, 46.
\textsuperscript{503} See Hasani, \textit{op.cit.} note 489, 35.
\textsuperscript{504} \textit{Ibid}. 33.
\textsuperscript{505} See Troebst, \textit{op.cit.} note 416, 26.
\textsuperscript{506} \textit{Ibid}. 29.
4. Reasons why there was no conflict escalation in certain Ex-Yugoslav Republics

It is clear that all wars in Yugoslavia were somehow initiated by Milošević. The mixture of the Serb presence in certain territories, and territorial claims, were the main causes of the war Serbia conducted in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosova. Milošević did not cause much trouble in Slovenia for two fundamental reasons:

* There is no Serb minority living in Slovenia; Slovenia is a very homogenous state in relation to the ethnic structure of the population
* Serbia has no direct physical territorial link with Slovenia

Although Serbia has a territorial link with Macedonia, there is a small presence of Serbs in Macedonia. Furthermore, the geo-strategic position of Macedonia serves as a buffer zone. Because of these two factors, the Serbian regime did not intervene in Macedonia. Due to the sensitivity of this position, and the risk that a war in Macedonia could involve different regional actors with huge interests in the area such as Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Turkey and Serbia, the international community worked carefully to preserve peace in Macedonia. Even during the outbreak of the conflict between Albanians and the Macedonian regime, the intervention by the international community to end the hostilities was faster than in the other part of ex-Yugoslavia.

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507 HRW, op.cit. note 441, 8-9.
CONCLUSION

The ethno-mobilization among Kosova Albanians took different shapes at different times. Starting from 1948, up to 1968, there are no discernible or open forms of ethno-mobilization among Albanians. The main reason for this was cruel direct repression by the Serbian republican/‘state’ apparatuses after the uprising in 1945. However, permanent illegal resistance movements acted in Kosova during this time too. Kosova felt freer after Ranković fell from power in 1966. Intensive ethno-mobilization started just after the demonstrations of 1968. Under this pressure and motivated toward a more balance-based Federation, Tito supported the constitutional changes during 1970-74. With the constitution of 1974 Kosova gained broader autonomy, but was still situated under Serbia. Ethno-mobilization, starting with the ‘80s, was double-aim-oriented: republic-oriented (meaning demand for Kosova to become republic within Federation) and national unification-oriented (meaning unification with Albania). During the ‘70s-‘80s, the economic development gap between the richest and poorest regions within Yugoslavia was widening. Huge dissatisfaction with poor economic conditions of life, combined with the national sentiments motivated by discontent of Albanians treated as second-class citizens to whom equality has been denied by denying a republic to them, led to the demonstrations of 1981 all over Kosova. A state of emergency was declared in Kosova by federal authorities. Illegal organizations, students, and intellectuals appeared as a main factor in the process of ethno-mobilization among Albanians during this period. The official Kosova Albanian political elite only indirectly influenced the process of ethno-mobilization by pressing for the opening of the UP and for closer relationships with Tirana.

At the same time, Serbs were also very disappointed with the Constitution of 1974 and with their position in the province. However, prior to 1981, their discontent officially was silent despite the fact that the Blue Book circulated among Serb communists which laid down conditions for future steps in abolition of Kosova’s autonomy. After the demonstrations of 1981 took place, Serbs started to openly demand the constitutional changes and openly show their discontent with their position in Kosova. They started to hold Albanians and provincial institutions accountable for what started to be perceived in the Serbian public opinion as ‘genocide’ against Serbs in Kosova. All these sentiments were instrumentalized by Serbian political elite, media, SOC, SASA, SWU etc., which on the other side were the main factors in the process of ethno-mobilization among Serbs.

