Multilevel order? Rethinking regional cooperation in Central Asia

On 30 April 1994, an agreement was signed between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan to create a Common Economic Space for the "free movement of goods, services, capital, labor and ensures coordinated credit, settlement, budget, customs and currency policies". This marked the beginning of the Central Asian Union (CAU). Within the framework of the CAU, political cooperation intensified and in 1995, the Interstate Council established its heads of state, along with the Council of Prime Ministers, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Council of Defense Ministers. A decision was also made to create the Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development (CABCD). However, the process did not progress far as the CAU only existed until 1998. After the accession of Tajikistan, in 1998, the CAU transformed into the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC).

In 2001, the CAEC became the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) and with this transformation the original economic focus shifted to one of stability and peacekeeping in the region. However, the institutional framework did not achieve its initial goals, and, most importantly, a single market was never established. In line with the decision to include Russia in CACO, the organization merged with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in 2005, resulting in its dissolution. The first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, attempted to resume regional integration efforts, but his initiative did not receive support, particularly from the then President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov. Only under the new Uzbek President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, did the Central Asian region become a key priority of the Uzbekistan’s foreign policy.

Since 2016, Central Asian cooperation is being maintained through regular consultative meetings between its heads of state. The first such summit took place in 2018 in Astana, Kazakhstan, followed by the second in 2019 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In 2022, the fourth meeting of the heads of Central Asia took place in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, where an agreement "On friendship, good-neighborliness and cooperation between the republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for the development of Central Asia in the 21st century" was signed. In August 2024, Astana hosted the sixth consultative meeting of the region’s heads of state, during which the states signed the Concept for the Development of Regional Cooperation "Central Asia-2040".

Although these consultative meetings have become regular and symbolically important, they have a non-binding character and serve mostly as a platform for regional dialogue. Most of the meeting’s resulting documents are drawn up in the form of joint statements or conceptual documents, meaning that their implementation is voluntary. Moreover, these summits are highly centralized, as they involve only heads of state and their close diplomatic circles. Civil society and independent experts are largely excluded from this process.

Thirty-four years after gaining independence, the Central Asian states have not developed regionality due to the lack of integration among them, although in political discourse it is common to highlight the “five” countries as a region (for instance, formats such as "C5+1" – Central Asian countries and the USA; "5+1" – Central Asia and the Russian Federation; "EU - Central Asia" – in the form of summits; "China + Central Asia", etc.). This regionality, created from the outside, can be seen as part of the "New Great Game".

Central Asian states are also members of several regional and transregional organizations. These include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). While memberships in these regional organizations offer opportunities for multilateral cooperation, they are largely driven by external powers (the SCO led by China, the EAEU and CSTO by Russia, the OIC by Arab states, and the OTS led by Turkey). Thus, there is no sole regional organization comprising only five Central Asian countries. So far, neither the mechanisms for implementing the accepted treaties between the countries nor the coordination of customs, tax, and budget policies have been regulated. This raises the question: can or will Central Asia move toward integrated regionalism, or is it just another form of regional cooperation?

Classic integration-oriented regionalism (modeled on the EU) would expect the region to establish a formal institutional organization. However, the case of Central Asia can probably be described as a non-Western or non-institutional form of regional "multilevel order". The consultative summits, bilateral agreements, and issue-specific cooperation on water, energy, border security are all examples of order-making practices. Such regional order does not require formal regionalism. This approach helps explain why Central Asia, despite the absence of regional institutions, still demonstrates patterns of coordination. An order may be normative (aimed at stability and coexistence), yet it is not necessarily prescriptive, as is often the case with regionalism. This is especially true in Central Asia, where external factors often promote regionalism as a political goal (C5+1 formats, etc.), while local leaders prefer pragmatic diplomacy that preserves state sovereignty. While Central Asia’s lack of formal integration is considered a failure by the Western model of regionalism, this lens of "multilevel order" helps to interpret it as a region-specific mode of governance.

Regional cooperation in Central Asia does not follow the traditional path of formal integration. Instead, the region exhibits a form of "multilevel order" with a system shaped by informal summit meetings, bilateral agreements, and membership in externally led organizations. Rather than viewing this lack of strong institutions as a setback, one can see it as a region-specific way of order-making. Rethinking regionalism through this lens allows us to better understand how the Central Asian states navigate complex geopolitical realities through coordination, coexistence, and strategic autonomy.

The consultative meetings of the leaders of Central Asia demonstrate their willingness and ability to cooperate independently from external powers. Central Asia can move forward toward regional cooperation on its own, but not toward deeper institutionalized integration in the near future. This is unlikely due to different foreign policy vectors, strong desire to preserve state sovereignty, and concerns regarding shifts in the balance of power. Therefore, such cooperation should not be viewed as competition with other regional organizations such as the CSTO or SCO, but rather as complementary. A regional institution, if established, should focus on building bridges, not walls, with the outside world.