PhD Andreas Pehr

Since the 1950s, theorists of federalism stated several assumptions when it comes to the impact of federalism on state's performance. Yet, for most of these facets, according empirics finally proving these quite meaningful associations are still missing (cf. Treisman 2000, Bednar/Eskridge/Ferejohn 2001, Gerring/Thacker 2004, Voigt/Blume 2010, Uttermark 2019).

One of the most influential arguments in this respect concerns the superiority of federalism in economics. Numerous considerations suggest the advantage of a federal setting in comparsion to unitarist systems due to better information, fiscal equivalence, higher decentralization, et cetera. Similar arguements are made regarding the satisfaction of citizens towards federal governance. Since federal decision-makers are "closer" to their citizens and their problems than in unitarist orders, tailored policies and pertinent political answers are more likely. In contrary, social welfare may be less developed in federations, because the number of veto players and a potential race-to-the-bottom hinders generous social spending.

Empirical works came to divergent conclusions and to handle various shortcomings in terms of a thorough analysis. This project aims to overcome these difficulties and applies a mixed-methods approach as well as integrates new data sources. Via multivariat panel regressions and qualitative instruments the study attempts to resolve the relationship of federalism and the three before-mentioned research objects.

Elazar once said that federal theory must be validated by practical results. This is the very principle the study attempts to fulfill. It shall contribute to the broad literature with empirical evidence and deliver the "ultimate" answer to the questions raised in federal thought.