After Milošević came to power, he supported the abolition of autonomy of Kosova by Serbia. The Kosova Albanian communist political leaders were removed from institutions. This led to a new wave of the ethno-mobilization among Kosova Albanians. It started with miners 55 kilometer march from Trepça mine in direction of Pristina to protest the removal of communist leaders, Azem Vlasi and Kaçuşa Jashari. The repression of the Serbian state increased, expelling Albanians from state jobs, closing their schools and facilities, arresting and permanently ill-treating civilians etc. Also many civilians were killed in either demonstrations or without any reason. During the period 1991-1997 gross human rights violations occurred in Kosova. Also it is worth remembering that at the end of the 20th century, Kosova was
introduced to a system of modern apartheid by the Serbian state, demonstrating an unprecedented example for modern Europe. During this period, the political epicenter of public political life became the Democratic League of Kosova (DLK). Its political determination was non-violence resistance. The leader of DLK, Ibrahim Rugova, was elected at the same time as the President of Kosova. The institution of the president was part of a parallel shadow system established by Albanians in Kosova. The government of Kosova was created in exile (Ljubljana, Slovenia). It continued its activity in Bonn, Germany. From 1993 to 1997, DLK was focused mainly on helping the parallel political system that was established in Kosova function. Most of the people hoped that the international community would solve Kosova’s problem. After the Dayton Peace Agreement, many Kosova Albanians were convinced that political and diplomatic means of solving the problem were exhausted since no one from the superpowers considered Kosova as serious problem; the superpowers peacefully accepted Serbian rule. After this delusion, political and military organizations such as KLA and NMLK started to gain strength. On 28 November 1997 KLA appeared publicly. Young people were the main actors in the process of ethno-mobilization that led to the war in Kosova. The international community’s actions to prevent conflict were very ineffective. Neither of the international organizations that dealt with the Kosova issue had been able to prevent the conflict that started in 1998. There are many reasons why the international community failed in its conflict prevention strategies in Kosova. However we consider some of them more important than others. First of all, one of the main mistakes of the international community is its misconception that Kosova’s problem is linked with the take over of the power in Serbia by Milošević. The roots of the Kosova problem go back to its occupation by the Serbian Kingdom in 1912/13 during the First Balkan War and its separation from the newly created Albanian state. Milošević as continuation of traditional chauvinist regimes in Serbia, particularly concerning Kosova, may have worsened the conflict and escalated it to the armed struggle, but he did not create it. He inherited the Kosova problem and misused it for its political aims. The other reason of this failure is that the international community perceived Kosova as internal problem of Serbia or FRY. The effort to try to resolve the Kosova problem within Serbia and Yugoslavia, as this report also shows historically was deemed to fail. Finally, the third mistake in our view is that Kosova was considered as belonging to the realm of human rights problems and solutions were sought to be found only within that sphere. While human rights violations were one of the dimensions of this problem, at the heart of the conflict stood the desire of the Albanian population for the external self-determination and the constant suppression of the Serbian regime of that political will. Only in this framework can a lasting solution for the Kosov a problem be found. Apart from these general failures of the international community, we consider that several other factors why the EU failed to intervene effectively in Yugoslavia and in Kosova. One is the lack of EU policy coherence, meaning that there are different and sometimes contradicting political interests among different member states. Also these interests are very often in contradiction even with Brussels bureaucracy, most often with EU Commission. The second is the lack of military capacities of EU to deal with a complex situation like that in the Balkans. And the third is the fragile
position of the EU vis-a-vis the US and Russia which are not so interested for strong and united Europe.
In this report we follow the line of argumentation that the Kosova conflict is neither a religious conflict nor a pure ethnic conflict. In our view, it was a permanent conflict between the occupied Albanian population struggling for freedom and self-determination and Serbian chauvinist regimes, which conquered Kosova in 1912/13 during the First Balkan War and constantly worked to suppress the will of the majority of people in Kosova. These regimes, in order to justify their misdeeds in Kosova, tried to give to this conflict features of ethnic and religious conflict, using the Serbian minority in Kosova as a tool to achieve its objectives. Only through a solution that would satisfy the will of the majority, but respect the rights of the minorities, will the wounds of this lasting conflict be healed.
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3. Interview with Gani Toska, Roma civil society activists conducted by Glauk Konjufca on 20th May 2007. Interview is in the HRCUP’s files.

4. Interview with Hydajet Hyseni, one of the leader of illegal movement on 70s and 80s, conducted by Glauk Konjufca on 15th of May 2007. Interview is in the HRCUP’s files.


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