Mission vs. costs: TVP Wilno and its uncertain realities

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began not in 2022, but in early 2014 with the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the launch of the war in Donbas. At that time, Russia had already launched its propaganda machine to target at least some segments of the population in neighboring countries.

A 2016 study commissioned by the Department of National Minorities at the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, conducted after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, surveyed 812 respondents from national minorities. It found that about 80% of users consumed various Russian media. Russian news channels were popular not only among ethnic Russians living in Lithuania but also among other minority groups. The audience share for Russian-language media ranged from 60% to 90% across different ethnic communities. Television, especially Russian TV channels, was the most popular source of information. On average, three out of four respondents watched various Russian programs. The second most popular channel was Lithuania’s public broadcaster LRT, followed by other Lithuanian-language television outlets.

A 2024 public opinion survey, commissioned by the Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission and conducted by Kantar, polled 1,123 individuals. Significantly, this research differed from the 2016 study by surveying the broader Lithuanian populace, rather than exclusively national minority representatives. The exact number of national minority individuals among the 1,123 respondents was not specified. According to the findings, only 14% of participants in 2024 reported recently viewing television channels broadcast from Russia. This demographic largely comprised older residents and those of Polish or Russian ethnicity. Methods of consuming these Russian channels included traditional television (47.6%), dedicated websites (34.2%), social media (27.7%), and satellite (14.7%). For obtaining global news in Russian, YouTube was the most frequently cited platform (64.3%), followed by Telegram channels (26.8%), Nastojaščeje Vremia (19.9%), and TV Rain (10.5%).

When questioned about their primary television sources for Lithuanian and international events, 55.9% of respondents selected the country’s public broadcaster LRT. Other notable choices included TV3 (53.5%), LNK (45.9%), Info TV (11.3%), Lietuvos rytas.tv (8.4%), Delfi TV (6.3%), BTV (5.7%), and an additional 8% opted for other channels. The survey findings do not indicate whether TVP Wilno's programming was categorized under the 8% for ‘other channels’.

In other words, one could hardly claim that TVP Wilno became the main source of information for Lithuania’s Polish minority and representatives of other ethnic groups capable of consuming media information in Polish. More specifically, it failed to overcome the trend where Lithuania’s Polish minority was placed between the Lithuanian and Russian media landscapes.

An analysis of the financial plans from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Telewizja Polska S.A. for 2025–2026 suggests a systemic shift in the funding paradigm for Polish media for foreign audiences. These decisions are not just budget corrections but a deep restructuring that calls into question TVP Wilno’s current operational model.

Michał Broniatowski, Director of the Foreign Media Center, stated: “We concluded that, given the size of the channel's original production, the allocated amount (36 million PLN in 2025) was significantly overstated. Reducing the costs to levels closer to TVP's internal standards was our main goal, and we achieved that. The cost per minute of original content on TVP Wilno was three times higher than for channels targeting the East: Belsat (Belarusian), Vot Tak (Russian), or Slava (Ukrainian).”

Thus, the 2025 TVP Wilno budget was cut from 36 million PLN (8.52 million EUR) to 20 million PLN, with further cuts planned (4.74 million EUR as of January 19, 2026).

To determine the new budget, the weekly duration of original programming on TVP Wilno was compared with that on Belsat and TVP World. While Belsat produced 63 hours per week with an annual budget of 59 million PLN (equivalent to 13.97 million EUR), and TVP World produced 67 hours, TVP Wilno delivered only 10.5 hours. Consequently, TVP Wilno’s new programming schedule became focused on news and commentary.

Polish decision-makers emphasize that production costs in Vilnius were deemed 'disproportionately high' compared to the Lithuanian market and the standards of Polish regional centers. According to Broniatowski, “the cost per minute of original content at TVP Wilno was three times higher than in eastern-facing channels: Belsat, Vot Tak, or Slava.”

One should also pay attention to the findings from the Supreme Audit Office of the Republic of Poland, which pointed out irregularities in human resource management at TVP. Additionally, financial reports revealed high technical and broadcasting costs across the entire company, reaching hundreds of millions of PLN. In the case of TVP Wilno, cost specifics included actors' services, set design, and royalties – raising concerns among auditors about the justification of those expenditures.

In 2024, TVP received significantly less public funding (a decrease of 900 million PLN compared to 2023, or 213.04 million EUR), ending the year with a net loss of nearly 239 million PLN (56.57 million EUR). In this macroeconomic climate, it became increasingly challenging, both politically and economically, to justify the upkeep of expensive foreign branches without clear evidence of their effectiveness or return on investment.

The decision to reduce funding for TVP Wilno generated significant resistance from segments of the Polish community in Lithuania. A petition titled “Opposition to the Decision to Limit TVP Wilno’s Operations” currently amassed over 5,559 signatures. Comments associated with the petition and found on social media primarily conveyed emotional and identity-driven arguments, such as:

● “This is a blow to the Polish community.”

● “I want to watch television in MY [native] language.”

● “TVP Wilno is a cradle of elites.”

To defend the current funding approach, Vilnius Mayor Valdas Benkunskas dispatched an open letter to the mayors of Poland’s partner cities. Intellectuals from the Jerzy Giedroyc Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation also issued an open letter, while a separate one initiated by Barbara Jundo-Kaliszewska received support from over 200 academics across Poland, Lithuania, and other countries. Further details regarding the efforts to defend TVP Wilno are available on Jundo-Kaliszewska’s social media profiles.

Although some observers criticize the production costs of TVP Wilno when compared to domestic TVP channels, others maintain that it plays a strategic role in the broader information environment. This function helps reduce the influence of Russian and Belarusian disinformation, a point especially critical for Poles in Lithuania, many of whom largely understand Russian.

For some members of the Polish community in Lithuania who support the station, its existence holds inherent value, irrespective of viewership metrics. It represents the presence of the Polish state in the East. To them, budget cuts are perceived as a 'withdrawal of Polishness.' Polish decision-makers, however, hold a different view, leading to observable contrasting perspectives.

Hence, Polish authorities are obligated to balance expenses and seek measurable outcomes. If TVP Wilno's costs exceed those of many domestic branches, and its impact remains unproven, then budget cuts are considered justifiable. Conversely, the Polish minority in Lithuania perceives spending on Polish media abroad as an indispensable form of support for their ethnic kin, regardless of the financial outlay.

The most critical question in the discussion surrounding TVP Wilno’s future is whether credible data exists to confirm that the station is genuinely watched by a statistically significant audience. If such data were available, it could provide a rationale for maintaining, or even increasing, its funding. However, to date, neither Polish decision-makers nor Lithuanian Polish minority representatives advocating for this media outlet have presented any viewership metrics.

The TVP Wilno situation holds two key implications. Firstly, it illustrates a common dilemma for media outlets specifically tailored for minorities. Such an outlet inherently targets a limited audience, which it must still engage with its content. This type of outlet often competes with channels in the official or other languages its audience understands, and it must also quickly adapt to the changing digital media environment.

Secondly, the TVP Wilno issue goes beyond just a budget argument for one editorial office. It tests how mature Poland's eastern policy is when resources are tight. The choice to cut funding might be smart economically (high costs, no performance data), but it's also risky. The challenge ahead won't be to defend an old TV model, which digital and social media are now replacing worldwide, but to create a new, cheaper, and more effective way to reach Poles in Lithuania, before someone else does.