After the final whistle: AFCON as a Test of Pan-Africanism

1052 – the number of posts that have used the hashtag #Moroccoonly, while on Instagram, over 1000 posts have used the tag #deporting africanmigrantsisapublicdemand. The posts using this particular hashtag have garnered over 500k views, and thousands of comments, which either repeat the same hashtag, or which encourage the deportation of African migrants from Morocco. All this since 13 February 2026.

On the other hand, posts created in response to the final minutes of the African Cup of Nations (AFCON) finale, where Senegalese players decided to withdraw from the game as a protest against a penalty attributed to the Moroccan player Ibrahim Diaz, drew comments such as “Africa won, not just Senegal” may suggest that Morocco is not seen as part of Africa.
The dynamic revealed in the aftermath of the final game between Morocco and Senegal requires an intricate social and historical reading to be able to understand its symbolism and implications. Namely, two key historical episodes that contributed to a racially divided continent. The racial and colorist divide that dominates the social and discursive imaginary currently prevailing has been impacted by deeper and more intricate historical episodes that date back to the Saadins dynasty, which lasted from 1510 to 1659 in Morocco. During this era, a sedimentation of what I refer to as a “double historical fracture” was created: two episodes that shaped how race was constructed, perceived, and internalized throughout Moroccan history, and how it hypothetically created an African “grudge”, a symbolic and persistent manifestation of a collective memory of racial hierarchy and colorist discourse.
The first historical fracture: the African “grudge”:
Although Morocco has largely been working towards the articulation of stronger and more strategic ties with its African partners since King Mohammed VI came into power, a critical revisiting of the historical construction of race and “Blackness” in Morocco remains important and necessary to understand the demands and expectations of this new diplomatic African chapter.
Under the reign of Sultan Moulay Ismail from 1672 to 1727, the racialization of the institution of slavery intensified. Practices such as the retrieval of enslaved individuals from Mali and the enslavement of “Black” Moroccans further consolidated the institution and created a new social configuration, with Black Moroccans and Africans forming groups (ex-slaved such as “Abid al-Bukhari” (the “Black army”) and “Haratin” (previously enslaved individuals and their descendants). These groups were placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy in Morocco, normalizing and institutionalizing their exploitation and marginalization. While “Abid Al-Bukhari” formed the front liners in wars and battles, the “Haratin” mainly designated previously enslaved individuals or their descendants, who despite their formal emancipation, were still socially marginalized and racialized.
Furthermore, there are other factors that contribute to the fragility of African solidarity which are also linked to the continent’s contemporary history, and these are based mostly on the persistent impact of colonial borders and politically constructed geographical demarcations.
The second historical fracture: the Sahara as a racializing border:
Before the establishment of colonial settlements on the African continent, North and Southern Africa had important links through trade, the training and the circulation of the Ulamas (Muslim Scholars) as well as other areas of cooperation. Upon the arrival of the colonial enterprise, geography became more political, assisting colonial powers in their extractive economies and facilitating continental fragmentation through the “divide and rule” mantra. While regions such as Central and Eastern Africa suffered from the arbitrariness of their borders, triggering issues of irredentism and conflict, the colonial enterprise has also acted to install a new divide between North Africa and other African states. With institutions of trade and slavery acting as determinants of new geographical configurations, the Sahara became a geographical demarcation of a new racial categorization, promoting the commonly used and highly – if not dismissive/lazy generalized catch all: “sub-Saharan Africa.” Thus a unifying curtain term for a rather diverse and heterogeneous population was created. Attempts by colonial powers to de-Africanize northern Africa created a durable and persistent epistemic and political boundary that would later largely resist pan-Africanist integration institutions.
The Pan-Africanist movement, with its ideological and institutional settings, was implemented in resistance to the colonial enterprise’s logics of division and fragmentation and it aimed to create platforms that would promote economic recovery, continental solidarity, and counter the discursive and ideological residue of colonialism. From the Pan-African Association in 1897 to the Organization of African Unity (the “ancestor” of the African Union), Pan-Africanism went from its cultural and heritage-focused origins to more political, diplomatic, and governance orientations.
Since then, Morocco’s encounter with Pan-Africanist discourse and institutions has been subject to numerous episodes and tensions. The Organization of African Unity, established in 1963, attempted to overcome rooted continental divides and opted for an inclusive and integrative agenda to both honor and accommodate the continent’s heterogeneity. However, the Moroccan withdrawal from the organization as a protest against the contested membership of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic due to the absence of international recognition of its statehood in 1984, marked a symbolic and diplomatic rupture; and with the Sahara functioning as a racialized border, political distance and continental fragmentation have been further reinforced.
Preventing a potential “third” fracture:
Days after the AFCON finale, and in the middle of tensions that were rising between Moroccans and the rest of the African continent, Senegal officially reaffirmed its support for Morocco’s autonomy plan over the Sahara, a gesture that is extremely significant on the Moroccan diplomatic stage. This gesture, in the context of heated FIFA and CAF related contestations, signifies that while the symbolic and historical divides might persist, Morocco is not replicating a chapter of seclusion, diplomatic rupture, or isolation. Since the accession of King Mohammed VI, Morocco has significantly increased its continental investment, and implemented strategic projects such as the Triple A (African, Agricultural, Adaptation) program designed specifically for Africa by the Cherifian Office of Phosphate (OCP) which promotes concrete projects between the OCP and a number of African countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria. Furthermore, the two extraordinary regularization campaigns of 2014 and 2017, which allowed for the regularization of over 50,000 migrants, mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa in Morocco, symbolized not only a transformation in migration governance but also a strategic repositioning of Morocco within Africa. Morocco has also been actively involved in cultural, educational, and religious exchanges and partnerships with the rest of Africa’s countries, namely through the training of the Ulamas from West Africa, and the expansion of cultural and educational programs of the Moroccan Agency of International Cooperation (AMCI). The new Moroccan African agenda has successfully implemented new cooperation corridors and pathways of South–South cooperation, with Morocco orienting its economic and diplomatic priorities toward the continent. However, what has been revealed through the aftermath of the AFCON shows the complexity and fragility of the construction of a shared African agenda and a rooted continental divide.
Therefore, active and swift intervention is necessary to provide remedial and preventative measures. While Morocco should continue to strengthen cooperation pathways and diplomatic ties with African states, the kingdom should also actively challenge the racist narratives inherited from the past. A genuine reconciliation should start with the reform of the educational system, to revisit the construction of race and otherness, and to critically challenge preconceived notions and perceptions.

Ibtissame Bourhnane
Ibtissame Bourhnane is a doctoral researcher at the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Migrations (CEDEM) and a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Liège. She has previously completed her master’s degree at the Mohammed VI Polytechnic University where she earned a master’s degree in Global Affairs in 2025. Ibtissame also holds a bachelor's degree in international studies, with a concentration in International Cooperation and Development and a minor in African Studies. Ibtissame has been engaged in topics related to migration since her senior capstone at Al Akhawayn University, where she studied the impact of migration policies in Morocco on maternal health among sub-Saharan migrant women. For her PhD project, Ibtissame is investigating the different survival strategies that African migrants adopt to navigate conditions of precarity and policy stagnation in conditions of voluntary immobility in Morocco.
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